You are here: / Third Department

Tag Archive for: Third Department

FALL ON SIDEWALK NEAR PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT NOT COMPENSABLE, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined claimant was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits stemming from a fall on a sidewalk near her plaice of employment. The relevant criteria were explained:

As a general rule, “accidents that occur in public areas away from the workplace and outside of work hours are not compensable” …  and, thus, “injuries sustained during travel to and from the place of employment” are not compensable… . Where, as here, the accident occurred near the claimant’s place of employment, “there develops a gray area where the risks of street travel merge with the risks attendant with employment and where the mere fact that the accident took place on a public road or sidewalk may not ipso facto negate the right to compensation” … . Under these circumstances, injuries will be compensable only if there was “(1) a special hazard at the particular off-premises point and (2) a close association of the access route with the premises, so far as going and coming are concerned” … , permitting the conclusion that “the accident happened as an incident and risk of employment” … . “Notably, the Board in the exercise of its fact-finding powers has the authority to make a discretionary determination of the risks attendant to employment under the particular circumstances of a case”… .

Here, there is no evidence that there was any special hazard on the uneven sidewalk where claimant fell, which was open to and used by the public, as the danger “existed to any passerby traveling along the street in that location” … . The sidewalk was near the privately-owned building where claimant worked, but the building housed many businesses and a restaurant and was open to the public, and there was “no showing that it was otherwise controlled by the employer, that workers were encouraged to use it or that it existed solely to provide access to [her] workplace” … . As substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that claimant’s accident did not occur in the course of her employment, it will not be disturbed.  Matter of Brennan v New York State Dept. of Health, 2018 NY Slip Op 01974, Third Dept 3-22-18

WORKERS’S COMPENSATION LAW (FALL ON SIDEWALK NEAR PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT NOT COMPENSABLE, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT))

AUTO DAMAGE APPRAISER NOT AN EMPLOYEE, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, determined claimant appraiser was not an employee of SCA Enterprises and was not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

SCA Enterprises Inc. is engaged in the business of connecting appraisers with its clients, which are insurance carriers, to assist in processing automobile damage claims across the United States. Although it conducts the majority of its business through designated franchisees who perform appraisals in specific geographic regions, it also utilizes independent appraisers in areas that are not covered by its franchise agreements. SCA uses a computerized operating system, known as the dashboard, to match franchisees and independent appraisers with assignments that are posted by its insurance carriers. Claimant, doing business as New Hartford Appraisal Service, is an independent appraiser who obtained assignments through SCA and filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits after those assignments ended. …

… SCA does not withhold taxes from the compensation that it pays to the independent appraisers, reimburse them for expenses or provide them with fringe benefits, training, equipment, tools, uniforms, business cards, supplies or office space. It also does not supervise their work, require them to attend meetings or review their final appraisal reports. Moreover, the independent appraisers set their own work schedules, are free to work for competitors, may take time off without SCA’s permission and refuse assignments without penalty. The requirements of the assignment, including the deadline by which the final report must be submitted, are dictated by the insurance carriers, not SCA. If there is a problem with an appraisal report, SCA simply passes the information on to the independent appraiser. The provisions of the service contract that the independent appraisers sign with SCA designate them as independent contractors and underscore their autonomy. Matter of Courto (SCA Enters. Inc.–Commissioner of Labor), 2018 NY Slip Op 01970, Third Dept 3-22-18

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (AUTO DAMAGE APPRAISER NOT AN EMPLOYEE, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/APPRAISER (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, AUTO DAMAGE APPRAISER NOT AN EMPLOYEE, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))

,

PLEA COLLOQUY INSUFFICIENT, CONVICTION REVERSED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction by guilty plea, determined the plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent:

Although the claim has not been preserved for our review given the absence of an appropriate postallocution motion by defendant, we nevertheless exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction and take corrective action under the particular circumstances presented… . “While there is no mandatory catechism required of a pleading defendant, there must be an affirmative showing on the record that the defendant waived his or her constitutional rights” … . Here, the record reveals the absence of a meaningful plea colloquy and that defendant entered his guilty plea without County Court providing any instruction on its implications or the rights that he was waiving by entering it … . People v Schmitz, 2018 NY Slip Op 01960, Third Dept 3-22-18

CRIMINAL LAW (PLEA COLLOQUY INSUFFICIENT, CONVICTION REVERSED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT))/GUILTY PLEA  (PLEA COLLOQUY INSUFFICIENT, CONVICTION REVERSED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, INTEREST OF JUSTICE, PLEA COLLOQUY INSUFFICIENT, CONVICTION REVERSED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT))/INTEREST OF JUSTICE (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, PLEA COLLOQUY INSUFFICIENT, CONVICTION REVERSED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT))/COLLOQUY (CRIMINAL LAW, (PLEA COLLOQUY INSUFFICIENT, CONVICTION REVERSED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT))

