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Immunity for Land Owners Allowing Use of Land by Snowmobilers

Plaintiff’s decedent was killed while riding a snowmobile on a trail on privately owned land.  Plaintiff’s snowmobile struck the side of a tractor-trailer carrying logs.  The private logging road where the accident occurred was also used as a snowmobile trail.  Plaintiff sued the owner of the land.  The Third Department upheld the trial court’s ruling that the landowner was immune from suit under General Obligations Law 9-103, because the statutory “consideration exception” did not apply.  Plaintiff contended that certain “recreational leases” (for hunting and fishing) constituted “consideration” for the use of the trail, triggering the immunity exception.    The Third Department determined those leases had nothing to do with snowmobiling and noted:

General Obligations Law § 9-103 provides immunity, subject to certain exceptions, to landowners, lessees and occupiers who make their land available to the public for various enumerated recreational  activities, including  snowmobiling. As relevant here, the consideration exception provides that immunity does not exist “for injury suffered in any case where permission . . . was granted  for a  consideration, other  than  the  consideration, if any, paid to said landowner by the state or federal government” (General Obligations Law § 9–103 [2] [b]). It is the plaintiff who has the burden of establishing that the  claimed exception applies and, as the Court of Appeals has instructed, we must strictly construe the exception so as not to defeat the statute’s broad purpose … .  Ferland … v GMO Renewable Resources LLC, et al, 514045, 3rd Dept 4-11-13

 

 

“Indirect Audit” to Determine Cash Receipts in Restaurant Okay

The audit division of the Department of Taxation and Finance found the petitioner’s cash sales receipts inadequate to perform an audit.  The audit division therefore used a one-day “indirect audit” to estimate what petitioner’s cash sales were (a one-day observation of the operation of the restaurant).  In upholding the method used by the audit division to determine under-reporting of cash receipts, the Third Department wrote:

Where,  as here, a  taxpayer fails to maintain sufficient records, the Division may  resort to an  indirect audit and  the taxpayer challenging such an  audit has  the “burden of  establishing by  clear and  convincing evidence  that the audit method or tax assessment [was] erroneous” … .   Although  a  longer audit period might have produced a more accurate representation of petitioner’s business activity, nonetheless petitioner failed to meet  its heavy  burden of establishing the unreasonableness or inaccuracy of the length used and method employed by the Division in its indirect audit under  the circumstances … .  Matter of Hwang v Tax Appeals Tribunal …, 512991, 3rd Dept 4-11-13

 

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Conduct in Prison Justified Upward Departure (SORA)

The Third Department upheld the SORA court’s upward departure from the SORA guidelines based upon the defendant’s exhibitionist sexual conduct in prison.  The Third Department wrote:

Even if, under factor 13, defendant had been assessed the full 20 points for unsatisfactory conduct while confined “with sexual misconduct” (for a total of 55 points, still a presumptive level I), as he urges should have occurred instead of an upward departure, this factor still would not adequately take into consideration the public nature of this conduct and the use of children’s images  to facilitate his arousal. People v Walker, 513776, 3rd Dept, 4-11-13

 

 

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Criteria for Motion to Vacate Based on Newly Discovered Evidence Explained

In upholding the trial court’s denial (without a hearing) of a 440 motion to vacate the defendant’s conviction based upon newly discovered evidence (i.e., a statement made by a juror to an investigator), the Third Department wrote:

Nor do we discern any error in County Court’s summary denial of that part of defendant’s motion that was based upon his claim of newly discovered evidence.  As relevant here, “[t]o justify vacatur under  CPL  440.10 (1) (g), the newly  discovered evidence ‘must . . . be  such  as will probably change the result if a new  trial is granted . . . [and] be  material to the issue'” …. A hearing is not necessary when the court can “adequately review the matter based upon the contents of the record and the motion papers”… .  People v Carter, 104989, 3rd Dept 4-11-13

 

 

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New Factual Claim Made for the First Time at Trial by Defendant Triggered “Inconsistent Statements” Jury Charge; Prior Injuries to Child Admissible under Molineux

In this case the defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of a three-year-old child.  In his statement to the police, the defendant said the child fell while she was in the shower. At trial the defendant testified the child also fell on the stairs.  The trial court gave an “inconsistent statements” charge to the jury, finding it would have been reasonable and logical for the defendant to have mentioned the fall on the stairs in his statement to police.  In upholding the trial court, the Third Department wrote:

In its general instructions to the jury, County Court included a charge regarding a witness testifying to a fact that the witness omitted at a prior time when it would have been reasonable and logical to have stated the fact (see CJI2d[NY] Credibility of Witnesses  [Inconsistent Statements]).Defendant contends that this constituted error. Defendant had given a detailed voluntary statement to police regarding the pertinent events surrounding the victim’s death. He did not include in that statement an account of the victim purportedly falling on the stairs while coming to eat lunch, but he testified regarding such event at trial. Since it would be reasonable to expect defendant to mention all potential injuries sustained by the victim while in his care that day, including this charge did not constitute reversible error.

