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Car Dealership Was Not the Owner of a Car Lent to a Customer While Customer’s Vehicle Was Repaired—Therefore Dealership Was Not Vicariously Liable for Injury Caused by the Driver of the Loaned Car

In reversing the motion court and granting summary judgment to defendant car dealership, the Fourth Department (over a dissent) determined that defendant dealership was not the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident, and therefore could not be held vicariously liable under Vehicle and Traffic Law 388.  Defendant’s employee (the daughter of the owner) agreed to lend her personal car to one Leederman while Leederman’s vehicle was being fixed at the dealership.  All of defendant’s “loaner cars” were in use and the dealership’s owner asked his daughter to lend her car to Leederman.  Leederman, in turn, let defendant Trummer use the car.  Trummer was driving when the accident occurred.  The Fourth Department wrote:

Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, an owner of a motor vehicle is vicariously liable for the negligent use or operation of such vehicle by anyone operating the vehicle with the owner’s express or implied permission (see § 388 [1] …).The term “owner” is defined as “[a] person, other than a lien holder, having the property in or title to a vehicle . . . The term includes a person entitled to the use and possession of a vehicle . . . subject to a security interest in another person and also includes any lessee or bailee of a motor vehicle . . . having the exclusive use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period greater than thirty days” (§ 128; see § 388 [3]).

We agree with defendant that it established as a matter of law that it was not the owner of the vehicle involved in the motor vehicle accident at issue, and that plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to ownership of that vehicle.  Monette v Trummer, et al, CA 12-01274, 79, 4th Dept, 4-26-13

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