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Criteria for Downward Departure from SORA Presumptive Risk Level

The Second Department described the criteria for a downward departure from the SORA presumptive risk level as follows: 

A court has the discretion to downwardly depart from the presumptive risk level in a proceeding pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C; hereinafter SORA) only after a defendant makes a twofold showing. First, a defendant must identify, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which “tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the [SORA] Guidelines” … . Second, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to support the applicability of that mitigating factor … . In the absence of that twofold showing, the court lacks discretion to depart from the presumptive risk level … .  People v Arroyo, 2013 NY Slip Op 02553, 2010-10108, 2nd Dept, 4-17-13

 

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