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Criteria for 1983 Action Against Municipality Based On Policy or Custom

In reversing the trial court’s setting aside a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in an action for false arrest, the Second Department laid out the criteria for a 1983 action against a municipality in this context:

… [A]plaintiff may prevail on a cause of action to recover damages pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 against a municipality where the plaintiff proves the existence of “(1) an official policy or custom [on the part of a municipal defendant] that (2) cause[d] the claimant to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right” … . “For a cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to lie against a municipality, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional must implement[ ]or execute[ ] a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers'” …, or have occurred pursuant to a practice “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage’ with the force of law” … .

“A municipal custom or policy can be shown by establishing that an official who is a final policy maker directly committed or commanded the violation of the plaintiff’s rights” … . Liability for a violation of 42 USC § 1983 may be predicated on “a single act, as long as it is the act of an official authorized to decide policy in that area” … .  Bassett v City of Rye, 2013 NY Slip Op 02037, 2011-10149, Index No 20430/05, 2nd Dept 3-27-13

 

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