,

MORTGAGE COMPANY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION TO SEEK EQUITABLE SUBROGATION TO THE WIFE’S INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, CRITERIA FOR AMENDING A COMPLAINT, RATIFICATION OF THE EXECUTION OF A MORTGAGE, AND EQUITABLE SUBROGATION EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, over a partial dissent, determined plaintiff mortgage company should have been allowed to amend its complaint to seek equitable subrogation in this foreclosure action. Defendants husband (Feller) and wife had a mortgage on the subject property. Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest subsequently provided a mortgage loan to defendant husband alone and the proceeds were used to pay off the first mortgage. Plaintiff’s predecessor then procured a judgment in foreclosure, but only with respect to defendant husband’s interest in the property. Plaintiff  sought to amend its complaint alleging it was entitled to the wife’s interest in the property (equitable subrogation). The court further found that defendant wife did not ratify the execution of the husband’s mortgage and explained the criteria for ratification:

As we recently clarified, the party seeking leave to amend a pleading “need not establish the merits of the proposed amendment” … . Rather, the appropriate standard to be applied on a motion for leave to amend a pleading is that, “‘in the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay in seeking leave, such applications are to be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit'” … . …

Ratification … is the express or implied “adoption of the acts of another by one for whom the other assumes to be acting, but without authority” … . …[P]laintiff has not alleged any unauthorized act on the part of Feller. It is undisputed that Feller and defendant held the property at issue as tenants by the entirety, and “there is nothing in New York law that prevents one of the co-owners from mortgaging or making an effective conveyance of his or her own interest in the tenancy. To the contrary, each tenant may sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber his or her rights in the property, subject to the continuing rights of the other” … .

Here, plaintiff’s predecessor in interest, Countrywide, provided funds through a second mortgage on the subject property to pay off a first mortgage securing a loan that both defendant and Feller were obligated to pay. Defendant would therefore be unjustly enriched if the doctrine of equitable subrogation were not applied, as denial of this equitable remedy “would provide a windfall to [defendant] by allowing [her] to have [her] original mortgage debt extinguished while at the same time maintain a right to the subject property that is superior to the mortgagee that furnished the funds that extinguished the first mortgage” … . Green Tree Servicing, LLC v Feller, 2018 NY Slip Op 01973, Third Dept 3-22-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, MORTGAGE COMPANY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION TO SEEK EQUITABLE SUBROGATION TO THE WIFE’S INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, CRITERIA FOR AMENDING A COMPLAINT, RATIFICATION OF THE EXECUTION OF A MORTGAGE, AND EQUITABLE SUBROGATION EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT))/FORECLOSURE (MORTGAGE COMPANY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION TO SEEK EQUITABLE SUBROGATION TO THE WIFE’S INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, CRITERIA FOR AMENDING A COMPLAINT, RATIFICATION OF THE EXECUTION OF A MORTGAGE, AND EQUITABLE SUBROGATION EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT))/RATIFICATION (FORECLOSURE, MORTGAGE COMPANY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION TO SEEK EQUITABLE SUBROGATION TO THE WIFE’S INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, CRITERIA FOR AMENDING A COMPLAINT, RATIFICATION OF THE EXECUTION OF A MORTGAGE, AND EQUITABLE SUBROGATION EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT))/EQUITABLE SUBROGATION (FORECLOSURE,  MORTGAGE COMPANY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION TO SEEK EQUITABLE SUBROGATION TO THE WIFE’S INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, CRITERIA FOR AMENDING A COMPLAINT, RATIFICATION OF THE EXECUTION OF A MORTGAGE, AND EQUITABLE SUBROGATION EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT))/MORTGAGES (FORECLOSURE, MORTGAGE COMPANY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION TO SEEK EQUITABLE SUBROGATION TO THE WIFE’S INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, CRITERIA FOR AMENDING A COMPLAINT, RATIFICATION OF THE EXECUTION OF A MORTGAGE, AND EQUITABLE SUBROGATION EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT))

,

CLAIMANT PROPERLY DENIED UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS DURING FIRST SEVEN WEEKS OF A STRIKE, ALTERNATIVE WORK SITE AVAILABLE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined claimant was properly denied unemployment insurance benefits for the first seven weeks of a strike because an alternative work site was available:

