You are here: / / Injured Party, as Well as the Insured Defendant, Has a Duty to Inform Insured’s C...

Injured Party, as Well as the Insured Defendant, Has a Duty to Inform Insured’s Carrier of Incident; Failure of Timely Notice by Both the Insured and the Injured Party Allowed Carrier to Disclaim

In this case the insurer [Tower] disclaimed coverage because it was not given notice of the claim.  The Second Department determined that both the insured [Xu] and the injured party [Gomez] had a duty to inform the carrier of the incident:

The question before us is whether Tower may be required to afford coverage to its defaulting insured (Xu) for the benefit of the injured party (Gomez) pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420(a)(3). Gomez is not accountable, of course, for Xu’s failure to provide notice to Tower during the period of nearly a year and a half  … . Still, even though “[i]n determining the reasonableness of an injured party’s notice, the notice required is measured less rigidly than that required of the insureds” …, some level of diligence was required of Gomez, as the dissent reluctantly concedes, once his counsel, upon receipt of the certificate evidencing that coverage had been renewed five months after the incident, was put on notice of the likelihood (even if not a certainty) that Xu had been covered by a Tower policy at the time of the incident (see Kalthoff v Arrowood Indem. Co., 95 AD3d 1413, 1415 [3d Dept 2012] [where the insured has failed to comply with the notice conditions of the policy, “the injured party bears the burden of demonstrating that it made reasonable efforts to identify the insurer and provide it with prompt notice”] …). Tower Ins Co of NY v Rong Rong Sun, 2013 NY Slip Op 02645, 8777, 108391/10, 1st Dept, 4-18-13

 

You might also like
Bus Company’s Duty of Care Did Not Include Keeping Steps to the Bus Dry and Free of Snow During a Snow Storm
Criteria for Setting Aside a Verdict As a Matter of Law and As Against the Weight of the Evidence Described
PLAINTIFF IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE ALLEGED HE WAS INJURED WHEN HE STEPPED ON A LOOSE MANHOLE COVER OWNED BY DEFENDANT-TOWN; THE TOWN DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION BUT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE THE CONDITION; THE TOWN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE DNA EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY A CRIMINALIST WAS IN PART TESTIMONIAL, THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION WAS NOT VIOLATED AND THE EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED (SECOND DEPT).
Most of Plaintiff’s Causes of Action Were Allegations Concerning the Conduct of a State Employee in His Official Capacity—Therefore, Those Causes of Action Were Actually Against the State and Could Only Be Heard in the Court of Claims/Elements of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Explained
SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PORTION OF THIS HYBRID ARTICLE 78/SUMMARY JUDGMENT ACTION BECAUSE NO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DETERMINATION OF THAT PORTION OF THE PROCEEDING HAD BEEN MADE.
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO MODIFY THE CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT RAISED DISPUTED FACTS; THE MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT WAS NOT GIVEN A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN HIS REQUEST TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA; MATTER REMITTED FOR THAT PURPOSE AND A REPORT TO THE APPELLATE COURT (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Claimant’s Failure to Give Timely Written Notice of Injury Excused Claimant, Who Had Been Diagnosed With Job-Related Stress, Did Not Have Good...