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CORNELL DID NOT HAVE TO FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES IN ITS STUDENT CODE TO REFUSE ADMISSION TO PETITIONER WHO OMITTED FROM HIS APPLICATION THE FACT HE HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM ANOTHER COLLEGE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined respondent Cornell did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it refused to enroll petitioner because petitioner did not reveal he had been expelled from Kansas State for violations of its code of conduct. Petitioner argued Cornell did not follow the provisions in its Code when it refused to enroll petitioner. But the Third Department held the Code applied only to “students” and not to those who were filling out an application for admission:

In reviewing a determination rendered by a private educational institution where no hearing is required, a court will not disturb it “unless a school acts arbitrarily and not in the exercise of its honest discretion, it fails to abide by its own rules or imposes a penalty so excessive that it shocks one’s sense of fairness” … . Petitioner argues that respondent was obliged to follow the provisions of the Code, which establishes standards of conduct for, as is relevant here, its students. A student is defined under the Code as a person “currently registered” with respondent in one of its divisions or as a special student, “currently enrolled in or taking classes” with respondent, “currently using” respondent’s facilities or property for academic purposes or “currently on leave of absence or under suspension from being a student.” Inasmuch as petitioner was none of those things when he misrepresented his academic background on an application for admission to respondent, neither the Code nor the procedures created by it were applicable to his misconduct, and Supreme Court erred in concluding that they were … . Matter of Kamila v Cornell Univ., 2020 NY Slip Op 02150, Third Dept 4-2-20

 

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ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD PROPERLY ALLOWED TO ADOPT THE NEGLECT PETITION AFTER THE PETITIONER REQUESTED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PETITION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined the attorney for the child (AFC) was properly allowed to proceed with the neglect petition after the petitioner requested to withdraw the petition. However the evidence of educational and medical neglect was insufficient:

… [W]e perceive no error or abuse of discretion in Family Court declining to dismiss the petitions and allowing the attorney for the children to adopt the petitions and proceed on them (see Family Ct Act § 1032 [b] …). Turning to the merits, as relevant here, a party seeking to establish neglect must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a child’s “physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his [or her] parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in supplying [him or her] with adequate . . . education in accordance with the provisions of part one of article [65] of the [E]ducation [L]aw, or medical . . . care, though financially able to do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so” … . Matter of Abel XX. (Jennifer XX.), 2020 NY Slip Op 02129, Third Dept 4-2-20

 

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DENYING VISITATION TO MOTHER WHO HAD NOT SEEN THE CHILD IN NINE YEARS BUT HAD GAINED EMPLOYMENT AND STOPPED ABUSING DRUGS WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE; FAMILY COURT GAVE UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE FORENSIC EVALUATOR’S FINDINGS AND TO MOTHER’S EMOTIONAL OUTBURSTS AT THE HEARING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined the denial of visitation to mother in this modification-of-visitation proceeding was not supported by the evidence. Mother had not seen the child in nine years but demonstrated she was employed and had stopped abusing drugs. Family Court gave undue weight to the findings of a forensic evaluator and to mother’s emotional state during the hearing:

In our view, the forensic evaluator essentially acquiesced to the father’s preferences that the child have no contact with the mother and, in effect, gave them a higher priority over any court directive. Any unwillingness by the father to facilitate visitation does not demonstrate that the child’s welfare would be placed in harm if visitation between the mother and the child occurred and in no way rebuts the presumption that visitation with the mother is in the best interests of the child. In view of the flaws in the forensic evaluator’s report, it should have been given minimal consideration.In our view, the forensic evaluator essentially acquiesced to the father’s preferences that the child have no contact with the mother and, in effect, gave them a higher priority over any court directive. Any unwillingness by the father to facilitate visitation does not demonstrate that the child’s welfare would be placed in harm if visitation between the mother and the child occurred and in no way rebuts the presumption that visitation with the mother is in the best interests of the child. In view of the flaws in the forensic evaluator’s report, it should have been given minimal consideration.

Family Court also found that the mother could not control her emotions during the trial. Although we do not discount a parent’s emotional stability as one factor in the best interests analysis, there was little evidence, if any, indicating that the mother displayed the same emotional outbursts either with the children that she had just regained custody of or outside the courtroom setting. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, any inability of the mother to control her emotions at the hearing has little relevance … . Matter of Jessica D. v Michael E., 2020 NY Slip Op 02133, Third Dept 4-2-20

 

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ON APPEAL, THE ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD DID NOT FULFILL HIS OBLIGATION TO CONSULT WITH THE CHILDREN TO DETERMINE THEIR WISHES OR TO ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN WHY CONSULTATION WAS NOT POSSIBLE; HE WAS RELIEVED OF HIS ASSIGNMENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, relieving the attorney for the child (AFC) of responsibility for the appeal, determined the AFC did not fulfill his responsibilities under the Rules of the Chief Judge (22 NYCRR 7.2):

The Rules of the Chief Judge require that an AFC in a custody or visitation proceeding “must zealously advocate the child’s position” (22 NYCRR 7.2 [d]; see 22 NYCRR 7.2 [c]), and further provide that, “[i]f the child is capable of knowing, voluntary and considered judgment, the [AFC] should be directed by the wishes of the child, even if the [AFC] believes that what the child wants is not in the child’s best interests” … . The Rules establish only two circumstances in which an AFC may adopt a position that does not reflect the child’s wishes — specifically, when he or she “is convinced either that the child lacks the capacity for knowing, voluntary and considered judgment, or that following the child’s wishes is likely to result in a substantial risk of imminent, serious harm to the child” … . …

The AFC here wholly failed to fulfill the obligations imposed by these provisions upon this appeal. The only stated basis for his determination to advocate for the children’s best interests rather than for their wishes was their ages. However, it was the AFC’s obligation to “consult with and advise the child[ren] to the extent of and in a manner consistent with [their] capacities” … . At 10, the older child was certainly old enough to be capable of expressing her wishes, and whether the younger child, at 6, had the capacity to do so was not solely dependent upon her calendar age, but also upon such individual considerations as her level of maturity and verbal abilities … . … Here, the AFC’s brief is devoid of any indication of the children’s wishes, with no reference to 22 NYCRR 7.2 or to the analysis that this rule requires an AFC to undertake before advocating for a position that does not express the child’s wishes … . …

Additionally, although the record reveals that the AFC met with the children during the Family Court proceeding, it does not appear that he met or spoke with them again during the appeal … . Matter of Jennifer VV. v Lawrence WW., 2020 NY Slip Op 02136, Third Dept 4-2-20

 

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WHETHER THE SCHOOL PRINCIPAL RECEIVED COMPETENT REPRESENTATION AT HER DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION WAS RELEVANT TO HER DECERTIFICATION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NYS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; THEREFORE THE MOTION TO QUASH THE SUBPOENA SEEKING THE ATTORNEY’S TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the motion to quash a subpoena seeking an attorney’s (Guerra’s) testimony in a teacher decertification proceeding should not have been granted. The attorney was seeking employment with the NYC Department of Education (NYCDOE) at the time she was representing the respondent school principal (Klingsberg) in disciplinary proceedings brought by the NYCDOE. The issue of whether respondent received competent representation in the disciplinary proceedings was relevant to whether those proceedings should be given collateral estoppel effect in the New York State Department of Education (SED) teacher decertification proceedings:

“[A] subpoena will be quashed only where the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious or where the information sought is utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry” … . The party moving to quash bears “the burden of establishing that the subpoena should be [quashed] under such circumstances” … . * * *

… [W]hether Klingsberg was competently represented at that prior proceeding so as to warrant giving preclusive effect to its factual findings is very much in issue in this decertification proceeding and, given that Guerra has firsthand knowledge regarding her representation of Klingsberg at that prior proceeding, it cannot be said that “the information sought [from Guerra] is utterly irrelevant” to the decertification inquiry … . Rather, Guerra’s testimony is highly relevant to whether collateral estoppel will be applied in the pending decertification proceeding. For this reason, petitioners have not satisfied their burden of proof on their motion to quash the subpoena … . Matter of Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y. v New York State Dept. of Educ., 2020 NY Slip Op 02140, Third Dept 4-2-20

