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Family Court’s Finding Father in Default for Nonappearance Reversed

In reversing Family Court’s finding the father in default for nonappearance in a custody and visitation modification proceeding, the Third Department noted that the father’s counsel did not tell the father his appearance was required and the court made no attempt to reach the father by phone:

The nonappearance of a party does not necessarily result in a default, “particularly where counsel appears upon the absent party’s behalf and offers an  explanation for his or her failure to attend”.   The father’s counsel stated that, while the father had elected not  to appear, counsel had  not  informed  him  that his appearance  was  necessary.  Family Court did not challenge the accuracy of that representation and, moreover, made no effort to reach the father telephonically or by other means.  Under these circumstances, Family Court erred in holding that the father’s nonappearance constituted a default …  Matter of Freedman, 514882, 414883, 3rd Dept 6-27-13

 

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Family Court Could Not Countermand County Court’s Order of Protection

The Third Department noted that Family Court can not countermand County Court’s order of protection stemming from the father’s assault of the mother.  Therefore, Family Court could not require the mother to facilitate the reading of the father’s letters to the child:

Family Court does not have jurisdiction to countermand the provisions  of a  criminal court  order  of protection ….  Considering that “an order of protection issued incident to a criminal proceeding is an ameliorative measure intended to safeguard the rights of victims”…, the criminal court order of protection would have to be modified, if deemed appropriate by County Court, before Family Court would be authorized to require the mother to accept, read or facilitate the reading of the father’s communications to the child.  Matter of Samantha WW v Gerald XX, 513853, 3rd Dept 6-27-13

 

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Events Before Last Custody Order Could Be Considered re: “Best Interests of Child” Even Though Only Post-Custody-Order Events Can Be Considered re: “Change of Circumstances”

In upholding Family Court’s custody ruling, the Third Department noted that events which occurred before the last custody order could be considered with respect to the best interests of the child:”

Family Court did not err in considering evidence of events that occurred before the entry of the prior custody order. Although  the inquiry as to whether  a substantial change  in circumstances has occurred should be limited to occurrences since the date of the prior custody order…, a best interests inquiry is broader and may include other facts that give the court a view of the totality of the circumstances and family dynamics, including proof that relates to either party’s fitness as a parent….  As less weight  is afforded to a stipulated order, admission of evidence concerning previous behavior or events is especially proper where no prior plenary hearing has been held and the prior order was issued on consent…. Here, Family Court did not abuse  its broad  discretion in determining the scope of the proof….  Matter of  Smith…, 513811, 3rd Dept 6-27-13

 

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Derivative Severe Abuse Finding Reversed

In reversing Family Court’s finding of derivative severe abuse, the Third Department explained the proof requirements as follows:

…[W]e agree with respondent that Family Court erred in concluding  that Nicholas and  Carolina were derivatively severely abused by respondent. As the Court of Appeals recently clarified in Matter of Dashawn W. (21 NY3d 36 [2013]), a determination of severe abuse requires that the court find, by clear and convincing evidence, as relevant here, not only that “the child [is] an  abused  child as a result of reckless or intentional acts of the parent committed under circumstances evincing a depraved  indifference to human  life, which  result in serious physical injury to the child as defined in [Penal Law  § 10.00 (10)]” (Social Services Law  §  384-b  [8] [a] [i]), but  also that petitioner “made  diligent efforts to encourage  and strengthen the parental relationship, including efforts to rehabilitate the respondent, when such efforts will not be detrimental to the best interests of the child, and  such  efforts have been unsuccessful and are unlikely to be successful in the foreseeable future” (Social Services Law  §  384-b  [8] [a] [iv]). Here, inasmuch as Family Court did not make either of the foregoing determinations and the evidence in the record does not enable us to do so, a finding of severe abuse against respondent cannot be sustained.  Matter of Nicholas S…, 511568, 3rd Dept 6-27-13

 

Parole Board Could Require No-Contact-with-Wife for One Year as a Condition

In upholding the Board of Parole’s determination that, as a condition of release on parole, petitioner, who had attacked his wife in the past, must refrain from any contact with his wife for one year and complete a domestic violence offenders program, the Third Department wrote:

…[T]the Board is vested with discretion to determine the conditions upon which an inmate is released, and its decision in that regard is not subject to judicial review if made in accordance with the law (see Executive Law §§ 259-c [2]; 259-i [5];…). Petitioners argue that the conditions at issue are unlawful, arbitrary and capricious, in that they lack a sufficient factual basis in the record and improperly impair their fundamental right to maintain a marital relationship. We disagree. Parole conditions that  are  “rationally  related  to  the inmate’s criminal history, past conduct and  future chances of recidivism” are not arbitrary and capricious ….   Moreover, petitioner’s fundamental rights to associate and marry may be restricted by  parole  conditions  that  are  “reasonably  related  to legitimate  penological  interests” … .  George v NYS Department of Corrections …, 516126, 3rd Dept 6-27-13

 

