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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION APPLIED (LABOR LAW 240 (1)) AND WHETHER DEFENDANT CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (LABOR LAW 200).

The Third Department determined there were questions of fact whether defendant intended to reside in the two-family home plaintiff was working on (thereby triggering the homeowner’s exemption from Labor Law liability) and whether defendant created a dangerous condition by providing a ladder that was too short. Therefore defendant’s motions for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) and 200 causes of action were properly denied:

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“Although Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 each ‘impose nondelegable duties upon contractors, owners and their agents to comply with certain safety practices for the protection of workers engaged in various construction-related activities . . .[,] the Legislature has carved out an exemption for the owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work'”… . The exemption stems from the legislative determination “that the typical homeowner is no better situated than the hired worker to furnish appropriate safety devices and to procure suitable insurance protection”… . The exemption does not “encompass homeowners who use their one or two-family premises entirely and solely for commercial purposes”… . In this regard, “renovating a residence for resale or rental plainly qualifies as work being performed for a commercial purpose” … . The relevant inquiry is “‘the homeowners’ intentions at the time of the injury underlying the action'” … .

Despite defendant’s submissions indicating that he intended to use the house, at least in part, as his own residence, defendant also submitted the deposition of plaintiff, who testified that defendant had told him that he planned to rent both halves of the two-family home. Thus, defendant’s submissions, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, failed to meet his prima facie burden of establishing his entitlement to the homeowner’s exemption … . …

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Where, as here, the injured worker contends that the underlying “accident arose not from the manner in which the work was performed, but rather from an allegedly dangerous condition at the work site, liability for a violation of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence will be imposed if the property owner created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it, and failed to remedy the condition within a reasonable amount of time”…  . According to plaintiff’s deposition testimony, defendant created the dangerous condition that caused his fall and failed to remedy it despite plaintiff’s complaints. More specifically, and according to plaintiff, defendant supplied plaintiff with a ladder that was too short for the fascia project that defendant had asked him to complete and, despite plaintiff voicing his concerns about the ladder, defendant told plaintiff that the project needed to be completed before plaintiff left that day. Plaintiff further testified that defendant thereafter held the same ladder that plaintiff had indicated was too short while plaintiff climbed it and then reached to attempt the fascia work before falling. Vogler v Perrault, 2017 NY Slip Op 02857, 3rd Dept 4-13-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION APPLIED (LABOR LAW 240 (1)) AND WHETHER DEFENDANT CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (LABOR LAW 200))/HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION APPLIED (LABOR LAW 240 (1)) AND WHETHER DEFENDANT CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (LABOR LAW 200))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION APPLIED (LABOR LAW 240 (1)) AND WHETHER DEFENDANT CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (LABOR LAW 200))

PETITIONER LACKED STANDING TO CONTEST BAN ON FRACKING.

The Third Department determined petitioner lacked standing to challenge the statewide ban on fracking:

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In 2010, then Governor David Paterson issued an executive order prohibiting respondent Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC) from issuing permits for the use of high volume hydraulic fracturing (hereinafter HVHF) for the stimulation of oil and gas wells pending the completion of a supplemental generic environmental impact statement under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8). That order was extended by Governor Andrew Cuomo in 2011 and remained in effect when petitioner, in December 2014, first wrote to respondent Commissioner of Environmental Conservation seeking permission to conduct HVHF on his properties in Allegany and Monroe Counties. …

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We agree with Supreme Court that petitioner lacked standing to challenge the statewide prohibition on HVHF. “Standing is a threshold determination, resting in part on policy considerations, that a person should be allowed access to the courts to adjudicate the merits of a particular dispute that satisfies the other justiciability criteria” … . In order to have standing in a land use matter, petitioner must demonstrate, among other things, that he “would suffer direct harm, injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large” … .

