Third Department – Page 137 – New York Appellate Digest

CLAIMANT’S TERMINATION FROM HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CITY BASED UPON TWO DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE CONVICTIONS DID NOT PRECLUDE HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the fact that the claimant was terminated from her employment as a city tax assessor because of two drunk-driving-related crimes did not preclude her from eligibility for unemployment insurance, The drunk driving incidents had nothing to do with her job and there was evidence she could have continued doing her job even though her license had been suspended for 90 days:

The disciplinary determination was founded, in part, upon claimant's two convictions for driving while under the influence of alcohol and her resulting license suspension. Whether this amounted to disqualifying misconduct posed a factual question for the Board, “and not every mistake, exercise of poor judgment or discharge for cause will rise to the level of misconduct” … . …

The drunk driving incidents did not occur while claimant was working. Notably, possession of a valid driver's license was not listed among the qualifications necessary to hold the position of Sole Assessor and claimant testified that she was not advised that this was a requirement … . Claimant was not incarcerated as a result of her convictions and she testified that she was ready and able to fulfill her job duties notwithstanding the suspension of her driver's license … . Moreover, while claimant acknowledged that she occasionally did site visits, she testified that she could perform her duties while her license was temporarily suspended given that much of the data needed to compute the assessments had already been compiled and she could obtain a lot of the information online. Matter of Stack (City of Glens Falls–Commissioner of Labor), 2018 NY Slip Op 06840, Third Dept 10-11-18

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (CLAIMANT'S TERMINATION FROM HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CITY BASED UPON TWO DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE CONVICTIONS DID NOT PRECLUDE HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (CLAIMANT'S TERMINATION FROM HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CITY BASED UPON TWO DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE CONVICTIONS DID NOT PRECLUDE HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (CLAIMANT'S TERMINATION FROM HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CITY BASED UPON TWO DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE CONVICTIONS DID NOT PRECLUDE HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))/CRIMINAL LAW (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, CLAIMANT'S TERMINATION FROM HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CITY BASED UPON TWO DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE CONVICTIONS DID NOT PRECLUDE HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))

October 11, 2018

Employment Law, Workers' Compensation

THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD PROPERLY FOUND CLAIMANT WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF A TRUCKING COMPANY AND A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF A COMPANY WITH WHICH THE TRUCKING COMPANY HAD A CONTRACT, THEREFORE THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AWARD WAS PROPERLY SPLIT BETWEEN THEM (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that claimant, a tractor trailer driver, was an employee of Eaton's Trucking Service and a special employee of Quality Carrier, with which Eaton had entered a contract. Therefore the Workers' Compensation Board properly found Eaton and Quality were each responsible for 50% of the workers' compensation awards:

… [W]e find that substantial evidence supports the Board's factual determination that claimant was a special employee of Quality … . Looking at “the underlying facts of the parties' relationship” … , the evidence established that Eaton and Quality had an arrangement whereby Eaton's drivers, including claimant, hauled products exclusively for Quality's customers and did so in furtherance of Quality's business, and that Eaton operated under Quality's logo and license without which Eaton could not have conducted its hauling operation. Their arrangement was the type of arrangement in which the “employee and equipment of [the] general employer were necessarily used and temporarily assigned to work for th[e] business” of the special employer, which has been recognized as creating a special employment relationship … . While Quality did not control the day-to-day oversight of claimant, this is not dispositive as Eaton and claimant operated entirely under Quality's authority and pursuant to its policies. As a result, Quality had sufficient control over the “details and ultimate result” of claimant's work, and Quality's working relationship with claimant was “sufficient in kind and degree so that [Quality] may be deemed [to be his] employer” … . Matter of Mitchell v Eaton's Trucking Serv., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 06839, Third Dept 10-11-18

WORKERS' COMPENSATION (THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD PROPERLY FOUND CLAIMANT WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF A TRUCKING COMPANY AND A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF A COMPANY WITH WHICH THE TRUCKING COMPANY HAD A CONTRACT, THEREFORE THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION AWARD WAS PROPERLY SPLIT BETWEEN THEM (THIRD DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD PROPERLY FOUND CLAIMANT WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF A TRUCKING COMPANY AND A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF A COMPANY WITH WHICH THE TRUCKING COMPANY HAD A CONTRACT, THEREFORE THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION AWARD WAS PROPERLY SPLIT BETWEEN THEM (THIRD DEPT))/SPECIAL EMPLOYEE (THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD PROPERLY FOUND CLAIMANT WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF A TRUCKING COMPANY AND A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF A COMPANY WITH WHICH THE TRUCKING COMPANY HAD A CONTRACT, THEREFORE THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION AWARD WAS PROPERLY SPLIT BETWEEN THEM (THIRD DEPT))

October 11, 2018

Retirement and Social Security Law

CORRECTION OFFICER’S FALL DOWN A STAIRWAY WAS PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY THE ACT OF AN INMATE, THE RESULTING DISABILITY IS THEREFORE COMPENSABLE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, annulling the hearing officer’s decision, determined that petitioner, a county correction officer, suffered a disability that resulted from the act of an inmate and was therefore compensable:

… [W]e find that petitioner has demonstrated that the injuries that he sustained from his fall occurred “contemporaneously with, and flowed directly, naturally and proximately from, the inmate’s” disobedient and affirmative act of descending down the stairs unexpectedly prior to receiving permission to do so … . Although “losing one’s footing — without more — does not constitute an affirmative act” … , petitioner’s misstep and fall flowed directly, naturally and proximately from the inmate’s act of being out of place without permission and startling petitioner by running down the stairs … . Having determined that petitioner’s injury was a natural and proximate result of an act of an inmate, the matter must be remitted for further proceedings on the issue of the permanency of petitioner’s alleged disability … . Matter of Garcia v DiNapoli, 2018 NY Slip Op 06602, Third Dept 10-4-18

RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (CORRECTION OFFICER’S FALL DOWN A STAIRWAY WAS PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY THE ACT OF AN INMATE, THE RESULTING DISABILITY IS THEREFORE COMPENSABLE (THIRD DEPT))/CORRECTION OFFICERS (RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW, CORRECTION OFFICER’S FALL DOWN A STAIRWAY WAS PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY THE ACT OF AN INMATE, THE RESULTING DISABILITY IS THEREFORE COMPENSABLE (THIRD DEPT))

October 4, 2018

Administrative Law, Workers' Compensation

SHOULDER INJURY WHICH OCCURRED WHEN CLAIMANT SCANNED HER PARKING PASS TO ENTER A PARKING GARAGE USED BY EMPLOYEES WAS NOT COMPENSABLE, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, affirmed the Workers' Compensation Board's finding that claimant's shoulder injury was not compensable because it did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. Claimant's injury occurred when she scanned her parking pass to enter a parking garage. The garage was not owned by her employer, but there were spaces reserved for employees and the employer paid for parking. The majority found sufficient evidence to support the Board's ruling. But the dissenters argued this was not a case which required weighing conflicting evidence, therefore precedent allowing recovery for injuries in employee parking areas should control:

In concluding that claimant's injury was not compensable, the Board found that the parking garage was utilized by members of the public, as well as other businesses located within the same building as the employer. The Board further noted that the employer did not own or maintain the garage. These facts, which the Board credited, lead to the conclusion that the employer did not extend its premises to the area where claimant's injury occurred … . Although facts exist that would support a contrary result, given that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision, we discern no basis to disturb it … .

From the dissent: We respectfully dissent. The proper disposition of this case is not based upon our substantial evidence standard of review, as this is not a case where the Workers' Compensation Board was weighing and balancing conflicting evidence. There was no relevant conflicting evidence. The location and circumstances of the underlying event are not disputed; claimant does not challenge the factual findings, but instead addresses the appeal solely to the resulting legal determination. In this case, the Board was required to apply the policy established by precedent to the relevant undisputed facts. As the Board failed to properly apply this precedent in rendering the determination, we would reverse, based upon the law. Matter of Grover v State Ins. Fund, 2018 NY Slip Op 06601, Third Dept 10-4-18

WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW (SHOULDER INJURY WHICH OCCURRED WHEN CLAIMANT SCANNED HER PARKING PASS TO ENTER A PARKING GARAGE USED BY EMPLOYEES WAS NOT COMPENSABLE, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT))/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, (SHOULDER INJURY WHICH OCCURRED WHEN CLAIMANT SCANNED HER PARKING PASS TO ENTER A PARKING GARAGE USED BY EMPLOYEES WAS NOT COMPENSABLE, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT))/PARKING GARAGES (WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, (SHOULDER INJURY WHICH OCCURRED WHEN CLAIMANT SCANNED HER PARKING PASS TO ENTER A PARKING GARAGE USED BY EMPLOYEES WAS NOT COMPENSABLE, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT))

October 4, 2018

Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)

PETITIONER, WHO WAS URINATING WHEN A FEMALE CORRECTION OFFICER PASSED HIS CELL, WAS NOT GUILTY OF LEWD CONDUCT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, annulling the determination, held that the petitioner did not engage in lewd conduct merely by urinating in his cell:

… [T]he Attorney General concedes, and we agree, that substantial evidence does not support that part of the determination finding petitioner guilty of engaging in lewd conduct… . The female correction officer testified that, while petitioner continued to urinate when she passed his cell, he made no gestures and did not expose his genitals to her … . Matter of Burroughs v Annucci, 2018 NY Slip Op 06168, Third Dept 9-19-18

DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS (INMATES) (PETITIONER, WHO WAS URINATING WHEN A FEMALE CORRECTION OFFICER PASSED HIS CELL, WAS NOT GUILTY OF LEWD CONDUCT (THIRD DEPT))/LEWD CONDUCT (DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS (INMATES), PETITIONER, WHO WAS URINATING WHEN A FEMALE CORRECTION OFFICER PASSED HIS CELL, WAS NOT GUILTY OF LEWD CONDUCT (THIRD DEPT))

September 19, 2018

Election Law

PARTY OBJECTING TO CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES’ NOMINATING PETITION DID NOT PROPERLY NOTIFY THE CANDIDATE OF THE OBJECTIONS, STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS SHOULD NOT HAVE INVALIDATED THE PETITION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the State Election Board, determined the nominating petition of a candidate for the US House of Representatives should not have been invalidated because the objecting party did not comply with the requirements for notifying the candidate of the objections:

9 NYCRR 6204.1 (b) provides that “[n]o specifications of objections to any petition will be considered by the [State B]oard unless the objector filing the specifications personally delivers or mails by registered or certified mail a duplicate copy of the specification[s] to each candidate for public office named in the petition . . . on or before the date of filing of [the] specifications with the [State B]oard” … . Suffice it to say, the elemental prerequisite of any service requirement is that a party is served with the correct documents … . Plainly, this did not occur. Here, petitioner was not served with “a duplicate copy” of the specifications of objections, but was instead served with specifications of objections related to another candidate. Moreover, even assuming, without deciding, that the service upon petitioner of an order to show cause and supporting papers seeking to invalidate the nominating petition — which contained the specifications of objections related to petitioner — could serve to remedy the original defect, such service was not effectuated “on or before the date of filing of [the] specifications with the [State B]oard” (9 NYCRR 6204.1 [b]). Further, the fact that petitioner thereafter actually received the correct specifications is irrelevant, as “notice received by means other than those authorized . . . cannot serve to bring [the objections] within the jurisdiction of the [State Board]”…. Inasmuch as 9 NYCRR 6204.1 (b) is “'mandatory and may not be disregarded,'” we are constrained to conclude that “[Liscum's] failure to abide by the mandatory service provisions thereof deprived the [State] Board of jurisdiction to properly consider the objections and thereafter rule to invalidate the petition” … . Matter of Neal v Liscum, 2018 NY Slip Op 06070, Third Dept 9-17-18

ELECTION LAW (PARTY OBJECTING TO CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES' NOMINATING PETITION DID NOT PROPERLY NOTIFY THE CANDIDATE OF THE OBJECTIONS, STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS SHOULD NOT HAVE INVALIDATED THE PETITION (THIRD DEPT))

September 17, 2018

Evidence, Trusts and Estates

SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE OBJECTION THAT THE DECEDENT LACKED TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, THE INQUIRY IS CONFINED TO THE TIME AT WHICH THE WILL IS SIGNED, TWO DISSENTERS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a two-justice partial dissent, determined that Surrogate's Court properly granted summary judgment dismissing the objection that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity.

… [E]vidence of decedent's diagnosis of dementia and declining cognitive abilities “does not, without more, create a question of fact on the issue of testamentary capacity, as the appropriate inquiry is whether the decedent was lucid and rational at the time the will was signed” … .

From the dissent:

… “[S]ummary judgment is rare in a contested probate proceeding and where, as here, there is conflicting evidence or the possibility of drawing conflicting inferences from undisputed evidence, summary judgment is inappropriate” … . Although a diagnosis of dementia, standing alone, is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact regarding mental capacity … , where, as here, there is proof of a progressively worsening mental condition, evidence of specific facts that occur close in time to execution is probative of testamentary capacity at the relevant time and is sufficient to establish a triable issue of fact … . Matter of Giaquinto, 2018 NY Slip Op 06065, Third Dept 9-12-18

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE OBJECTION THAT THE DECEDENT LACKED TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, THE INQUIRY IS CONFINED TO THE TIME AT WHICH THE WILL IS SIGNED, TWO DISSENTERS (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE OBJECTION THAT THE DECEDENT LACKED TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, THE INQUIRY IS CONFINED TO THE TIME AT WHICH THE WILL IS SIGNED, TWO DISSENTERS (THIRD DEPT))/TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY (SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE OBJECTION THAT THE DECEDENT LACKED TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, THE INQUIRY IS CONFINED TO THE TIME AT WHICH THE WILL IS SIGNED, TWO DISSENTERS (THIRD DEPT))/SUMMARY JUDGMENT (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY, SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE OBJECTION THAT THE DECEDENT LACKED TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, THE INQUIRY IS CONFINED TO THE TIME AT WHICH THE WILL IS SIGNED, TWO DISSENTERS (THIRD DEPT))

September 12, 2018

Retirement and Social Security Law

FIREFIGHTER’S FALL EXITING AN AMBULANCE WAS AN ACCIDENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the incident in which petitioner firefighter was injured constituted an accident within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law:

Petitioner testified that he had entered and exited ambulances hundreds of times during the course of his career as a firefighter. He was familiar with the folding step located at the rear of the ambulance and indicated that it was usually down and in an open position so that people could safely get in and out of the ambulance. He explained that the step was designed to flip up temporarily when a stretcher was being loaded into the ambulance to keep the wheels from striking the step and then to flip back down. Petitioner stated that, when he entered the ambulance on the date in question, the stretcher had already been removed, so he assumed that the step was down when he went to exit. He indicated that, as he was exiting the ambulance, he placed his foot on the edge of the step, which was a color similar to the bumper, while it was flipped up and flush against the bumper. When he did so, it collapsed downward, causing him to fall to the ground.

Under these circumstances, the precipitating external event, i.e., the flipping down of the folding step, was sudden, unexpected and not a risk inherent in petitioner's ordinary job duties … . Likewise, petitioner's fall was not attributable to inattention or a mere misstep , but rather to an apparently malfunctioning piece of equipment that was designed, under normal circumstances, to promote safety … . Accordingly, respondent's denial of petitioner's application on the ground that the incident was not an accident within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law is not supported by substantial evidence and must be annulled. Matter of Loia v DiNapoliI, 2018 NY Slip Op 05984, Third Dept 9-6-18

RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (FIREFIGHTER'S FALL EXITING AN AMBULANCE WAS AN ACCIDENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (THIRD DEPT))/FIREFIGHTERS (RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW, FIREFIGHTER'S FALL EXITING AN AMBULANCE WAS AN ACCIDENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (THIRD DEPT))

September 6, 2018

Workers' Compensation

NO SCHEDULE LOSS OF USE (SLU) BENEFITS CALCULATED BASED UPON THE LOSS OF USE OF THE KNEE AND ANKLE SEPARATELY, AS OPPOSED A CALCULATION BASED UPON THE LOSS OF USE OF THE LEG AS A WHOLE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined claimant was not entitled to schedule loss of use (SLU) benefits calculated on loss of use of his knee and ankle, as opposed to SLU calculated on loss of use of his leg generally:

Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (3) sets forth SLU awards that the Board may make resulting from permanent injuries to certain body parts, losses of hearing or vision and facial disfigurements. This Court has observed that such awards are not given for particular injuries, but rather “for the residual physical and functional impairments” … . Consistent with this observation, neither the statute nor the Board's guidelines lists the ankle or the knee as body parts lending themselves to separate SLU awards. Rather, impairments to these extremities are encompassed by awards for the loss of use of the leg … . Matter of Genduso v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2018 NY Slip Op 05981, Third Dept 9-6-18