Board’s Determination Business Was Claimant’s “Employer” Reversed

In reversing the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s determination that “Quick Change” was claimant’s employer and therefore was liable for contributions to unemployment benefits, the Third Department noted:

Here, Quick Change did not screen claimant but, rather, retained his services based upon his reputation in the industry. Claimant was  free to accept or reject an  assignment  from  Quick Change,  was  not prohibited  from  working  for others,  did  not  sign a written contract and  received no  fringe benefits. Although Quick Change arranged for claimant to begin working at a specific time and place designated by the client, the work schedule thereafter  was  dictated  solely by  the  client, and  a  representative from  Quick Change  was  never present at the job site. Quick Change did not train claimant or instruct him in any aspect of how to perform his work, and claimant was not required to report to Quick Change in any manner. Claimant furnished his own supplies and received no reimbursement from Quick Change. Once the work was completed, claimant submitted invoices to Quick Change for payment. Quick Change set the rate of pay; however, it was based upon the established market  for such  services. Moreover, while the owner of Quick Change hypothesized that she would likely pay claimant in the event that the client did not pay, this was based  upon  a sense of personal obligation rather than a  contractual  commitment.  In the Matter of Richins…, 515330, 515370, 3rd Dept 6-27-13

 

Benefits Awarded for Psychic Injury (Stress) Affirmed

The Third Department affirmed an award of Workers’ Compensation benefits based on psychic injury (stress).  Due an audit of the travel reimbursement policies of the employer, the employee (claimant) was required to pay taxes on “income” of $100,000 (the reason for the employee’s psychic injury).  The Third Department explained the analytical factors as follows:

A  workers’ compensation claim for psychic injury stemming  from work-related  stress is not  compensable  if it was “a direct consequence of a lawful personnel decision involving a disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, demotion, or termination taken in good  faith by the employer”… .  Claimant, however, was not accused of wrongdoing by the employer.    Instead, her mental injuries stemmed from the serious financial liabilities she incurred as a result of a review of the employer’s reimbursement practices….[W]e  will not disturb the Board’s determination that the stress that claimant experienced was greater than that generally experienced by similarly situated workers in a normal work environment… .  Matter of Brittain v NYS Insurance Dept, 515279, 3rd Dept 6-27-13

 

Statute of Limitations Defense in Article 78 Proceeding Waived Because Not Raised in Answer or Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss

In reversing Supreme Court’s dismissal of an Article 78 proceeding as untimely, the Third Department determined the statute of limitations defense was waived because it was not raised in the answer or in a pre-answer motion to dismiss:

Petitioner contends that Supreme Court erred in granting respondent’s oral motion to dismiss the petition based upon statute of limitations grounds inasmuch as respondent  failed to timely raise this defense/objection in either its verified answer or a pre-answer motion to dismiss. We agree. It is well established that an aggrieved party must raise a statute of limitations defense/objection in either the answer or a pre-answer motion  to  dismiss  (see  CPLR  3211  [e]; 7804  [f];…). A pre-answer motion  to dismiss based  upon  a statute of limitations defense/objection necessarily “must  be  made  prior to the time in which to serve an  answer, and the failure to do  so will result in a waiver of the defense unless [thereafter] raised in the responsive pleading”… .  Matter of Kowalczyk v Village of Monticello, 515968, 3rd Dept 6-27-13

 

Bed and Breakfast Not Entitled to Homeowner’s Exemption

The Third Department determined the owner of a bed and breakfast was not entitled to the homeowner’s exemption from the Labor Law:

…[A]lthough “[b]oth Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 impose nondelegable duties upon contractors, owners and their agents  to comply  with  certain safety practices for the protection of workers engaged in various construction-related activities . . . [,] the  Legislature has carved  out  an  exemption for the owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work”….    That exemption, however, “is not available to an owner who uses or intends  to use  [the] dwelling  only  for commercial  purposes”… .  Bagley v Moffett, 515914, 3rd Dept 6-27-13

 

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County Court’s Suppression of Statements and Fruits of Search Reversed

The Third Department reversed County Court’s suppression of defendant’s statements and County Court’s finding that defendant had not voluntarily consented to the search of his car (both based on the absence of Miranda warnings).   The Third Department determined a reasonable person innocent of a crime would still have felt he was free to leave (i.e., that he was not in custody) after his failure of field sobriety tests and a negative alcosensor test.  The Third Department further noted that the failure to provide Miranda warnings would not necessarily render a consent to search involuntary:

The court ….overlooked the settled proposition that “[a] temporary roadside detention pursuant to a routine traffic stop is not custodial within the meaning of Miranda” … .The facts here reveal a reasonable initial interrogation attendant to a roadside detention that was merely investigatory…. The Troopers’ inquiries, the mixed results of the field sobriety tests and a negative alcosensor test would not have caused a reasonable person innocent of any wrongdoing to believe that he or she was in custody….   In our view, the Troopers’ observations of defendant’s condition justified the further  detention  for the  limited  purpose  of  investigating whether  he  was  operating his motor  vehicle in an  impaired condition… .  People v Brown, 105134, 3rd Dept 6-27-13

 

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