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Question of Fact About Whether Driving to or from Work Constitutes an Act Within the Scope of Employment

Finding that issues of fact had been raised about whether the plaintiff was acting within the scope of his employment (thereby making Workers’ Compensation his only remedy), the First Department wrote:

Defendant contends that workers’ compensation benefits are plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for the injuries he sustained when he was struck by the truck defendant was driving (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 29[6]). However, issues of fact exist whether the parties were “acting within the scope of their employment, as coemployees, at the time of injury” … . * * * While, generally, traveling to and from work is not deemed to be within the scope of employment, as an employee approaches the site of his employment, “there develops a gray area where the risks of street travel merge with the risks attendant with employment” … . Then the test of compensability is whether there is a causal relationship between the employment and the accident and whether the employee “was exposed to a particular risk not shared by the public generally” … . Issues of fact exist whether defendant’s accident was causally related to a risk attendant with his employment rather than one shared by the public generally. Ortiz v Lynch, 2013 NY Slip Op 02667, 9839, 302254/11, 1st Dept, 4-18-13

 

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