You are here: / COURTROOM CLOSURES

Tag Archive for: COURTROOM CLOSURES

Exclusion of Defendant’s Brother from the Courtroom Based Upon the Fear of a Testifying Witness Was Proper, Despite Lack of Express Findings by Trial Judge

The First Department determined the exclusion of a single spectator (defendant’s brother) during the testimony of a witness was proper, despite the absence of express findings by the trial judge. The witness expressed her fear of defendant’s brother. The court explained the analytical criteria:

The People established an overriding interest that warranted a courtroom closure that was limited to the exclusion of a single spectator during the testimony of a single witness … . Contrary to defendant’s arguments, the witness articulated a specific fear of testifying in the presence of defendant’s brother, and we find that this fear justified the limited closure … . The trial court was in the best position to determine whether the witness’ expression of fear rose to a level justifying the closure. We note that the court was aware of the brother’s approach to a different witness. Although “a timely objection . . . would have permitted the court to rectify the situation instantly by making express findings” …, defendant made no such objection, and thus did not preserve his complaint that the court failed to set forth express findings of fact to justify the exclusion of defendant’s brother. Accordingly, we decline to review this claim in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find that the court’s ruling “implicitly adopted the People’s particularized showing” and was “specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered” .. . People v Williams, 2015 NY Slip Op 07335, 1st Dept 10-8-15

 

Exclusion of Alleged Gang Members from Courtroom During Testimony of Fearful Witness Was Proper

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly closed the courtroom to alleged gang members during the testimony of a witness who indicated she was afraid of the gang members. The Second Department explained the relevant criteria:

In order to comport with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, a courtroom closure must satisfy a four-prong standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Waller v Georgia: (1) “the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced,” (2) “the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest,” (3) “the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding,” and (4) “it must make findings adequate to support the closure” (Waller v Georgia, 467 US at 48…).

Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, the trial court’s partial closure of the courtroom during the testimony of the eyewitness to the stabbing by excluding a certain group of men from the courtroom was not error. The witness, who had entered the courthouse from a side entrance and had remained secluded in a room not accessible to the public before entering the courtroom, wore a hat pulled down low over her face and a hoodie into the courtroom and immediately requested a recess upon entering the courtroom and then refused to testify. Upon hearing the witness express her fear of testifying because of certain men in the audience whom she identified as affiliated with the defendant and belonging to a particular gang, the court conducted a closed courtroom hearing to ascertain the nature of the witness’s fear and its effect upon her ability to testify in open court. The witness named one of the men and testified that she knew each of the men from her neighborhood, that they were members of a gang with which the defendant was affiliated, that the gang was a rival gang to the one in which her boyfriend was involved, and there had been prior violent altercations between the men in the courtroom and the witness’s boyfriend. The witness testified that she believed that the men would attempt to kill her if she testified against the defendant. Further, she testified that one of the men made eye contact with her and shook his head at her in the courtroom, which she interpreted as a threat not to testify. The witness was very frightened by the idea that the men, who already knew her name, would now know her face. The evidence of the witness’s extreme fear of testifying in open court before the men, her refusal to do so, the trial court’s observations that, based upon the witness’s demeanor, the fear was genuine, together with the fact that, although approximately 15 or so people were present during the stabbing of the decedent, the witness was the only person to come forward to the police, constitutes sufficient proof to establish an overriding interest that was likely to be prejudiced unless the courtroom was closed to the individuals of whom the witness was fearful … . In addition, the scope of the closure was no broader than was necessary. The exclusions were limited to the men identified by the witness as causing her fear, and their exclusion was limited to the duration of her testimony … . Furthermore, the trial court explored the possibility of limiting the courtroom exclusion to only the individual who had shaken his head at the witness, but the witness indicated that her fear would not be abated if the other men she recognized remained in the courtroom. Accordingly, this record shows that the trial court, in directing the exclusion at issue, determined that no lesser alternative would protect the interest at stake … . People v Dawson, 2015 NY Slip Op 05959, 2nd Dept 7-8-15

 

, ,

Defense Counsel’s Absence When Judge Decided to Replace a Sick Juror Not Preserved by Objection/Court Need Not Put on the Record Its Consideration of Alternatives to Courtroom Closure/Factual Allegations Insufficient to Justify a Suppression Hearing

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, over a dissent, determined defense counsel’s absence from the courtroom when the judge put on the record that he was replacing a sick juror was not a mode of proceedings error and was not preserved by objection. Defense counsel entered the courtroom just as the judge seated the alternate juror and did not object. The Court of Appeals also determined the trial judge was not required to put on the record his consideration of measures other than the closure of the courtroom when undercover officers testified, and sufficient facts were not raised in the defense motion papers to justify a suppression hearing:

Here, although defense counsel was not present in court while the judge was stating on the record that he intended to replace the sick juror and counsel for co-defendant was objecting to that replacement, the record shows that prior to arriving in the courtroom, counsel was aware from his discussion with the court that there was a sick juror and that the court had previously excused an alternate juror for psychological reasons. Most importantly, defense counsel was in the courtroom when the judge told the alternate to take the seat of the sick juror. If counsel had any objection to the replacement of the juror, including a desire to be heard further on the issue, he had the time and the opportunity to make his position known. It was incumbent upon him to raise an objection at that time, before the trial proceeded. Certainly, the better practice would have been for the trial judge to await counsel’s arrival before placing his decision regarding the juror on the record. While, as the dissent notes, defense counsel was absent during the on-the-record discussion about dismissing the juror, nonetheless, counsel was present at the critical time when the sick juror was being replaced by the alternate, and counsel did not raise any objection concerning the right to counsel or otherwise, at a time when the trial court had the opportunity to change course. * * *

… [T]his Court has rejected the argument that United States Supreme Court precedent requires a trial court to explain, on the record, the alternatives to closure that it considered (People v Echevarria, 21 NY3d 1, 18 [2013]; People v Ramos, 90 NY2d 490, 504 [1997]). Rather, we have concluded that where the record establishes, as it does here, the need to close a portion of the proceedings, “it can be implied that the trial court, in ordering closure, determined that no lesser alternative would protect the articulated interest”… . * * *

… [D]efendant’s simple denial that he was not engaged in any criminal conduct at the time he was stopped did not raise any issue of fact requiring a [suppression] hearing. It was defendant’s role in the conspiracy … and his conduct … at the time of the purchase of the kilogram of cocaine that provided probable cause to arrest him. Under those circumstances, it was incumbent upon defendant to refute the allegations in order to obtain a hearing. People v Garay, 2015 NY Slip Op 02672, CtApp 3-31-15

 

, ,

Criteria for Balancing the Need for a Public Trial and First Amendment Rights (Freedom of the Press) With the Defendant’s Right to a Fair Trial Discussed in Some Detail—Here the Court’s Sealing of Some Records and Closures of the Courtroom Reflected a Proper Discretionary Balance

The First Department, in a detailed decision, determined Supreme Court had properly balanced the requirement that a criminal trial be open to the public and the defendant’s right to a fair trial.  Because the court properly used its discretion to balance the two concerns neither mandamus nor prohibition was an available remedy.  The decision is worth reading—many of the issues discussed are not noted here:

The First Amendment guarantees the public and the press a qualified right of access to criminal trials … . This right must be kept in balance with the compelling interest of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and the right to privacy of prospective jurors … . The public’s right of access may be limited where there is a compelling governmental interest and closure is narrowly tailored to serve that interest … .

New York’s approach to courtroom closure is “comparable to the federal analysis” … . The press is not imbued with any special right of access, and while it possesses “the same right of access as the public,” it has no right to information about a trial that is “greater” or “superior” to that of the general public … . A ” trial judge has an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity'” … . Decisions to seal or disclose records fall within the inherent power of the court to control the records of its own proceedings … . While a court must guarantee that the defendant receives a fair trial, it must do so in a manner that balances the interests of “the defendant, jurors, witnesses, attorneys and the public at large” … . Matter of Daily News, L.P. v Wiley, 2015 NY Slip Op 02010, 3rd Dept 3-12-15

 

,

Rebuttal Evidence Re: a Defense that Was Not Asserted Should Not Have Been Allowed (Harmless Error)/Partial Closure of Courtroom During Testimony of Undercover Officers Proper

The First Department, over a dissent, determined that, although Supreme Court erred when it allowed the prosecution to reopen its case to present rebuttal evidence, the error was harmless in this bench trial. Defense counsel had mentioned an agency defense to the drug-sale charge, but then explained that the only defense raised at trial was defendant’s complete noninvolvement. Under those circumstances evidence rebutting the agency defense, which was never asserted, should not have been allowed. The First Department also held that Supreme Court properly closed the courtroom during the testimony of undercover officers.  With regard to the partial closure of the courtroom, the First Department wrote:

The Hinton hearing court, which closed the courtroom for the testimony of two undercover officers and which offered to permit family members or other persons designated by defendant to enter, properly exercised its discretion in rejecting defense counsel’s proposal that a court officer screen members of the general public who sought to enter during the testimony. The court concluded that this suggestion would have been impracticable because there was no additional court officer available to be posted outside the courtroom, and because in any event the officer would frequently have to interrupt the testimony to report the presence of persons seeking to enter. Therefore, under the circumstances presented, defendant’s proposal was not a “reasonable alternative[] to closing the proceeding” … . People v Mallard, 2015 NY Slip Op 01882, 1st Dept 3-10-15

 

Courtroom Properly Closed During Testimony of Undercover Office

The First Department determined the trial court properly closed the courtroom and excluded defendant’s sister from the courtroom during the testimony of  the undercover officer:

…[T]he evidence established the type of overriding interest warranting the limited closure of the courtroom that has been upheld … . The undercover officer’s testimony at the hearing supported the court’s finding that testifying at trial in an open courtroom would compromise his undercover work and jeopardize his and his family’s safety … . The officer testified that he had been working undercover for four years, that he was on active duty and bought drugs for buy and bust arrests three or four times per week, and that he had made about 10 purchases near where he bought the drugs from defendant. The officer further testified that several of his investigations were ongoing, that certain targets remained at large, that he had been verbally threatened while working undercover, and that he took numerous precautions to conceal his identity when he had to testify in court. The court’s decision to exclude defendant’s sister, who lived within two blocks of the location where the officer bought drugs from defendant and where he continued to work undercover, is consistent with our prior holdings … . The officer testified that he was concerned that defendant’s sister might expose his identity. * * *

…[A]s the Court of Appeals has held, where the record in a buy-and-bust case “makes no mention of alternatives but is otherwise sufficient to establish the need to close the particular proceeding . . . it can be implied that the trial court, in ordering closure, determined that no lesser alternative would protect the articulated interest” … . People v Johnson, 2014 NY Slip Op 02510, 1st Dept 4-10-14

 

Partial Closure of Courtroom During Testimony of Undercover Police Okay

he Second Department determined partial closure of the courtroom during the testimony of undercover police detectives was proper:

…[T]he court providently adopted a reasonable alternative to full closure of the courtroom, excluding the general public and allowing the defendant’s sister and the defendant’s friend to be present during the testimony of the two undercover detectives, and placing a blackboard in front of the detectives so as to shield their identities from the sister and the friend. The two undercover detectives testified at a Hinton hearing … that they had conducted a long-term undercover operation in the particular housing project where the defendant had been arrested, and that there were unapprehended or “lost” subjects from that investigation. Further, they both testified that they had been threatened by subjects in the past and their safety would be jeopardized if their identities were revealed, that they both planned to conduct future narcotics operations in the area and that one detective planned to return to the particular housing project, that they currently had pending cases in the courthouse in which they were testifying, and that they took special precautions when testifying in court so as to protect their identities. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, this testimony exceeded mere “unparticularized impressions of the vicissitudes of undercover narcotics work in general” and included particularized references to their own work which established a specific link between their safety concerns and open-court testimony in this case … . People v Tate, 2013 NY Slip Op 06882, 2nd Dept 10-23-13

 

,

Exclusion of Defense Counsel’s Colleague from a Wade Hearing Deprived Defendant of His Right to a Public Trial

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, reversed a conviction finding the defendant was denied his right to a public trial. To protect the undercover officer and others, the defendant was excluded from the Wade hearing concerning the validity of the undercover officer’s identification of the defendant.  The trial court, in ordering partial closure of the courtroom, had allowed defense counsel, and colleagues of defense counsel, to be present during the hearing. During the hearing, defense counsel’s officemate was denied entry to the courtroom by the court officer stationed at the door, who had consulted with the sergeant inside the courtroom.  The First Department determined the exclusion of the defendant from the hearing was proper, but the exclusion of the attorney required reversal.  The court wrote:

Here, the undercover was the critical witness, and excluding defense counsel’s colleague from the courtroom during this time was not inconsequential. Furthermore, defense counsel explained that the excluded attorney was his officemate, with whom he had consulted about the case. The court also acknowledged that the excluded attorney had substantial experience in criminal defense cases. Although there would have been a problem even if the attorney had no such experience or connection to the case, the exclusion here was particularly troubling because defense counsel alerted the court that his colleagues might be coming, and the excluded attorney could have been of assistance to defense counsel during this critical phase of the trial … .  *  *  *

…[T]he exclusion of defense counsel’s colleague interfered with the very purpose of the requirement of a public trial. The requirement that the courtroom be open whenever possible and that closure orders be narrowly tailored “is for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions” …. Excluding defense counsel’s experienced colleague, who was familiar with the case, deprived defendant of his right to have this person present to assess the undercover’s testimony, and enabled the People to present the undercover’s testimony without the salutary effects of extra scrutiny.  People v Moise, 2013 NY Slip Op 05550, 1st Dept, 8-6-13

 

Okay to Close Portion of Trial to Public to Protect Safety of Undercover Officers

As the Court of Appeals explained, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Graffeo, the issue and ruling:

“The primary issue in each of these buy-and-bust cases is whether the trial court properly closed the courtroom to the general public during the testimony of undercover officers. We conclude that the limited closures comported with Sixth Amendment public trial principles…”. In each of the three cases before the court, the trial judge closed the trial to the public when the undercover officers testified to protect the officers’ safety. Whether the officers’ safety would be jeopardized by testimony in open court must be demonstrated in a hearing. The court explained the applicable law and findings as follows: The United States Supreme Court has explained that a courtroom closure must satisfy a four-part standard to comport with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment: “[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure” (Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39, 48 [1984]). Only the first prong (overriding interest) and third prong (reasonable alternatives) are at issue in these cases. * * * …[T[he trial court in each instance held a … hearing and made a particularized finding that requiring the undercover officers to testify in open court would create a genuine risk to their physical safety. The trial courts limited the closures to the portions of the proceedings directly implicating the overriding interest — the undercover officers’ safety — by ordering the courtrooms closed only for the duration of the officers’ testimony. People v Echevarria, et al, Nos 59, 60, 61, CtApp, 4- 30-13

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy