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County Executive Has Authority to Commence Lawsuit Without Resolution from County Legislature

The Fourth Department determined the Erie County Executive had the authority to bring a lawsuit alleging fraud on the part of a County Commissioner which resulted in the payment of more than $4,000,000 for goods and services that had not been provided.  The defendant contended the County could not bring the suit absent a resolution by the County Legislature.  The Fourth Department wrote:

There is no dispute that the County Legislature did not pass a resolution authorizing the commencement of this action. Contrary to defendant’s contention, however, we conclude that, notwithstanding the absence of such a resolution, the County Executive was empowered to commence this action on behalf of the County (see Matter of County of Rockland v Town of Clarkstown, 167 Misc 2d 367, 371). Under the County Charter, the County Executive is the Chief Executive Officer, the administrative head of the County government, and the Chief Budget Officer of the County.The County Charter grants the County Executive “all necessary incidental powers to perform and exercise any of the duties and functions specified . . . or lawfully delegated to him” (Erie County Charter § 302 [former (n)], now [m]).The County Executive is empowered by the County Charter to authorize the County Attorney to commence civil litigation to enforce any of the duties and functions lawfully designated to the County Executive (see § 602; see also § 302 [former (m)], now [l]; [former (n)], now [m]).Inasmuch as this action seeks to recover over $4 million dollars of the County’s funds that were allegedly improperly paid under the M/A-Com contract as a result of defendant’s alleged fraud, we conclude that the County Executive’s duties as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Budget Officer of the County clearly embrace the subject matter of this action and empower him to authorize the County Attorney to commence the litigation (see Rockland County, 167 Misc 2d at 371).  Justices Sconiers and Whalen disagreed in a substantial dissent.  County of Erie v M/A-Com, Inc., et al, 1184, CA 12-00075, 4th Dept. 3-15-13

 

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