You are here: / / Sentences for Underlying Felony and Bail Jumping Must Be Consecutive Absent...

Sentences for Underlying Felony and Bail Jumping Must Be Consecutive Absent Mitigating Factors that Bear Directly on the Manner the Crime Was Committed

In finding the sentencing court used the wrong “mitigating” factors to determine whether the sentence for bail jumping could run concurrently with the sentence for the underlying felony, the Third Department wrote:

Penal Law § 70.25 (2-c) restricts a court’s sentencing discretion when a person who is convicted of bail jumping in the second  degree  also is convicted of the underlying felony in connection with which he or she had been released on bail. Specifically, if indeterminate sentences are imposed upon both the bail jumping charge and the underlying felony, the bail jumping sentence must run consecutively to the other sentence unless the court “finds mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed” (Penal Law § 70.25 [2-c]…).  Here, County Court sought to justify concurrent sentences based upon “the severe penalties, fines, restrictions and state prison sentence [defendant was] earning by [his] antisocial behavior of drinking and driving and failing to come to court, and because [he had pleaded] guilty . . . and waived appeal in another county.” However, these factors have no bearing upon the manner in which the crime was committed … and, therefore, do not support imposing concurrent sentences in this case.  People v Harrison, 105176, 3rd Dept 4-18-22

 

You might also like
IN A TAYLOR LAW ARBITRATION, WHERE THE PARTIES CHOOSE THE ARBITRATORS, THE PARTIALITY OF A CHOSEN ARBITRATOR, WITHOUT MORE, IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION (THIRD DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT’S CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY, COMMON-LAW INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).
HEARING OFFICER SHOULD HAVE INQUIRED FURTHER INTO INMATE’S REFUSAL TO TESTIFY IN PETITIONER’S HEARING, NEW HEARING ORDERED.
“Presumption of Compensability” Applied
PETITIONER, WHO WAS URINATING WHEN A FEMALE CORRECTION OFFICER PASSED HIS CELL, WAS NOT GUILTY OF LEWD CONDUCT (THIRD DEPT).
PETITIONERS’ CHALLENGE TO THE NEW PROVISIONS OF THE ELECTION LAW ADDRESSING THE NEW PROCESS OF CANVASSING ABSENTEE BALLOTS WAS PRECLUDED BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES (THIRD DEPT). ​
THE JUDGE’S LAW CLERK WHEN DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION WAS MADE WAS THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY WHEN DEFENDANT WAS INDICTED AND PROSECUTED; THE APPEARANCE OF A CONFLICT OF INTEREST REQUIRED REVERSAL AND REMITTAL; ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT BEFORE COUNTY COURT, THE ISSUE WAS CONSIDERED ON APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT).
ALLOWING THE PEOPLE’S INVESTIGATOR TO GO INTO THE JURY ROOM DURING DELIBERATIONS TO SHOW THE JURORS HOW TO OPERATE A DIGITAL RECORDER WAS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR THAT REQUIRED REVERSAL, DESPITE THE DEFENDANT’S CONSENT TO THE PROCEDURE (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Inmate Should Not Have Been Required to Document His Native American Ancestry... No Evidence Police Officer Acted in “Reckless Disregard” for Safety