 

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THE TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT AND DEFAMATION CAUSES OF ACTION WERE NOT REFUTED BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND WERE ADEQUATELY PLED (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff had stated causes of action for tortious interference with contract and defamation and the actions should not have been dismissed on either the “documentary evidence” or “failure to state a cause of action” ground:

Turning first to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), a motion to dismiss pursuant to this provision “will be granted only if the documentary evidence resolves all factual issues as a matter of law, and conclusively disposes of the plaintiff’s claim” … . What may be deemed “documentary evidence” for purposes of this subsection is quite limited. “Materials that clearly qualify as documentary evidence include documents . . . such as mortgages, deed[s], contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are essentially undeniable” … . Here, Supreme Court relied upon the statements taken during defendant’s investigation, as well as its non-harassment policy. As plaintiff argues, even sworn affidavits have been held inadequate to meet this statutory standard, and defendant’s submissions here do not qualify as documentary evidence … . …

The grounds for dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) are also strictly limited; the court is not allowed to render a determination upon a thorough review of the relevant facts adduced by both parties, but rather is substantially more constrained in its review, examining only the plaintiff’s pleadings and affidavits … . …

To establish a claim for tortious interference with a contract, the plaintiff must allege “the existence of [his or her] valid contract with a third party, [the] defendant’s knowledge of that contract, [the] defendant’s intentional and improper procuring of a breach, and damages” … . Here, plaintiff’s complaint alleged that a valid contract existed between plaintiff and the distributor, that defendant intentionally spread “false, specious and salacious accusations against [p]laintiff,” and that such conduct “had no good faith or justifiable cause” and did not “protect an economic interest.” Liberally construing these allegations, as we must, taking all of the alleged facts as true, and giving plaintiff every favorable inference … , they do not fail to state a claim.

The defamation claim will ultimately require “proof that the defendant made ‘a false statement, published that statement to a third party without privilege, with fault measured by at least a negligence standard, and the statement caused special damages or constituted defamation per se'” … . Here, the complaint sets forth the particular words complained of and the damages plaintiff allegedly sustained … . Carr v Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 02141, Third Dept 4-2-20

 

CLAIMANT ADEQUATELY IDENTIFIED THE RULING OBJECTED TO IN HER APPLICATION FOR BOARD REVIEW; HER APPLICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REJECTED ON THAT GROUND (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Worker’s Compensation Board, determined claimant’s application for Board review should not have been rejected based upon claimant’s answer to question 15 which asks for the the specific ruling objected to:

Claimant filed her application for Board review … and question number 15 on the form RB-89 application and the accompanying instructions directed her to “[s]pecify the objection or exception interposed to the [WCLJ’s] ruling and when it was interposed as required by 12 NYCRR 300.13 (b) (2) (ii)” … . Claimant responded by stating that “an exception was noted at the hearing on [January 11, 2018],” that the WCLJ had noted that exception in his decision and that the “objection [was] continued by way of” the application for Board review. The Board found that this response was deficient because it failed to identify the exception. This finding overlooked the information already provided in the application for Board review, however, as claimant made clear in her responses to question numbers 11 and 12 that the challenged ruling was the finding of “no compensable disability” from May 10, 2017 to November 27, 2017 and that the issue was whether the WCLJ had erred in crediting certain medical testimony to make that ruling. Claimant identified the ruling at issue in those responses and, by citing the “exception” continued in her “application for review,” her response to question number 15 unambiguously referred to the ruling named in her prior responses so as to provide the information required by 12 NYCRR 300.13 (b) (2) (ii) and demanded by the form instructions … . Matter of Narine v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 2020 NY Slip Op 02142, Third Dept 4-2-20

 

PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN REPAIR NOT MAINTENANCE AND THE LADDER DID NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION FROM A FALL; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s (Markou’s) motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should have been granted. Plaintiff was troubleshooting a problem with lighting when his ladder slid sideways. He jumped off the ladder and landed on his feet to avoid hitting his head on the ground. The plaintiff made out a prima facie case that he was engaged in a protected activity (repair rather than routine maintenance) and the ladder did not provide adequate protection:

… [W]e find that plaintiffs established that Markou was engaged in a protected activity under Labor Law § 240 (1), in that he was attempting to repair the overhead lighting system in the cold storage area of defendant’s premises … . …  Notwithstanding Supreme Court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion, the court correctly concluded that plaintiffs, through the deposition testimony and sworn affidavit of their expert, sustained their prima facie burden of showing that the ladder was not “so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection” to Markou (Labor Law § 240 [1]), causing him to fall and sustain injuries. Markou v Sano-Rubin Constr. Co., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 02144, Third Dept 4-2-20

 

THE BOARD HAS THE AUTHORITY TO CHOOSE BETWEEN TWO CONFLICTING MEDICAL OPINIONS, HERE DEALING WITH WEANING CLAIMANT FROM OPIOID PAIN KILLERS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the Workers’ Compensation Board has the authority to chose between two conflicting medical opinions. Here claimant had significant pain was was taking high doses of opioids. The independent medical examiner (IME) had one opinion about how the claimant should be weaned from the opioids and claimant’s own physician had a different opinion. The Board sided with the IME:

Although claimant’s physician and the IME gave differing opinions regarding the advisability of weaning claimant from his opiate medications, as well as the manner in which it should be accomplished, the Board is vested with the authority to resolve conflicting medical opinions … . Thus, the Board could choose to credit the opinion of the IME, which was in accordance with the applicable guidelines, over that of claimant’s treating physician. Therefore, inasmuch as substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision, we find no reason to disturb it … . Matter of Forte v Muccini, 2020 NY Slip Op 01881, Third Dept 3-16-20

 

SPECULATIVE MEDICAL OPINION DID NOT SUPPORT FINDING CLAIMANT’S PRIOR EMPLOYER LIABLE FOR ASBESTOS-RELATED MESOTHELIOMA, DESPITE EVIDENCE OF EXPOSURE AT THE PRIOR EMPLOYER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the Workers’ Compensation Board properly found that claimant’s mesothelioma was due to asbestos exposure at Kodak, even though claimant was exposed to asbestos in his prior employment at International Paper. Kodak unsuccessfully sought apportionment of the liability with International Paper. Claimant’s employment at International Paper ended in 1967 and claimant worked at Kodak from 1967 to 1985. He was diagnosed in 2013:

… Workers’ Compensation Law § 44 states that, when a worker’s disability due to an occupational disease is established and benefits are awarded, “[t]he total compensation due shall be recoverable from the employer who last employed the employee in the employment to the nature of which the disease was due and in which it was contracted. If, however, such disease . . . was contracted while such employee was in the employment of a prior employer, the employer who is made liable for the total compensation . . . may appeal to the [B]oard for an apportionment of such compensation among the several employers who since the contraction of such disease shall have employed such employee in the employment to the nature of which the disease was due” … . “Importantly, liability under this provision is premised upon employment at the time of or following the contraction of the compensable occupational disease, not upon the disablement that ensues” …  The determination of when an employee contracted the disease, which refers to “when the disease process begins, as evidenced by symptoms, diagnosis or other medical evidence that shows [that the] disease process must have existed” … , is a question of fact to be determined by the Board, which will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence … . * * *

While the Board recognized that there may be a delay of up to 50 years between exposure to asbestos and a mesothelioma diagnosis, it correctly found that the medical opinions that decedent’s prior employment contributed to his condition were speculative and insufficient … . Matter of Gimber v Eastman Kodak Co., 2020 NY Slip Op 01875, Third Dept 3-16-20

 

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