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Hearing Officer’s Refusal to Call Witness Required Expungement of Relevant Charges

The Third Department determined the relevant charges must be expunged because the hearing officer refused to call a witness, a violation of the inmate’s constitutional right:

…[T]he Hearing Officer erroneously refused to call a correction officer who witnessed petitioner’s behavior while being escorted to his cell. Inasmuch  as petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to call a witness with regard to that incident, expungement of the related charges is required… .  Matter of Cahill v Prack, 515216, 3rd Dept, 5-16-13

 

Failure to Explain Why Inmate’s Roommates Allegedly Refused to Testify Required Annulment​

Because no explanation was provided to explain the requested witnesses’ (the inmate’s roommates’) alleged refusal to testify, the Third Department annulled the determination:

Petitioner requested the testimony of three witnesses who shared a room with him. The Hearing Officer stated that inmate refusal forms for all three had been signed by the employee assistant, but not by the inmates, and that no explanations were given for their refusal to testify. Because the record does not contain any reason for the witnesses’ refusal or indicate that the Hearing Officer attempted to verify their refusal, petitioner’s regulatory right to call witnesses has been violated (see 7 NYCRR 254.5 [a]; ….).  Matter of Sorrentino v Fischer, 515214, 3rd Dept, 5-16-13

 

 

Hearing Officer’s Refusal to Provide Requested Documents Required Annulment

The Third Department determined the failure to provide the inmate with evidence he requested required the annulment of the guilty determination:

Petitioner requested copies of  any “to/from” forms related to the incident and, despite the fact that one  of the correction officers testified to giving his account  of the events at issue in such  a  form, the Hearing Officer declined to provide petitioner a copy. Inasmuch as that document could have been relevant to formulating petitioner’s defense and effectuating his questioning of the officer, the determination must be annulled… .  Matter of Bermudez v Fischer, 514110, 3rd Dept, 5-16-13

 

Claimant’s Non-Work-Related Felony Deemed to Breach Express or Implied Duty Owed to Employer

The Third Department determined claimant was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits because of an act constituting a felony which took place at the claimant’s home, not at work, but which generated negative publicity, breaching a duty owed to the employer (a car dealership).  The Third Department wrote:

Substantial evidence supports the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board that claimant lost his “employment as a result of an act constituting a felony in connection with such employment” (Labor Law § 593; see Labor Law§  597). Claimant, a car salesperson, was fired after his arrest on charges stemming from, among other things, his surreptitious videotaping of individuals who used the bathroom of his home. The charges, which generated negative publicity and numerous customer complaints, ultimately were resolved when claimant pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful surveillance in the second degree. Given the public nature of claimant’s position and the detrimental effect his continued employment could have had upon the employer’s business, the Board properly determined that claimant’s actions constituted a breach of  an  express  or implied duty owed to the employer… Matter of Engel [Commissioner of Labor], 515513, 3rd Dept, 5-16-13

 

 

Claimant Not Entitled to Benefits For Time Spent Working Out of House 

After claimant was laid off, he operated a business [Hatch Ventures] periodically out of his home.  The Third Department determined the claimant was not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits for the days he operated his business but that “recoverable overpayment and forfeiture penalty” should not be imposed because claimant did not make a willful misrepresentation with respect to his home business:

A claimant is not entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits during the time that he or she  is not  totally unemployed (see Labor Law § 591 [1]).It has  been  held that a claimant who undertakes activities on behalf of an ongoing business is not considered to be totally unemployed even if those activities are minimal  or the business is not  profitable ….   The issue of total unemployment is a factual question for the Board, and  its determination will be  upheld  if supported by  substantial evidence….   Here, claimant admittedly performed various activities on behalf of Hatch Ventures, made business-related expenditures and received income from product sales. Notably, he  indicated that, from  June 1, 2011  until June  30, 2011, he  performed  such  activities three days  a  week  for one  hour  each  day  and  that, after July 1, 2011, he performed them one day per week for three hours.  Matter of Lewis [Copmmissioner of Labor], 515345, 3rd Dept, 5-16-13

 

 

Defendant’s Papers Deemed Insufficient to Trigger Need for Suppression Hearing

The Third Department determined the defendant’s motion papers did not demonstrate the need for a suppression hearing:

Because defendant failed to allege sufficient facts to justify a hearing, County Court did not err in summarily denying defendant’s motion for a Mapp hearing…. Motion papers seeking suppression of evidence “must state the ground or grounds of the motion and must contain sworn allegations of fact . . . supporting such grounds” (CPL 710.60 [1]).A hearing is not automatic; a court may summarily deny the motion if the papers do not allege a legal basis for suppression  or if the factual allegations do not as a matter of law support any alleged ground (see CPL 710.60 [3];…) “[F]actual sufficiency should be determined with reference to the face of the pleadings, the context of the motion and [the] defendant’s access to information”….  Here, defendant made his motion after he was supplied with the search warrant application, supporting documents and return, as well as discovery. He had resolved the other criminal charges that precipitated the warrant application, providing him with information related to the situation surrounding the application. In these circumstances, defendant’s bare allegation of a lack of probable cause, without any factual support, was insufficient to require a hearing …   Accordingly, the court properly determined that a hearing was not necessary to decide the motion. People v Vanness, 103553, 3rd Dept, 5-16-13

