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Questions of Fact Raised Whether Negligent Diversion of Water by Private Property Owner and Negligent Repair by Town Caused Dangerous Icy- Road-Condition; Defendant Driver Lost Control of Her Car on the Ice and Collided with Plaintiffs

The Second Department determined that questions of fact existed about whether defendant abutting property owner (Gromley) and the defendant town created the icy road condition that caused defendant driver to lose control of her car, thereby allegedly injuring the plaintiffs in a collision with the school bus in which plaintiffs were riding:

A private landowner may be liable for injuries sustained in a car accident that is proximately caused by an ice condition occurring on an abutting public roadway, where that ice condition was caused and created by the artificial diversion of naturally flowing water from the private landowner’s property onto the public roadway… . … [T]he plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the artificially diverted water from the Gormley defendants’ property contributed to the ice condition on the subject roadway that caused [defendant driver] to lose control of her car and collide with the school bus… . * * *

…[T]he plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the Town affirmatively created the condition through an act of its own negligence, and whether the Town’s negligence at the time the road was repaired immediately resulted in the existence of the hazardous condition … . Cebron v Tuncoglu, 2013 NY slip Op 05729, 2nd Dept 8-28-13

 

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