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Repugnant Verdict Required Reversal

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, reversed defendant’s conviction of manslaughter in the first degree as a hate crime as inconsistent with defendant’s acquittal of manslaughter in the first degree (without the hate crime element).  The Fourth Department wrote:

“A verdict is inconsistent or repugnant . . . where the defendant is convicted of an offense containing an essential element that the jury has found the defendant did not commit” … .  “A verdict shall be set aside as repugnant only when it is inherently inconsistent when viewed in light of the elements of each crime as charged to the jury” …, “without regard to the accuracy of those instructions” … .  “The underlying purpose of this rule is to ensure that an individual is not convicted of ‘a crime on which the jury has actually found that the defendant did not commit an essential element, whether it be one element or all’ ” ….

By acquitting defendant of manslaughter in the first degree, the jury necessarily found that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one element of manslaughter in the first degree.  To find defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree as a hate crime, however, the jury must have found that the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of manslaughter in the first degree, plus the added element that defendant selected the victim due to his sexual orientation.  It therefore follows that the verdict is inconsistent.  People v DeLee, 419, 4th Dept 7-19-13

 

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