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SUBSTITUTE TEACHER NOT ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN TWO SUCCESSIVE ACADEMIC YEARS DURING THE PANDEMIC BECAUSE HE RECEIVED ASSURANCE OF CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined claimant, a substitute teacher, was not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits between two successive academic years (during the COVID pandemic) because he had received assurance of continued employment. The dissenters disagreed with the majority’s conclusion claimant had been assured of continued employment:

“[P]ursuant to Labor Law § 590 (10), a professional employed by an educational institution is precluded from receiving unemployment insurance benefits for the period between two successive academic years when he or she has received a reasonable assurance of continued employment” … . “A reasonable assurance has been interpreted as a representation by the employer that substantially the same economic terms and conditions will continue to apply to the extent that the claimant will receive at least 90% of the earnings received during the first academic period” … . “Notably, the question of whether a claimant received a reasonable assurance of reemployment for the following academic year is a question of fact and, if the Board’s findings in that regard are supported by substantial evidence, they will not be disturbed” … . Matter of Jensen (Commissioner of Labor), 2024 NY Slip Op 06253, Third Dept 12-12-24

Practice Point: A substitute teacher is not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits during the period between two successive academic years if he or she has received assurance of continued employment.

 

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DEFENDANT’S 140-YEARS-TO-LIFE SENTENCE IN THIS PREDATORY-SEXUAL-ASSAULT-OF-A-CHILD PROSECUTION DEEMED UNDULY HARSH AND SEVERE; THE PEOPLE HAD TWICE OFFERED A 15-20-YEAR SENTENCE; SENTENCE REDUCED TO 20-TO-LIFE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department held that defendant’s 140 years-to-life sentence in this predatory-sexual-assault-of-a-child prosecution was unduly harsh and severe. The sentence was reduced to 20 years-to-life:​

We turn to defendant’s aggregate sentence of 140 years to life in prison. As a threshold matter, our determination that the sentences imposed on counts 2 and 15 must run concurrently reduces defendant’s aggregate prison term to 118 years to life. The bulk of that remaining aggregate sentence is still consumed by the consecutive 22-years-to-life prison terms imposed for defendant’s convictions of predatory sexual assault against a child under counts 2 and 15, 4, 5, 6 and 7. Although defendant’s crimes are heinous, the sentences on each of those counts are near the top end of the permissible range notwithstanding defendant’s lack of any prior criminal history (see Penal Law § 70.80 [2] …). We also note that the People advocated for the 140-years-to-life aggregate sentence even though that sentence exceeded by over a century their plea offer of 12 to 15 years in satisfaction of all 15 counts of the indictment — an offer they extended twice.

Accordingly, we find that defendant’s aggregate prison sentence is unduly harsh and severe (see CPL 470.15 [6] [b] …). We modify the sentences, in the interest of justice, by reducing the term of imprisonment imposed on defendant’s convictions on the counts of predatory sexual assault against a child (counts 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 15) to 20 years to life, and we direct those sentences to run concurrently with each other. We further modify the sentences imposed on counts 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13 to run concurrently with each other and with the sentences imposed on counts 2 and 15, 4, 5, 6 and 7, resulting in an aggregate prison term of 20 years to life, to be followed by 10 years of postrelease supervision … . People v Mayette, 2024 NY Slip Op 06083, Third Dept 12-5-24

Practice Point: Here the court noted that the People had offered a 15-20-year sentence as part of a plea deal and then advocated for the 140-years-to-life sentence upon conviction, which was imposed. The Third Department reduced the sentence to 20-to-life.​

 

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PURSUANT TO THE TOWN CODE, THE PLANNING BOARD DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO INTERPRET A LOCAL ZONING LAW TO APPROVE A DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, MATTER REMITTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-judge dissent, determined the planning board did not have the power to issue a special use permit and site plan approval for a commercial park:

… [T]he jurisdiction of a zoning board of appeals is appellate in nature (see Town Law § 267-a [4]). Nevertheless, a town possesses the authority to enact a local law or ordinance vesting its zoning board of appeals with original jurisdiction (see Town Law § 267-a [4]), including, for example, to address questions of zoning code interpretation … . Here, the Code of the Town of Thompson expressly provides that the ZBA may pass on matters of interpretation as to whether a proposed use is permitted under the zoning code either “[o]n appeal from a[ ] . . . determination made by an administrative official, or on request by an official, board or agency of the Town” (Code of the Town of Thompson § 250-46 [A] …), the latter option being what was requested by petitioners. * * *

… [I]t is evident that a genuine question exists as to whether the project will fall within a permissible or prohibited use, and the Planning Board improperly resolved this issue on its own. “Planning boards are without power to interpret the local zoning law, as that power is vested exclusively in local code enforcement officials and the zoning board of appeals” … . As such, the issue should have been resolved either by the local code enforcement officer, or by the ZBA upon referral from the Planning Board (see Code of the Town of Thompson §§ 250-41 [C], 250-46 [A] … . Matter of Smith v Town of Thompson Planning Bd., 2024 NY Slip Op 06085, Third Dept 12-5-24

Practice Point: Check the Town Law and the local Town Code to determine whether a Planning Board has the power to act. Here the Planning Board did not have the power to interpret a local zoning law and determine, on its own, that the proposed development is a permissible use of the land.​

 

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NO APPEAL LIES FROM COUNTY COURT’S DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION FOR RESENTENCING UNDER THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA). ​

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Powers, affirming County Court, determined no appeal lies from the dismissal-without-prejudice of defendant’s application for resentencing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA):

… [County Court] dismissed the application without prejudice finding that, although she met the step one eligibility criteria for an alternative sentence, “there [was] no [corroborating] evidence nor even allegations presented that [d]efendant was, at the time of the offense, a victim of domestic violence subjected to substantial abuse inflicted by a member of her family or household” as required by CPL 440.47 (2) (c) … . * * *

Where, as here, the Legislature specifically provides for appealability of certain orders but not others, “an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded” … . “[S]ince the Legislature failed to provide for an appeal from the [dismissal] of an application for resentencing pursuant to [Penal Law § 60.12 and CPL 440.47 (2) (c)], no appeal was intended” … . “Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it so as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used” … . Here, the Legislature intended a different result as to the appealability of orders dismissing without prejudice under step one or step two and an order denying an application on the merits after a hearing under step three, and this Court must give effect to that intention … . Had an appeal from a dismissal without prejudice been intended under step one or step two of the DVSJA, “the [L]egislature could easily have so stated” … . Rather, the language utilized by the Legislature — specifically that dismissal is without prejudice — mandates that the appropriate remedy in this situation is for a defendant to file a new application satisfying the evidentiary requirements of CPL 440.47. Thus, as “[a]ppeals in criminal cases are strictly limited to those authorized by statute,” this appeal is not properly before this Court and must be dismissed … . People v Melissa OO., 2024 NY Slip Op 05920, Third Dept 11-27-24

Practice Point: Criminal appeals are creatures of statutes. Here the DVSJA did not provide for an appeal of the dismissal-without-prejudice of defendant’s application for resentencing. County Court dismissed the application because defendant did not submit evidence she was a victim of domestic abuse.​

 

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SUPREME COURT ERRONEOUSLY IGNORED AN ARTIFICIAL MONUMENT DESCRIBED IN A DEED WHEN ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE A BOUNDARY DISPUTE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the court, when attempting to resolve a boundary dispute, erred in ignoring an artificial monument, a railroad right-of-way, which was described in a deed:

Here, plaintiffs’ deed includes the only deed call to a natural landmark, as it places the southeast corner of plaintiffs’ property at “a willow tree on the bank of the creek.” Haley and Glasser [the parties’ surveyors] agreed that neither the willow tree nor its former location could be ascertained; similarly, the stake and stones called for in the deed at that location could not be found. Glasser also posited that, as creeks meander over time, the modern location of “the bank of the creek” provided no information as to the appropriate location of the southeast corner, so he disregarded that deed call. Glasser then opted to draw plaintiffs’ property to comport with the exact metes and bounds called for in plaintiffs’ deed, and Supreme Court adopted such methodology and accepted the resulting boundary. Even crediting Glasser’s methodology and his assertions about the meandering creek, as Supreme Court did here, Glasser also admitted that the deed call to the former railroad right-of-way reflects an artificial monument, and that he disregarded such deed call. In adopting Glasser’s methodology and accepting the resulting boundary, the court erred as a matter of law, as it focused on the courses and distances in the deed, in contravention of the long-established hierarchy giving preference to deed calls to artificial monuments … . As Supreme Court failed to consider the railroad right-of-way, we exercise our broad powers to review the record on appeal and make the appropriate determinations. Zwack v Hunt, 2024 NY Slip Op 05926, Third Dept 11-27-24

Practice Point: If an artificial monument, here a railroad right-of-way, is described in a deed, it cannot be ignored in attempting to locate boundaries.

 

CLAIMANT DEMONSTRATED HE HAD NOT REMOVED HIMSELF FROM THE LABOR MARKET WITH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE; CLAIMANT WAS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO BENEFITS FROM THE TIME HE DEMONSTRATED ATTACHMENT TO THE WORKFORCE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, over a dissent, determined claimant sufficiently demonstrated he had not removed himself from the job market and was therefore entitled to benefits:

Claimant submitted extensive evidence of his job search, both through job location services and individually, providing more than 600 pages of proof that he filed applications to numerous job postings. These included applications for positions such as dishwasher, doorman, cook, parking garage attendant, kitchen attendant/helper, juice barista and laundry attendant. However, as claimant testified, despite having applied for innumerable jobs, he did not receive any interviews. He also applied for vocational rehabilitation services and was advised to enroll in English as a second language classes, which he promptly did. The WCLJ found that claimant demonstrated attachment to the workforce as of November 16, 2021, the date his English classes started, and we agree.

We are mindful that the Board “is the sole arbiter of witness credibility” … , but the decision here does not hinge on witness credibility. Rather, documentary evidence amply demonstrates that claimant has engaged in a “diligent and persistent job search so as to demonstrate attachment to the labor market” …, and we find that the Board’s conclusion to the contrary is not supported by substantial evidence…. . Matter of Lapan v Trade Winds Envtl., 2024 NY Slip Op 05929, Third Department 11-27-24

Practice Point: Here there was documentary evidence claimant was trying to find work. The Workers’ Compensation Board’s conclusion claimant had removed himself from the workforce was reversed.

 

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HERE THE AUTOMATIC DOOR AT A RESIDENTIAL FACILITY CLOSED ON THE ELDERLY PLAINTIFF; SENSORS WHICH WOULD PREVENT THE DOOR FROM CLOSING WERE AVAILABLE; THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE DOOR WAS SAFE (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the lawsuit stemming from an automatic door at a residential facility closing on the elderly plaintiff should not have been dismissed, despite the evidence that the door was not defective. There was evidence that sensors which would stop the door from closing when a person is in the doorway could have been installed:

Given the competing expert affidavits on whether defendants maintained their property in a reasonably safe condition under the circumstances, Supreme Court erred in awarding defendants summary judgment dismissing the complaint … . Context is essential in gauging whether a property owner has maintained its premises in a reasonably safe condition. Here, defendants knew certain residents required walkers or wheelchairs that would impact their ability to navigate through a doorway, that the facility’s doors were previously serviced for closing too quickly, and that presence sensors were a readily available option from the manufacturer. Plaintiff also sustained a serious injury to her right leg requiring surgery. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party, we find that there are triable issues of fact as to whether the premises were reasonably safe … . Any issue of comparative fault on the part of plaintiff and/or her daughter and grandson who were with her at the time of this incident is a question to be resolved by a factfinder … . Spielman v Glenwyck Dev., LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 05932, Third Dept 11-27-24

Practice Point: Here there was no evidence the automatic door which closed on plaintiff was defective, but there was a question of fact whether the installation of sensors would have rendered the door safe for use by the elderly.

 

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THE HISTORY OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN INFANT PLAINTIFF AND ANOTHER STUDENT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE ATTACK ON INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS FORESEEABLE FROM THE SCHOOL’S PERSPECTIVE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the negligent supervision action against defendant school should not have been dismissed. Infant plaintiff (E.E.) had been attacked and seriously injured by another student (J.H.). Supreme Court found the attack was not foreseeable. The Third Department found the evidence of foreseeability sufficient to raise a question of fact:

The record contains evidence of the following. J.H. had a school disciplinary history of 18 incidents between 2015 and 2018, which resulted in numerous detentions and suspensions. Of these 18 incidents, it appears that at least five involved acts of violence on J.H.’s part. One of the suspensions was for lighting a fellow student’s hair on fire, while another suspension was for her previous attack on E.E. That particular incident involved J.H. borrowing rings from other students in order to maximize the injuries that she could inflict upon E.E. J.H. was also suspended for obtaining unclothed photos of E.E. and posting them online under the guise that it was E.E. who was posting them. By the spring of 2017, school officials were aware that J.H. was suffering from anxiety and depression, had been the subject of a PINS petition, was a runaway risk, exhibited violent behavior, had “no judgment” and was “very unpredictable.” At some point around the middle of the 2017-2018 school year, J.H. screamed at E.E. in a school hallway, “what are you looking at?”, and E.E. reported this to a teacher. Approximately two weeks before the incident in question, J.H.’s mother called a school guidance counselor and warned that J.H. was planning to do something to get herself expelled from school. The district superintendent stated that if she had been made aware of this call, she would have advised the high school principal about it and ensured that there was a safety plan in place.

While we are mindful that there were no specific incidents between J.H. and E.E. for a number of months prior to the subject assault, the evidence of J.H.’s extensive disciplinary history, including acts of violence together with the prior incidents aimed at E.E. herself, as well as the recent warning call from J.H.’s mother, was sufficient to raise triable issues of fact with respect to whether J.H.’s attack on E.E. was foreseeable and whether it was a consequence of a lack of adequate supervision on defendant’s part … . To the extent that defendant argues a lack of foreseeability by pointing to J.H.’s deposition testimony wherein she indicated that she did not plan the attack in advance, we are unpersuaded. “The issue is not the speed of the punch, but the circumstances leading up to and surrounding that conduct” … . In light of the foregoing, it was error to grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment. T.E. v South Glens Falls Cent. Sch. Dist., 2024 NY Slip Op 05934, Third Dept 11-27-24

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the proof necessary to raise a question of fact about the foreseeability of an attack on a student by another student.

 

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THE CASEWORKER WAS PART OF THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION IN THIS “COURSE OF SEXUAL CONDUCT WITH A CHILD” PROSECUTION; THE PEOPLE WERE THEREFORE DEEMED TO HAVE HAD CONTROL OVER OR TO HAVE BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE CASWORKER’S NOTES; THE NOTES INCLUDED BRADY MATERIAL WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER TO THE DEFENSE BEFORE TRIAL; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s “course of sexual conduct with a child” conviction and ordering a new trial, determined that the caseworker’s notes taken during an interview of the child constituted Brady material which should have been turned over to the defendant before trial. The caseworker was part of the criminal investigation. Therefore the notes were deemed to have been under the People’s control or in the People’s possession. There was a notation by the caseworker to the effect the victim “was acting normal and as if nothing happened…”.:

“[W]hether knowledge of a government official or employee may be imputed to the People . . . turn[s] on whether participation in the criminal probe was an ancillary law enforcement task” and, thus, “while social workers are generally not agents of the police, in situations where they engage in a joint venture with police agencies to collaborate on child abuse or sexual abuse investigations, share information and a common purpose, and have a cooperative working arrangement with police, an agency relationship may exist such that the social workers’ knowledge is imputed to the People” … . * * *

The People’s provision of this material after the close of all proof deprived defendant of “a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine the People’s witnesses or as evidence during his case” … . People v Baez, 2024 NY Slip Op 05844, Third Dept 11-21-24

Practice Point: When a caseworker is part of a criminal investigation, the caseworker’s notes taken when interviewing a child victim are deemed to be under the control of or possessed by the People, such that any Brady material in the notes must be turned over to the defense prior to trial.

 

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THERE WAS NO PROOF THE WAIVER OF INDICTMENT WAS SIGNED IN OPEN COURT IN THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL; GUILTY PLEA VACATED AND SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating the guilty plea and dismissing the superior court information, determined the record did not demonstrate the defendant signed the waiver of appeal in open court in the presence of counsel:

… [T]he plea minutes are silent as to when the undated waiver was executed by defendant, and during the colloquy County Court referred to defendant as having “signed” the waiver in the past tense … . Neither the waiver nor the plea colloquy confirms that defendant signed the written waiver in the presence of counsel. Further, although County Court indicated in the undated order approving the waiver that it was generally satisfied that the requirements of CPL 195.10 and 195.20 had been met, nothing in the order explicitly confirms “that the waiver was signed in open court” in the presence of counsel . Thus, … the record does not reflect that defendant’s waiver of indictment passes constitutional and statutory muster, and it follows that defendant’s guilty plea must be vacated and the underlying SCI dismissed … . People v Trapani, 2024 NY Slip Op 05846, Third Dept 11-21-24

Practice Point: When a defendant waives his right to an indictment and agrees to plead to a superior court information, the record must reflect the waiver was made in open court and in the presence of counsel. Absent proof of those statutory and constitutional requirements the waiver is invalid.

Similar issue and result in People v Rupp, 2024 NY Slip Op 05845, Third Dept 11-21-24.

 

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