At the time of commencement of this proceeding, petitioner had not applied for a permit nor offered any proof that he met any of the requirements to obtain a permit. He offered no proof of any plans to move forward with the process and conceded that any plans would necessarily involve commitments by oil and gas exploration companies, of which he had none. Petitioner’s standing at the time of filing was no different than that of any landowner in the state; thus he lacked standing to challenge the determination … . Matter of Morabito v Martens, 2017 NY Slip Op 02863, 3rd Dept 4-13-17

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (PETITIONER LACKED STANDING TO CONTEST BAN ON FRACKING)/FRACKING (PETITIONER LACKED STANDING TO CONTEST BAN ON FRACKING)

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COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO ALLOW AMENDMENT OF CONSPIRACY COUNT BY ADDING AN OVERT ACT, ISSUE HEARD ON APPEAL DESPITE LACK OF PRESERVATION AND FAILURE TO RAISE ON APPEAL.

The Third Department determined County Count did not have the authority to amend a defective conspiracy count by allowing the People to add an overt act. The court entertained the issue even though it was not preserved and it was not raised on appeal. The Third Department had made the same ruling in the codefendant’s (Placido’s) appeal:

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In connection with Placido’s appeal, this Court has held that count 2 of the indictment was jurisdictionally defective and that County Court lacked the authority to grant the People’s motion to amend that count … ). In light of the fact that count 2 of the indictment was identical in respect to Placido and defendant, it necessarily follows that this Court’s holding in People v Placido … applies with equal force to defendant. Accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that defendant did not raise this issue before County Court and does not raise it on appeal, we exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction and reverse defendant’s conviction for conspiracy in the fourth degree. People v Deleon, 2017 NY Slip Op 02848, 3rd Dept 4-13-17

CRIMINAL LAW (COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO ALLOW AMENDMENT OF CONSPIRACY COUNT BY ADDING AN OVERT ACT, ISSUE HEARD ON APPEAL DESPITE LACK OF PRESERVATION AND FAILURE TO RAISE ON APPEAL)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO ALLOW AMENDMENT OF CONSPIRACY COUNT BY ADDING AN OVERT ACT, ISSUE HEARD ON APPEAL DESPITE LACK OF PRESERVATION AND FAILURE TO RAISE ON APPEAL)/INDICTMENTS (COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO ALLOW AMENDMENT OF CONSPIRACY COUNT BY ADDING AN OVERT ACT, ISSUE HEARD ON APPEAL DESPITE LACK OF PRESERVATION AND FAILURE TO RAISE ON APPEAL)

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A RECORDED OPTION TO BUY LAND WAS PROPERLY ORDERED DESPITE THE INABILITY TO IMMEDIATELY RECORD THE DEED UPON PURCHASE, TRANSFER OF THE DEED, NOT RECORDING OF THE DEED, WAS ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED BY THE OPTION AGREEMENT.

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined a recorded option agreement allowing plaintiff to buy back a portion of the parcel of land sold by the plaintiff was enforceable against subsequent purchasers of the parcel, even though the deed to the option property could not be recorded at the time the option was exercised (subdivision approval would be necessary to record the deed). The court held that because only transfer of the deed, not the recording of the deed, was required under the option agreement, the agreement could be enforced by an action for specific performance (which requires that the buyer be ready, willing and able to purchase the property when the option is exercised):

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… “[N]othing within the four corners of the option agreement requires plaintiff to obtain subdivision approval prior to exercising its option with respect to the 3.5-acre parcel, nor does the option agreement provide that the failure to obtain such approval renders the underlying agreement null and void” … . Further, as Supreme Court correctly noted, Real Property Law § 291 does not compel plaintiff to actually record the reconveyance deed for the subject parcel, as “recording is not required in order to transfer title to real property” (… see Real Property Law § 291). Rather, title to property vests upon the execution and delivery of the deed (see Real Property Law § 244…), and the fact that the deed may not be recorded until a later date — or at all — does not affect the validity of the conveyance … . While it is true that, generally speaking, prudence would suggest that a grantee record his or her deed, there is no requirement that he or she do so. More to the point, we do not interpret the option agreement before us as requiring plaintiff to record the deed obtained subsequent to exercising its rights relative to the 3.5-acre parcel — only a provision that, if it elects to do so, it be at its expense.  Tomhannock, LLC v Roustabout Resources, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 02712, 3rd Dept 4-6-17

