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Exclusion of Defense Counsel’s Colleague from a Wade Hearing Deprived Defendant of His Right to a Public Trial

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, reversed a conviction finding the defendant was denied his right to a public trial. To protect the undercover officer and others, the defendant was excluded from the Wade hearing concerning the validity of the undercover officer’s identification of the defendant.  The trial court, in ordering partial closure of the courtroom, had allowed defense counsel, and colleagues of defense counsel, to be present during the hearing. During the hearing, defense counsel’s officemate was denied entry to the courtroom by the court officer stationed at the door, who had consulted with the sergeant inside the courtroom.  The First Department determined the exclusion of the defendant from the hearing was proper, but the exclusion of the attorney required reversal.  The court wrote:

Here, the undercover was the critical witness, and excluding defense counsel’s colleague from the courtroom during this time was not inconsequential. Furthermore, defense counsel explained that the excluded attorney was his officemate, with whom he had consulted about the case. The court also acknowledged that the excluded attorney had substantial experience in criminal defense cases. Although there would have been a problem even if the attorney had no such experience or connection to the case, the exclusion here was particularly troubling because defense counsel alerted the court that his colleagues might be coming, and the excluded attorney could have been of assistance to defense counsel during this critical phase of the trial … .  *  *  *

…[T]he exclusion of defense counsel’s colleague interfered with the very purpose of the requirement of a public trial. The requirement that the courtroom be open whenever possible and that closure orders be narrowly tailored “is for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions” …. Excluding defense counsel’s experienced colleague, who was familiar with the case, deprived defendant of his right to have this person present to assess the undercover’s testimony, and enabled the People to present the undercover’s testimony without the salutary effects of extra scrutiny.  People v Moise, 2013 NY Slip Op 05550, 1st Dept, 8-6-13

 

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