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There Is No Transfer of Property Until the Deed Is Accepted by the Buyer

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Read, the Court of Appeals determined that a grant of property takes place only when the deed is (1) delivered and (2) accepted.  There was a foreclosure sale.  In order to obtain a judgment for the deficiency between the amount of the foreclosed loan and the actual foreclosure sale price, a motion must be made within 90 days “after the date of the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the proper deed of conveyance to the purchaser…”.  In this case the buyer at the foreclosure sale (M & T) did not at first accept the deed because M & T planned to assign its bid prior to the closing.  The deed was returned to the referee who agreed to hold it.  About three months later, M & T asked the referee to execute and resend the deed. About two weeks after that M & T filed a motion for a deficiency judgment. Defendants opposed the motion arguing it was made more than 90 days after the consummation of the sale. The appellate division agreed with the defendants.  The Court of Appeals reversed and wrote:

As a general rule, a deed is presumed to have been “delivered and accepted at its date”; however, this presumption “must yield to opposing evidence” … . Here, M&T’s attorney twice declined to accept or retain physical possession of the referee’s deed dated May 11, 2010. As a result, the referee took back the deed and other closing documents and ultimately executed a deed on August 9, 2010, when M&T’s attorney accepted it … . This constitutes “opposing evidence” sufficient to rebut any presumption of delivery in May 2010 … . M&T’s motion was therefore timely because brought within 90 days “after the date of the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the proper deed of conveyance to the purchaser” (RPAPL 1371 [2]) — i.e., August 9, 2010.  M & T Real Estate Trust v Doyle, 55, CtApp 3-26-13

 

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