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Supreme Court Does Not Have the Power to Dismiss a Complaint for Delay in Prosecution Absent 90-Notice (CPLR 3216)

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court’s dismissal of a complaint based on delay in prosecuting the action because the 90-day demand (CPLR 3216) had not been served on the plaintiff.  The First Department wrote:

CPLR 3216 permits a court to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute only after the court or the defendant has served the plaintiff with a written demand requiring the plaintiff to resume prosecution of the action and to serve and file a note of issue within 90 days after receipt of the demand, and also stating that the failure to comply with the demand will serve as the basis for a motion to dismiss the action. Here, the Supreme Court did not possess the power to dismiss this pre-note of issue action on the ground of a general lack of prosecution since the plaintiff had not received a 90-day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216(b) requiring the plaintiff to serve and file a note of issue … .  Armouth-Levy v New York City, 2013 NY Slip Op 05551, 2nd Dept, 8-7-13

 

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