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Sexual Assault by Son of Homeowners Not an Insured “Occurrence” Under Homeowners’ Insurance Policy

The Second Department determined a sexual assault allegedly perpetrated by the son of the homeowners was not an insured “occurrence” within the meaning of the homeowners’ insurance policy:

Here, Joseph M. allegedly was insured under a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by the plaintiff to his parents, which provided personal liability coverage for claims made against an insured for damages because of bodily injury caused by an “occurrence.” The policy defined the term “occurrence” as “an accident . . . which result[ed] in . . . bodily injury.”   The complaint in the underlying action alleged that the plaintiff in that action sustained bodily injury due to a sexual assault perpetrated by Joseph M. Since the bodily injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff in the underlying action were inherent in the conduct that Joseph M. allegedly engaged in, the alleged sexual assault cannot be construed as an accident within the definition of “occurrence” for which the plaintiff’s policy affords coverage … . State Farm Fire and Cas Co v Joseph M, 2013 NY Slip Op 03318, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

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