REAL PROPERTY (SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A RECORDED OPTION TO BUY LAND WAS PROPERLY ORDERED DESPITE THE INABILITY TO IMMEDIATELY RECORD THE DEED UPON PURCHASE, TRANSFER OF THE DEED, NOT RECORDING OF THE DEED, WAS ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED BY THE OPTION AGREEMENT)/SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (REAL PROPERTY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A RECORDED OPTION TO BUY LAND WAS PROPERLY ORDERED DESPITE THE INABILITY TO IMMEDIATELY RECORD THE DEED UPON PURCHASE, TRANSFER OF THE DEED, NOT RECORDING OF THE DEED, WAS ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED BY THE OPTION AGREEMENT)/DEEDS  (SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A RECORDED OPTION TO BUY LAND WAS PROPERLY ORDERED DESPITE THE INABILITY TO IMMEDIATELY RECORD THE DEED UPON PURCHASE, TRANSFER OF THE DEED, NOT RECORDING OF THE DEED, WAS ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED BY THE OPTION AGREEMENT)/OPTION AGREEMENTS (REAL PROPERTY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A RECORDED OPTION TO BUY LAND WAS PROPERLY ORDERED DESPITE THE INABILITY TO IMMEDIATELY RECORD THE DEED UPON PURCHASE, TRANSFER OF THE DEED, NOT RECORDING OF THE DEED, WAS ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED BY THE OPTION AGREEMENT)

RESPONDENT NOT INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT IN THIS PINS PROCEEDING, ORDER OF DISPOSITION VACATED.

The Third Department vacated Family Court’s order of disposition in the PINS matter finding that respondent had violated the terms of his probation. Respondent was never informed of his right to remain silent:

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“Family Court Act § 741 (a) requires that at a respondent’s initial appearance in a proceeding and at the commencement of any hearing under Family Court Act article 7, the respondent and his or her parent or other person legally responsible for his or her care be advised of the respondent’s right to remain silent” … . … Respondent … argues that Family Court did not comply with Family Ct Act § 741 in this proceeding, … and our review confirms that Family Court failed to apprise him of his right to remain silent at either the initial appearance or fact-finding hearing. As a result, the appealed-from order of disposition must be vacated … . Matter of Daniel XX., 2017 NY Slip Op 02717, 3rd Dept 4-6-17

FAMILY LAW (RESPONDENT NOT INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT INT HIS PINS PROCEEDING, ORDER OF DISPOSITION VACATED)/PINS (RESPONDENT NOT INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT INT HIS PINS PROCEEDING, ORDER OF DISPOSITION VACATED)

DESPITE THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY IN THIS PATERNITY PROCEEDING, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A BEST INTERESTS HEARING.

The Third Department determined Family Court should not have dismissed the paternity petition based solely on the presumption of legitimacy and should have held a best interests hearing:

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We agree with petitioner that, as he made the requisite threshold showing of “a nonfrivolous controversy as to paternity” … , his request for genetic testing should not have been denied in the absence of a best interests finding.

In enacting the statutory provisions, the Legislature plainly anticipated that cases involving the presumption of legitimacy may present themselves in which, based upon all of the circumstances, it will not be in a child’s best interests to order genetic testing… . Although respondents ask us to find that this is such a case, we are unable to exercise our broad power of review to render the best interests determination upon the present record. The limited testimony that was taken at the hearing failed to address many of the factors that have been recognized in similar proceedings as relevant to the issue of the child’s best interests. These include such factors as the child’s interest in knowing the identity of his or her biological father, whether testing may have a traumatic effect on the child, and whether continued uncertainty may have a negative impact on a parent-child relationship in the absence of testing … . * * *

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Accordingly, the matter must be remitted for a hearing and a determination as to whether, based upon all of the circumstances, including the presumption of legitimacy, genetic testing would be in the child’s best interests … . Matter of Mario WW. v Kristin XX., 2017 NY Slip Op 02715, 3rd Dept 4-6-17

 

FAMILY LAW (DESPITE THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY IN THIS PATERNITY PROCEEDING, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A BEST INTERESTS HEARING)/PATERNITY (DESPITE THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY IN THIS PATERNITY PROCEEDING, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A BEST INTERESTS HEARING)/LEGITIMACY, PRESUMPTION OF  (DESPITE THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY IN THIS PATERNITY PROCEEDING, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A BEST INTERESTS HEARING)

GRANDMOTHER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A PROLONGED SEPARATION OF THE CHILD FROM MOTHER OR THE MOTHER’S RELINQUISHMENT OF CONTROL AND CARE, CUSTODY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO GRANDMOTHER.

