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Property Owner Responsible for Defect in Sidewalk that Did Not Directly “Abut” Owner’s Property (Liability Based On New York City Ordinance).

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, the First Department determined a property owner was responsible for ensuring the safe condition of a sidewalk that did not directly abut the defendant’s property.  The sidewalk was separated from the defendant’s property by a strip of land owned the City. The Court determined the terms “abutting” and “adjoining” in the ordinance making a property owner responsible for the condition of a sidewalk should be construed “to include property in close proximity to an improved sidewalk although separated from it by [the strip of land]”… .  James vs 1620 Westchester Avenue, LLC, 8710A, 17396/06 First Dept. 2-7-13

 

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