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Husband’s Contribution to Purchase of Home by Wife’s Parents Constituted a Constructive Trust

In a divorce action, the Second Department affirmed Supreme Court’s determination that the husband’s [Henn’s] contribution toward the purchase of a house constituted a constructive trust.  The parties separated before Henn moved into the home.  The wife’s [Tyree’s] parents [the Raffas] contributed some money and purchased the home for Henn and Tyree, both of whom also contributed funds toward the purchase.  In concluding Henn’s contribution constituted a constructive trust, the court wrote:

Here, the Supreme Court correctly found that the first element relevant to imposing a constructive trust was satisfied, as Henn and the Raffas were related through marriage and they pooled their resources to purchase the subject premises … . Henn satisfied the second element by demonstrating that the Raffas implicitly promised to convey the premises to him and Tyree … . He satisfied the third element, which requires a showing that he acted in reliance on the promise, by establishing that he gave $58,500 to Samuel J. Raffa, and that Samuel J. Raffa used that money to purchase the premises … . As for the fourth element, which requires a showing of unjust enrichment flowing from the breach of the promise, the evidence adduced at trial established that Henn never moved into the premises or acquired a legal interest therein. To the contrary, he and Tyree separated the very month that the premises were acquired by the Raffas, and Tyree commenced this divorce action just a few months later. The Raffas remained the sole owners of the premises, and they did not return Henn’s $58,500. In view of this evidence, there is no basis upon which to disturb the Supreme Court’s determination… . Tyree v Henn, 2013 NY Slip Op 05895, 2nd Dept 9-18-13

 

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