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Attorney General’s Medicaid Fraud Control Unit Was Authorized Under Both State and Federal Law to Prosecute a Case Stemming from the Provision of Federal Medicare Services

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Fahey, the Fourth Department determined that the Attorney General’s Medicaid Fraud Control Unit was authorized, pursuant to Executive Law 63, to prosecute the defendants, who provided federal Medicare services exclusively but received payment from both Medicare and Medicaid.  In addition, the Fourth Department determined that the federal statute which created the state Medicaid Fraud Control Units, and which allows the state Medicaid Fraud Control Units to prosecute federal Medicare violations only where the prosecution as a whole is “primarily related to the state [Medicaid] plan,” did not preempt Executive Law 63 as it was applied in this case.  People v Miran, KA 12-01189, 319, 4th Dept, 4-26-13

 

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