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Attempt to Deny Visitation to Incarcerated Mother Denied

In affirming Family Court’s denial of grandmother’s (the child’s primary physical custodian’s) petition to suspend the child’s visitation with mother, who is incarcerated, the Fourth Department wrote:

Even assuming, arguendo, that the grandmother established “ ‘a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant an inquiry into whether the best interests of the [child] warranted a change in custody’ ”…, we conclude that, contrary to the grandmother’s contention, visitation with the mother at the correctional facility is in the child’s best interests.

There is a presumption that visitation with the noncustodial parent is in thechild’s best interests…, and a “parent’s incarceration, by itself, does not vitiate” that presumption….“Unless there is a compelling reason or substantial evidence that visitation with an incarcerated parent is detrimental to a child’s welfare, such visitation should not be” suspended ….    We conclude that the grandmother failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that visitation with the mother would be detrimental to the child, and thus she did not overcome the presumption that visitation with the mother is in the child’s best interests… .  Matter of Cormier v Clarke…, 409, 4th Dept, 6-7-13

 

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