 

Proper Procedure for Resentencing Under Drug Law Reform Act Explained

The Third Department explained the proper procedure for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act as follows:

The Drug Law Reform Act establishes a specific procedural course that was not followed here. Upon  finding a  defendant eligible for resentencing, the court must  issue a  written interlocutory order informing the defendant of the term of imprisonment  it intends to impose, setting forth findings of fact and the reasons underlying the proposed resentence, and advising the defendant  that, unless he or she withdraws  the application or appeals from the interlocutory order, the court will vacate the original sentence and impose the proposed resentence (see L 2004, ch 738, § 23).County  Court’s failure to proceed  in this manner deprived defendant of the opportunity to carefully consider his options, including the taking of an  appeal  from  the interlocutory order.  People v Minor, 104880, 3rd Dept, 5-16-13

 

 

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Gang Affiliation and Prior Drug Offenses Admissible Under Molineux in Murder Case/Motion to Suppress Statement Made When Questioning Continued After Defendant Stated He Did Not Want to Answer Any More Questions Should Have Been Granted

The Third Department determined evidence of defendant’s gang affiliation and uncharged drug offenses were admissible in defendant’s murder trial under Molineux.  In addition, the Third Department determined defendant’s statements made after he said he didn’t want to answer any more questions should have been suppressed.  [The Third Department rejected the People’s argument that the suppression issue was decided in a prior prosecution and the doctrine of collateral estoppel should apply.] With respect to the Molineux and “right to remain silent” issues, the Court wrote:

“Generally speaking, evidence of uncharged  crimes or prior bad acts may be admitted where they fall within the recognized Molineux exceptions – motive, intent, absence of mistake, common plan or scheme and identity – or where such proof is inextricably interwoven with the charged crimes, provide[s] necessary background or complete[s] a witness’s narrative” … . Here, defendant’s drug-related activities and purported gang membership provided necessary background information, explained how [the other parties] and defendant knew one another (as well as why defendant’s acquaintances went along with his plan to rob the weed spot[where the murder took place]) and, viewed in the context of the activities that occurred prior to the shooting, established both defendant’s awareness of the weed spot and a motive for the shooting; thus, such “evidence was highly probative of several relevant and material issues at trial and genuinely interwoven with the facts surrounding the shooting” … .

The case law makes clear that “[a] defendant’s invocation of the right to remain silent must be scrupulously honored” … once the right is asserted in an “unequivocal and unqualified” fashion … Whether  a defendant’s  request in this regard is “unequivocal is a mixed question of law and fact that must be determined with reference to  the  circumstances surrounding  the  request[,] including the defendant’s demeanor, manner of expression and the particular words found to have been used by the defendant” … .  People v Johnson, 104081, 3rd Dept, 5-16-13

SUPPRESSION, SUPPRESS

 

No Cause of Action Based Upon “Vicious Propensities” When Plaintiff Knocked Down by Playful Dog

In determining summary judgment should have been granted to the defendant dog owners, the Third Department explained the defendants had demonstrated they had no prior knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensities.  The plaintiff was injured when defendant’s dog [Delilah] bumped into her while running in play, activity the Third Department determined was “normal canine behavior” which could not be considered a vicious propensity:

It is well established that “‘the owner of a domestic animal who either knows or should have known of that animal’s vicious propensities will be held liable for the harm the animal causes as a result of those propensities'” …. As the movants, it was defendants’ burden to establish that they had no prior knowledge that Delilah had any vicious propensities …. Notably, a vicious propensity does not  necessarily have  to be  “dangerous  or ferocious” but, rather, may consist of a proclivity to act in a way that puts others at risk of harm, so long  as “‘such proclivity results in the injury giving rise to the lawsuit'” .   Nonetheless, “normal canine behavior” is insufficient to establish a vicious propensity ….  Bloom v Van Lenten, 515606, 3rd Dept, 5-16-13

 

Adverse Possession Not Demonstrated

In reversing the adverse-possession ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, because the proof showed only non-exclusive, sporadic and incomplete use of the land, the Third Department wrote:

…[W]e conclude that plaintiffs’ vague testimony did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that they ever cultivated and improved the entire .17 acre of the disputed area, or that they usually cultivated and improved even a small portion of the disputed area for the full 10-year requisite time period. That is, the minimal and sporadic use that was demonstrated is insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute the requisite cultivation or improvement …. Further, in light of Powell’s testimony that he cared for the disputed area for defendants, plaintiffs cannot establish the “exclusivity” element, which requires a showing that “the adverse possessor . . . alone care[d] for or improve[d] the disputed property as if it were his/her own”….  Robbins v Schiff, 514749, 3rd Dept, 5-9-13

 

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