You are here: / / Nature of Declaratory Judgment and Doctrine of Ripeness Explained

Nature of Declaratory Judgment and Doctrine of Ripeness Explained

In affirming the result in an Article 78/declaratory judgment proceeding which unsuccessfully challenged the Department of Environmental Conservation’s finding that petitioner had violated statutory and regulatory provisions relating to the application of pesticide, the Fourth Department explained the principles underlying a declaratory judgment action and the doctrine of ripeness:

Petitioners sought a declaration of the rights of the parties with respect to a 2002 consent order, and also sought further declarations that petitioners had the right to obtain waivers of the right to notification of the approximate dates upon which petitioners would apply products to the property of other customers. Pursuant to CPLR 3001, “[t]he supreme court may render a declaratory judgment . .. as to the rights and other legal relations of the parties to a justiciable controversy.” “A declaratory judgment action thus ‘requires an actual controversy between genuine disputants with a stake in the outcome,’ and may not be used as ‘a vehicle for an advisory opinion’ ” … . Here, the court, with the consent of the DEC, dismissed all charges related to alleged violations of the 2002 consent order, and thus no active controversy remained with respect to it.  *  *  *

The test for ripeness is well settled, to wit, a determination must be final before it is subject to judicial review (see CPLR 7801 [1]). “In order to determine whether an agency determination is final, a two-part test is applied. ‘First, the agency must have reached a definitive position on the issue that inflicts actual, concrete injury and[,] second, the injury inflicted may not be prevented or significantly ameliorated by further administrative action or by steps available to the complaining party’ ” … .  Matter of Green Thumb Lawn Care, Inc v Iwanowicz…, 372, 4th Dept, 6-7-13

 

You might also like
Failure to Inform Defendant of the Period of Postrelease Supervision Required Reversal in the Absence of an Objection
IN THIS COMBINED ARTICLE 78 AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION, THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE TO ARTICLE 78 DID NOT APPLY TO THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION WHICH ONLY INVOLVED PRIVATE PARTIES, NOT A GOVERNMENT BODY OR OFFICER (FOURTH DEPT).
PROOF OF STANDING DID NOT MEET CRITERIA OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED.
The Striking Down (by the Court of Appeals) of a Retroactive Zoning Ordinance Which Prohibited the Operation of a Landfill Did Not Require the Striking Down of a Subsequent Health and Safety Regulation Which Had the Same Effect
ALTHOUGH THE DRIVER’S MOTHER HAD PURCHASED AND INSURED THE CAR AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, THE SELLER’S REGISTRATION PLATES WERE STILL ON THE CAR, THE SELLER WAS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING OWNERSHIP (FOURTH DEPT).
THE LANGUAGE IN THE HIPAA FORM, INDICATING PLAINTIFF’S PHYSICIAN MAY BUT IS NOT OBLIGATED TO SPEAK WITH DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY, WAS PROPERLY APPROVED BY SUPREME COURT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S LAWSUIT AGAINST DEFENDANT NURSING HOME, WHICH APPARENTLY ALLEGED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS NEGLIGENTLY EXPOSED TO COVID-19, WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY THE “EMERGENCY OR DISASTER TREATMENT PROTECTION ACT” OR THE “FEDERAL PUBLIC READINESS AND EMERGENCY ACT” (FOURTH DEPT).
Jurisdiction Was Gained Over Out-of State Manufacturer Under Two Provisions of CPLR 302

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Question of Fact Raised in Rear-End Collision Case Attempt to Deny Visitation to Incarcerated Mother Denied