Pursuant to Labor Law § 592 (1), unemployment insurance benefits are suspended during the first consecutive seven weeks of a strike or industrial controversy beginning the day after a claimant ceases working due to a strike, unless there has been a peremptory lockout by the employer … . The record reflects that claimant did not work during the relevant period due to the strike, and that he refused his manager’s directive to report to an alternate work site that was open, staffed by supervisors and operational during the strike. Thus, substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination to suspend his benefits pursuant to Labor Law § 592 (1) … . The record also demonstrates that the employer did not, at any point, institute a work stoppage or lockout preventing employees from working but, rather, the union initiated the strike and work stoppage, in which claimant participated. Further, as the Board correctly determined, the employer’s decision to consolidate operations due to the strike and to temporarily assign claimant to a nearby work site did not constitute a “lockout[]” … , which only occurs upon “the refusal by an employer to furnish available work to [its] regular employees” … . Matter of Parron (Commissioner of Labor), 2018 NY Slip Op 01696, Second Dept 3-15-18

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (STRIKES, CLAIMANT PROPERLY DENIED UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS DURING FIRST SEVEN WEEKS OF A STRIKE, ALTERNATIVE WORK SITE AVAILABLE (THIRD DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, STRIKES, CLAIMANT PROPERLY DENIED UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS DURING FIRST SEVEN WEEKS OF A STRIKE, ALTERNATIVE WORK SITE AVAILABLE (THIRD DEPT))/STRIKES (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, CLAIMANT PROPERLY DENIED UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS DURING FIRST SEVEN WEEKS OF A STRIKE, ALTERNATIVE WORK SITE AVAILABLE (THIRD DEPT))

UNDER THE LAW AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE SENTENCED TO ADDITIONAL INCARCERATION FOR A VIOLATION OF HIS CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE IN THIS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED CASE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined, under law at the time of the offense, defendant should not have been sentenced to additional incarceration for a violation of his conditional discharge in this driving while intoxicated case:

After he served his jail term, a declaration of delinquency was filed in 2015, claiming that he violated his conditional discharge by operating a vehicle without an ignition interlock device. In 2016, defendant admitted to violating the terms of his conditional discharge, and County Court revoked the conditional discharge and sentenced him to an additional aggregate prison term of 1 to 3 years, to be followed by three years of conditional discharge. Defendant appeals.

The People concede, and we agree, that pursuant to our recent decision in People v Coon (156 AD3d 105 [2017]), the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon defendant’s violation of the terms of his conditional discharge must be vacated. “A defendant must be sentenced according to the law as it existed at the time that he or she committed the offense and, at the time defendant operated a vehicle without an ignition interlock device, the applicable law did not allow for the imposition of an additional period of imprisonment” … . People v Arvidson, 2018 NY Slip Op 01682, Third Dept 3-15-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DWI, UNDER THE LAW AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE SENTENCED TO ADDITIONAL INCARCERATION FOR A VIOLATION OF HIS CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE IN THIS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED CASE (THIRD DEPT))/DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE, UNDER THE LAW AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE SENTENCED TO ADDITIONAL INCARCERATION FOR A VIOLATION OF HIS CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE IN THIS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED CASE (THIRD DEPT))/SENTENCING (DWI, VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE,  UNDER THE LAW AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE SENTENCED TO ADDITIONAL INCARCERATION FOR A VIOLATION OF HIS CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE IN THIS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED CASE (THIRD DEPT))/CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE, VIOLATION OF (DWI, UNDER THE LAW AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE SENTENCED TO ADDITIONAL INCARCERATION FOR A VIOLATION OF HIS CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE IN THIS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED CASE (THIRD DEPT))

EVIDENCE PETITIONER HAD ACCESS TO THE AREA WHERE THE CONTRABAND WAS FOUND WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE PETITIONER’S POSSESSION OF THE CONTRABAND (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, annulling the misbehavior determination, found that the evidence petitioner possessed contraband was insufficient. The fact that petitioner had access to the area where the contraband was found was not enough. A lock pick had been found in a door mechanism:

The correction officer who served as the facility’s locksmith testified that the lock pick did not belong to him and that, because the lock pick was observed to be dirty, the lock pick had probably been in the tracking of the cell door for a while prior to its discovery. The Hearing Officer accepted as true petitioner’s testimony that he had initially complained that the cell door would not close and that the door had been opened and closed numerous times without a problem on the day in question. We find significant petitioner’s testimony that he alerted facility staff to the malfunctioning door and the locksmith’s testimony suggesting that the lock pick had most likely been hidden in the tracking of the cell door for an extended period of time and prior to petitioner’s occupation of the cell … . In our view, these circumstances do not permit a reasonable inference that petitioner possessed the contraband simply because he might have had access to the area where the contraband was found and that it, to some extent, was under his control … . Matter of Perez v Annucci, 2018 NY Slip Op 01521, Third Dept 3-8-18

DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS (INMATES) EVIDENCE PETITIONER HAD ACCESS TO THE AREA WHERE THE CONTRABAND WAS FOUND WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE PETITIONER’S POSSESSION OF THE CONTRABAND (THIRD DEPT))

, , ,

NO EVIDENCE OF THREATENED USE OF A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT, ROBBERY FIRST CONVICTION NOT SUPPORTED, COUNTY COURT DID NOT CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY INTO DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST TO WITHDRAW, CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, over a dissent, determined the evidence was insufficient to support the robbery first degree charge (no evidence of threat with a dangerous instrument) and the trial court should have conducted an inquiry into defense counsel’s request to withdraw:

Indisputably, the “gun” was plastic and did not work, and there was no evidence that it could potentially harm someone… . Similarly, while there was testimony that one of the men entering the motel room was holding the tire checker, there was no evidence that any individual brandished the tire checker in a threatening manner… . … [T]here is no question that one of the individuals possessed a dangerous instrument. What was missing was any evidence that there was any verbal threat of immediate use of the instrument or that it was “employ[ed]” in any way … . * * *

… [D]efendant’s right to counsel was not adequately protected. County Court’s determination focused on the inconveniences that would result if counsel were substituted and the trial were delayed one month, as well as defendant’s propensity to complain. But it was trial counsel, not defendant, complaining that the relationship had broken down, and the request was not made on the eve of trial. While we are not suggesting that a request made by counsel warrants heightened inquiry, “a conflict of interest or other irreconcilable conflict with counsel” may constitute good cause for substitution… , and there was no inquiry here to assess the gravity of counsel’s concerns in this regard. The motion raised specific examples to support trial counsel’s claim that there was “an irretrievable breakdown” in the relationship with defendant. As such, the court should have first questioned both defendant and trial counsel about “the nature of the disagreement or its potential for resolution” prior to denying the motion … . Absent such a “minimal inquiry,” we are compelled to reverse the judgment of conviction … . People v Matthews, 2018 NY Slip Op 01499, Second Dept 3-8-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, ATTORNEYS, NO EVIDENCE OF THREATENED USE OF A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT, ROBBERY FIRST CONVICTION NOT SUPPORTED, COUNTY COURT DID NOT CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY INTO DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST TO WITHDRAW, CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/ROBBERY (DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT, NO EVIDENCE OF THREATENED USE OF A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT, ROBBERY FIRST CONVICTION NOT SUPPORTED (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (ROBBERY, DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT, NO EVIDENCE OF THREATENED USE OF A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT, ROBBERY FIRST CONVICTION NOT SUPPORTED (THIRD DEPT))/DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT (ROBBERY, NO EVIDENCE OF THREATENED USE OF A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT, ROBBERY FIRST CONVICTION NOT SUPPORTED (THIRD DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, COUNTY COURT DID NOT CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY INTO DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST TO WITHDRAW, CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/RIGHT TO COUNSEL  (CRIMINAL LAW, COUNTY COURT DID NOT CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY INTO DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST TO WITHDRAW, CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/WITHDRAW (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL, COUNTY COURT DID NOT CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY INTO DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST TO WITHDRAW, CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))

, , ,

QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY COMPLAINT AGAINST THE DISTRIBUTOR AND SELLER OF CLOTHES WHICH CAUGHT FIRE AFTER CONTACT WITH A HEATER, THE HEATER DEFENDANTS WERE AGGRIEVED BY THE DISMISSAL UNDER JOINT LIABILITY PRINCIPLES AND THEREFORE COULD APPEAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department reversed (modified) Supreme Court’s dismissal of products liability complaint against the distributor (At Last Sportswear) and seller (Walmart) of plaintiff’s clothing which caught fire. The court also determined the Enerco defendants (the manufacturer, designer, and distributor of the heater which ignited the clothes) were aggrieved by the order, based upon joint liability principles, and therefore could appeal it:

Although liability can be apportioned between any tortfeasors, whether they are codefendants or nonparties, if an alleged tortfeasor was a codefendant whom the court had dismissed from the case, the law of the case doctrine would preclude the remaining defendants from introducing at trial any evidence regarding the same type of defect or error by that alleged tortfeasor that was previously litigated … . Thus, the Enerco defendants were entitled to challenge motions by any codefendants seeking to be released from the action, they were aggrieved by any orders granting dismissal and they could, therefore, appeal any such orders. …