In addition, the Third Department found no error in the trial court’s allowing evidence of prior injuries revealed by the autopsy and two injuries incurred by the child when she was in defendant’s care.  This evidence of “similar uncharged crimes” was deemed admissible under Molineux to demonstrate “the absence of an accident” as the cause of the child’s injuries.  People v Tinkler, 103766, 3rd Dept 4-11-13

 

 

 

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Procedure for Testing Adequacy of Causes of Action in Article 78 Petition; Criteria for Bad Faith Abolishment of Position

The Third Department upheld Supreme Court’s determination that the petitioner had stated a cause of action in his Article 78 proceeding for bad faith abolishment of his tenured Assistant Superintendent position.  The Third Department noted that the proper criteria for analysis in this Article 78 proceeding is the same as in a pre-answer motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211:

In a CPLR article 78 proceeding, objections in point of law may be raised either through  a pre-answer motion  to dismiss or – as here – in the verified answer  (see CPLR  7804  [f]). Such objections are appropriately afforded review similar in nature to that applied to defenses raised in a pre-answer motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a).  *  *  *

A school district may abolish a position, even when this results in the discharge of a tenured employee, so long as it “has made a good faith determination based on economic considerations” … . *  *  * We agree with Supreme Court that [petitioner’s] specific and nonconclusory assertions, when deemed to be true for this purpose, were sufficient to allege that the abolition of his position “was motivated by reasons other than a desire to promote institutional efficiency and economy” and thus state a cause of action … .  Matter of Lally v Johnson City School District, 515488, 3rd Dept 4-4-13

 

Petitioner Entitled to Attorney’s Fees Based on Respondent’s Failure to Timely Respond to Requests for Information

The Third Department determined petitioner should be granted attorney’s fees because of respondent’s ignoring a FOIL request until an Article 78 proceeding was brought.  Even though respondent indicated the requested documents didn’t exist, the Third Department ruled that petitioner had “prevailed” in the FOIL proceedings and was therefore entitled to attorney’s fees:

By commencing this proceeding to force respondent to respond to its request, after a tortuous history, petitioner finally “received all the information that it requested and to which it was entitled in response to the underlying FOIL litigation, [and thus] it may  be said to have substantially prevailed within the meaning of Public Officers Law § 89 (4) ©” … .

The fact that full compliance with the statute was finally achieved in the form of a certification that the requested record could not be found after a diligent search, as opposed to the production of responsive documents, does not preclude a  petitioner from being  found  to have substantially prevailed, for the petitioner received the full and only response available pursuant to the statute under the circumstances. As we have emphasized, the counsel fee provision was added in recognition that persons seeking to force an agency to respond to a proper FOIL request “must engage in costly litigation,” and the statute was recently amended “in order to ‘create a clear deterrent to unreasonable delays and denials of access [and thereby] encourage every unit of government to make a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of FOIL’”… . Matter of Legal Aid Society v NYS Department of Corrections …, 515257, 3rd Dept 4-4-13

 

Disciplinary Actions by SUNY School Did Not Violate Student’s Due Process Rights 

In upholding the disciplinary action taken by a SUNY school against a student, the Third Department determined the student’s due process rights had not been violated:

Petitioner’s due  process rights were  not violated in as much as he was given written notice of the charges prior to the hearing, the name of the witness against him, the opportunity to present a defense and have the assistance of an advisor at the hearing, and a statement detailing the factual findings, evidence relied upon and discipline imposed… .  Matter of Schwarzmueller v SUNY Potsdam, et al, 515193, 3rd Dept 4-4-13

COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

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Appeal Found “Frivilous”

In finding an appeal frivolous, the Third Department wrote:

We also are persuaded that defendant’s pursuit of this appeal is frivolous within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (c) (2) and, therefore, plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable counsel fees incurred in responding thereto.  … [O]nce  plaintiff was  awarded  partial summary  judgment  in February 2011 and secured a judgment in its favor, defendant had several permissible options, such as appealing the underlying order and judgment or paying – in full – the amount awarded to plaintiff.  Instead, defendant continued to dispute the sum due by delaying payment, thereby compelling plaintiff to move for the turnover order and, ultimately, to expend resources responding to the instant appeal seeking $825.55.  Such conduct, in our view, warrants an award of reasonable counsel fees incurred in responding to this appeal, and this matter is remitted to Supreme Court for a determination of the amount of such fees … .  Defendant’s remaining arguments, to the extent not specifically addressed, have been considered and found to be  lacking in merit.  Valley Psychological, PC v … Geico, 514672, 3rd Dept 4-4-13

 

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