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Denial of Parole Supported by Evidence

In reversing Supreme Court, the Second Department determined the Parole Board’s denial of parole was not arbitrary and capricious.  After noting that the 2011 amendments to Executive Law 259-c(4) did not apply retroactively, the court wrote:

…[T]he Supreme Court erred in concluding that the Parole Board’s determination was arbitrary and capricious … . Although the Parole Board’s primary focus in denying parole was the nature of the crime committed, the Parole Board also looked at the petitioner’s institutional record … . The Parole Board “need not expressly discuss each of [the statutory guidelines] in its determination” …, and it was not “required specifically to articulate every factor considered” … . Whether the Parole Board considered the proper factors and followed the proper guidelines are questions that should be assessed based on the “written determination . . . evaluated in the context of the parole hearing transcript” … . Here, the hearing transcript indicates that the Parole Board gave due consideration to a number of factors that reflected well on the petitioner, but that these factors did not outweigh those factors that militated against granting parole. Matter of Fraser v Evans, 2013 NY slip Op 05900, 2nd Dept 9-18-13

 

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