[At Last’s and Walmart’s] expert opined that the dress materials complied with and exceeded the requirements of the Federal Flammable Fabrics Act (15 USC § 1191 et seq. [hereinafter FFA]) and accompanying regulations (16 CFR part 1610) for general wearing apparel, as well as the industry standard, that the dress was reasonably safe and suitable for its intended use, that it was not defective in any manner and that this type of 100% cotton dress was a standard commodity.  …

… [T]he Enerco defendants submitted an affidavit from their own expert, who opined that the FFA standards are insufficient to determine whether a garment is safe because it addresses only some factors affecting flammability of the fabric but not the design of the garment itself … . He supported his opinion with literature in which industry professionals addressed the inadequacy of the FFA standards to protect consumers. These competing expert opinions present a triable issue of fact regarding whether a design defect exists … . …

The parties’ experts disagreed as to whether labels warning about the dress’s flammability and the need to be cautious around heat sources were appropriate for such general wearing apparel and existed in the United States market for this type of garment. Thus, factual issues remain regarding whether At Last Sportswear and the Wal-Mart defendants breached a duty to warn. Palmatier v Mr. Heater Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 01368, Third Dept 3-1-18

PRODUCTS LIABILITY (QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY COMPLAINT AGAINST THE DISTRIBUTOR AND SELLER OF CLOTHES WHICH CAUGHT FIRE AFTER CONTACT WITH A HEATER, THE HEATER DEFENDANTS WERE AGGRIEVED BY THE DISMISSAL UNDER JOINT LIABILITY PRINCIPLES AND THEREFORE COULD APPEAL (THIRD DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (JOINT TORTFEASORS, (QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY COMPLAINT AGAINST THE DISTRIBUTOR AND SELLER OF CLOTHES WHICH CAUGHT FIRE AFTER CONTACT WITH A HEATER, THE HEATER DEFENDANTS WERE AGGRIEVED BY THE DISMISSAL UNDER JOINT LIABILITY PRINCIPLES AND THEREFORE COULD APPEAL (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (JOINT TORTFEASORS, (QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY COMPLAINT AGAINST THE DISTRIBUTOR AND SELLER OF CLOTHES WHICH CAUGHT FIRE AFTER CONTACT WITH A HEATER, THE HEATER DEFENDANTS WERE AGGRIEVED BY THE DISMISSAL UNDER JOINT LIABILITY PRINCIPLES AND THEREFORE COULD APPEAL (THIRD DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY COMPLAINT AGAINST THE DISTRIBUTOR AND SELLER OF CLOTHES WHICH CAUGHT FIRE AFTER CONTACT WITH A HEATER, THE HEATER DEFENDANTS WERE AGGRIEVED BY THE DISMISSAL UNDER JOINT LIABILITY PRINCIPLES AND THEREFORE COULD APPEAL (THIRD DEPT))/JOINT TORTFEASORS (QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY COMPLAINT AGAINST THE DISTRIBUTOR AND SELLER OF CLOTHES WHICH CAUGHT FIRE AFTER CONTACT WITH A HEATER, THE HEATER DEFENDANTS WERE AGGRIEVED BY THE DISMISSAL UNDER JOINT LIABILITY PRINCIPLES AND THEREFORE COULD APPEAL (THIRD DEPT))

PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ALTERING OR ERECTING A STRUCTURE WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1), DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE METHOD OR MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined plaintiff was not engaged in an activity protected by Labor Law 240 (1) when he was injured and the defendant owner of the property did not supervise or control the manner of plaintiff’s work, requiring dismissal of the Labor Law 200 cause of action as well. The plaintiff worked for a car crushing busing and was standing on a crushed car on a trailer when he was knocked into the air by a piece of heavy equipment:

… [E]ven if we were to agree with plaintiff that the open trailer was a structure as that term is used in Labor Law § 240 (1), the record provides us with no basis to conclude that the activity in which plaintiff was engaged was a protected activity or, as relevant here, that plaintiff was altering or erecting a structure. …

“When an alleged defect or dangerous condition arises from [a] contractor’s methods and the owner exercises no supervisory control over the operation, no liability attaches to the owner under the common law or under Labor Law § 200” … . Lopez v 6071 Enters., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 01372, Third Dept 3-1-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ALTERING OR ERECTING A STRUCTURE WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1), DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE METHOD OR MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/ALTERING OR ERECTING A STRUCTURE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ALTERING OR ERECTING A STRUCTURE WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1), DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE METHOD OR MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy