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Fraud Cause of Action in Legal Malpractice Case Sufficiently Pled

In a legal malpractice action, the Second Department determined the cause of action for fraud should not have been dismissed:

…[T]he Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the causes of action alleging fraud. “To properly plead a cause of action to recover damages for fraud, the plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant made a false representation of fact, (2) the defendant had knowledge of the falsity, (3) the misrepresentation was made in order to induce the plaintiff’s reliance, (4) there was justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff, and (5) the plaintiff was injured by the reliance” …. Here, the complaint alleged that the defendants committed fraud by misrepresenting that they “made a motion for a default judgment” when they “never made, filed, or drafted” such a motion, that the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation, and that the defendants billed the plaintiff for drafting the motion. Those allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action to recover damages for fraud …. Vermont Mut Ins Co v McCabe & Mack, LLP, 2013 NY Slip Op 02392, 2012-00566, Index No 4510/10, 2nd Dept, 4-10-13

 

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