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined grandmother (petitioner) did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances justifying the award of custody of the child to her. Despite mother’s move to Florida while the child remained with grandmother, the proof did not demonstrate either a prolonged separation from mother or mother’s relinquishment of care and control. The decision includes a detailed explanation of the relevant law:

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While petitioner demonstrated that the child continuously resided with her for an 11-month period following the mother’s move to Florida, she failed to proffer sufficient evidence to establish that this was a prolonged separation of the mother and the child during which the mother voluntarily relinquished care and control of the child to her. Indeed, petitioner’s testimony demonstrated that the mother maintained consistent contact with the child throughout her 11-month residence in Florida. In particular, petitioner stated that the mother regularly called the child, visited the child over Christmas and paid for petitioner and the child to fly to Florida over the child’s April vacation.

With respect to voluntary relinquishment, petitioner merely stated that she and the mother had discussed the mother’s move to Florida, but had never discussed whether the mother intended the child to move with her. In stark contrast, the mother testified that, prior to moving, she and petitioner had a discussion about the child remaining in New York only until such time as she had secured employment and prepared suitable living arrangements for herself and the child in Florida. Further, the mother testified that, after she was established in Florida, she only allowed the child to remain in New York because the child had asked to stay through the end of the school year. Despite that Family Court did not make any express credibility determinations resolving the conflicting testimony of petitioner and the mother, this Court’s fact-finding authority is as broad as that of Family Court … . In an exercise of that broad fact-finding authority, we find the mother’s account, which demonstrates that she did not intend to cede care and control of the child to petitioner, to be the more credible one.

Moreover, petitioner offered little to no evidence as to her role, if any, in making important decisions affecting the child’s life. Matter of Donna SS. v Amy TT., 2017 NY Slip Op 02710, 3rd Dept 4-6-17

 

FAMILY LAW (GRANDMOTHER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A PROLONGED SEPARATION OF THE CHILD FROM MOTHER OR THE MOTHER’S RELINQUISHMENT OF CONTROL AND CARE, CUSTODY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO GRANDMOTHER)/CUSTODY (GRANDMOTHER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A PROLONGED SEPARATION OF THE CHILD FROM MOTHER OR THE MOTHER’S RELINQUISHMENT OF CONTROL AND CARE, CUSTODY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO GRANDMOTHER)

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SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED.

The Third Department, hearing an Article 78 petition, over an extensive two-justice dissent, annulled the determination of SUNY Postdam which found student petitioner guilty of sexual misconduct and expelled him. The court noted its discomfort with several procedural issues and with the punishment imposed. The Third Department held that the determination was not supported by substantial evidence:

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The complainant’s account was set forth by others who had conversed with her, with the Hearing Board considering written notes prepared by respondent Annette Robbins, SUNY’s director of student conduct and community standards, and the hearing testimony of a campus police officer. * * *

… [H]earsay must be “sufficiently relevant and probative [if it is] to constitute substantial evidence” … and, “when the hearsay evidence is seriously controverted, common sense and elemental fairness suggest that it may not constitute the substantial evidence necessary to support the [challenged] determination” … .

Petitioner testified at the hearing and, while the broad contours of his account matched those of the complainant, their accounts differed on the critical issue of consent. * * *

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… [W]e feel the need to comment on the circumstances leading to its imposition. Upon petitioner’s appeal from the decision of the Hearing Board, the Appellate Board, sua sponte and without any explanation, recommended enhancing the penalty to expulsion. …  While nothing in the student code of conduct expressly prohibits the Appellate Board from recommending, and SUNY’s president from ultimately imposing, a more severe sanction upon a disciplined student’s appeal, nor does the student code of conduct explicitly advise an appealing student that such a consequence may inure as a result of an appeal. We are troubled by the absence of any such clear articulation that an enhanced penalty may result from a student’s choice to appeal the underlying determination and believe that, in this context, fairness warrants a clear and conspicuous advisement to that effect. Matter of Haug v State Univ. of N.Y. At Potsdam, 2017 NY Slip Op 02708, 3rd Dept 4-6-17

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)/EVIDENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,  (SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)/COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (MISCONDUCT, SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)/HEARSAY (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, SUNY POTSDAM’S SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DETERMINATION ANNULLED, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IMPOSITION OF A HARSHER PENALTY AFTER STUDENT’S APPEAL CRITICIZED)

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DEFENDANT ARGUED HAD SHE BEEN INFORMED DEPORTATION WAS NOT AN ISSUE SHE WOULD HAVE PLED GUILTY AND THEREBY AVOIDED THE LONGER SENTENCE IMPOSED AFTER TRIAL, HEARING ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE HER CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD.

The Third Department determined a hearing should have been held on defendant’s motion to set aside her conviction after trial on ineffective assistance grounds. Defendant argued that had she known she could not be deported based upon a guilty plea she would not have gone to trial and thereby been subject to a longer sentence:

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Defendant maintains that, had counsel properly determined her immigration status during the course of her representation, she would likely have entered a guilty plea. She would have thus been exposed to less prison time than she received after trial, much like that of her codefendant. We note that miscommunications in matters such as this have provided a basis for finding that a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel … . People v Monterio, 2017 NY Slip Op 02693, 3rd Dept 4-6-17

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT ARGUED HAD SHE BEEN INFORMED DEPORTATION WAS NOT AN ISSUE SHE WOULD HAVE PLED GUILTY AND THEREBY AVOIDED THE LONGER SENTENCE IMPOSED AFTER TRIAL, HEARING ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE HER CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT ARGUED HAD SHE BEEN INFORMED DEPORTATION WAS NOT AN ISSUE SHE WOULD HAVE PLED GUILTY AND THEREBY AVOIDED THE LONGER SENTENCE IMPOSED AFTER TRIAL, HEARING ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE HER CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD)/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (DEFENDANT ARGUED HAD SHE BEEN INFORMED DEPORTATION WAS NOT AN ISSUE SHE WOULD HAVE PLED GUILTY AND THEREBY AVOIDED THE LONGER SENTENCE IMPOSED AFTER TRIAL, HEARING ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE HER CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD)/SET ASIDE CONVICTION, MOTION TO  (DEFENDANT ARGUED HAD SHE BEEN INFORMED DEPORTATION WAS NOT AN ISSUE SHE WOULD HAVE PLED GUILTY AND THEREBY AVOIDED THE LONGER SENTENCE IMPOSED AFTER TRIAL, HEARING ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE HER CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD)

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COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ALLOW PEOPLE TO AMEND A DEFECTIVE CONSPIRACY COUNT BY ADDING AN ALLEGED OVERT ACT.

The Third Department determined County Court should not have allowed the People to amend a conspiracy count which did not charge the commission of an overt act:

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Given that “[a]n indictment may not be amended in any respect . . . for the purpose of curing: (a) [a] failure . . . to charge or state an offense; or (b) “[l]egal insufficiency of the factual allegations” (CPL 200.70 [2]), County Court had no authority to grant the People’s motion to amend the indictment to allege an overt act. Moreover, the People’s contention that defendant consented to the amendment is directly contradicted by the fact that defendant specifically argued that the proper remedy for the People’s failure was dismissal of count 2 of the indictment. Accordingly, as count 2 was jurisdictionally defective and not subject to amendment, we reverse the conviction for conspiracy in the fourth degree and the sentence imposed thereon … . People v Placido, 2017 NY Slip Op 02694, 3rd Dept 4-6-17

CRIMINAL LAW (COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ALLOW PEOPLE TO AMEND A DEFECTIVE CONSPIRACY COUNT BY ADDING AN ALLEGED OVERT ACT)/INDICTMENT, AMENDMENT OF (COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ALLOW PEOPLE TO AMEND A DEFECTIVE CONSPIRACY COUNT BY ADDING AN ALLEGED OVERT ACT)/CONSPIRACY (CRIMINAL LAW, COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ALLOW PEOPLE TO AMEND A DEFECTIVE CONSPIRACY COUNT BY ADDING AN ALLEGED OVERT ACT)

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