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Custody Grant to Grandmother, Rather than Father, Okay

After mother had been found to have neglected her child, the Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, affirmed the grant of custody to grandmother, as opposed to father:

“It is fundamental that a biological parent has a claim of custody of his or her child, superior to that of all others, in the absence of surrender, abandonment, persistent neglect, unfitness, disruption of custody over an  extended period of  time  or other  extraordinary circumstances”….    The relevant factors to be considered in determining whether extraordinary circumstances exist include “‘the length of time the child has lived with the nonparent, the quality of that relationship and the length of time the biological parent allowed such custody to continue without trying to assume the primary parental role'”… .   It is the nonparent’s burden to establish extraordinary circumstances …and, when that burden is met, custody is determined based upon the child’s best interests…. Matter of Marcus CC v Erica BB…, 514433, 3rd Dept, 6-20-13

 

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