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Failure to Wear Hard Hat Does Not Preclude 240(1) Claim

he First Department determined a worker was entitled to partial summary judgment on a 240(1) claim based on a falling pipe striking him in the head.  The fact that the worker was not wearing a hard hat did not raise a triable issue of fact on the 240(1) claim:

The evidence demonstrates that plaintiff, a welder who was working at a power plant that was being constructed, was struck on the head by a pipe that fell from a height of approximately 85 to 120 feet as a result of a gap in a toeboard installed along a grated walkway near the top of a generator in the power plant … . It is undisputed that there was no netting to prevent objects from falling on workers and contrary to defendants’ contention, plaintiff is not required to show exactly how the pipe fell, since, under any of the proffered theories, the lack of protective devices was the proximate cause of his injuries …. Nor is plaintiff required to show that the pipe was being hoisted or secured when it fell, since that is not a precondition to liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1) … .

In opposition, defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact since they failed to show that adequate protective devices required by Labor Law § 240(1) were employed at the site. That plaintiff was wearing a welding hood but not a hard hat does not raise an issue of fact since “[a] hard hat is not the type of safety device enumerated in Labor Law § 240(1) to be constructed, placed and operated, so as to give proper protection from extraordinary elevation-related risks to a construction worker” … . Mercado v Caithness Long Is LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 02005, 9634, 102473/09, 590277/11, 1st Dept 3-26-13

 

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