WORKERS' COMPENSATION (NO SCHEDULE LOSS OF USE (SLU) BENEFITS CALCULATED BASED UPON THE LOSS OF USE OF THE KNEE AND ANKLE SEPARATELY, AS OPPOSED A CALCULATION BASED UPON THE LOSS OF USE OF THE LEG AS A WHOLE (THIRD DEPT))

September 6, 2018

Criminal Law, Evidence

POSSESSION OF SEXUAL PERFORMANCE OF A CHILD CONVICTIONS REVERSED, PHOTOGRAPHS DID NOT MEET STATUTORY CRITERIA, ALTHOUGH THE MAJORITY AFFIRMED DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION IN THIS RAPE, CRIMINAL SEXUAL ACT, AND POSSESSION OF SEXUAL PERFORMANCE BY A CHILD PROSECUTION, THE DISSENT WOULD HAVE REVERSED BECAUSE THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EXHIBITS UPON WHICH THE PROSECUTION RELIED WERE NOT PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a dissent, affirmed defendant's conviction and long prison sentence for rape, criminal sexual act, possessing a sexual performance by a child and criminal solicitation. Three of the four possession of a sexual performance by a child were reversed because the “the lewd exhibition of the genitals” element was not present, only the victim's bare chest was depicted. The dissenting justice argued that the photographic exhibits were not supported by a proper foundation and should not have been admitted. With the photographs deemed inadmissible, the dissent would have reversed defendant's convictions:

From the dissent: The People's foundational questioning here, generously described by the majority as “brief,” was wholly lacking in substance. Although the People asked appropriate witnesses, including the victim, to identify the subject matter of the photographs to which they had knowledge, little or no additional information was elicited. Fatally, the People did not elicit any testimony that could establish that any of the photographs fairly and accurately depict the subject matter identified therein … . …

Specifically, with respect to the 16 photographic exhibits depicting the victim in various stages of undress, the People simply asked the victim whether each photograph “look[ed] familiar.” Contrary to the assertions of the majority, the victim's general testimony identifying herself as the person depicted in those photographs was insufficient to properly authenticate them. Even if the victim's testimony demonstrated that the photographs admitted into evidence were a fair representation of the photographs that she took or were taken of her, as the majority contends, no one testified that the admitted photographs had not been altered or that they were true and accurate representations of the photographs actually recovered from defendant's cell phone and computer … . There was simply no sworn testimony to refute the possibility that the photographs had been manipulated.

Although not discussed by the majority in detail, the remaining 10 photographic exhibits allegedly depict a motel room, different areas in the victim's bedroom and defendant's home computers, vehicle and residence. These photographs were offered into evidence to corroborate the victim's testimony, to provide background information and/or to allow the jury to assess whether the photographs of the victim were taken in either the motel room or the victim's bedroom. As with the photographs of the victim, the People did not elicit any testimony whatsoever to establish that these photographs fairly and accurately represented the subject matter depicted therein, as required … . People v Pendell, 2018 NY Slip Op 05899, Third Dept 8-23-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, PHOTOGRAPHS, ALTHOUGH THE MAJORITY AFFIRMED DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION IN THIS RAPE, CRIMINAL SEXUAL ACT, AND POSSESSION OF SEXUAL PERFORMANCE BY A CHILD PROSECUTION, THE DISSENT WOULD HAVE REVERSED BECAUSE THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EXHIBITS UPON WHICH THE PROSECUTION RELIED WERE NOT PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PHOTOGRAPHS, ALTHOUGH THE MAJORITY AFFIRMED DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION IN THIS RAPE, CRIMINAL SEXUAL ACT, AND POSSESSION OF SEXUAL PERFORMANCE BY A CHILD PROSECUTION, THE DISSENT WOULD HAVE REVERSED BECAUSE THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EXHIBITS UPON WHICH THE PROSECUTION RELIED WERE NOT PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED (THIRD DEPT))/PHOTOGRAPHS (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, ALTHOUGH THE MAJORITY AFFIRMED DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION IN THIS RAPE, CRIMINAL SEXUAL ACT, AND POSSESSION OF SEXUAL PERFORMANCE BY A CHILD PROSECUTION, THE DISSENT WOULD HAVE REVERSED BECAUSE THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EXHIBITS UPON WHICH THE PROSECUTION RELIED WERE NOT PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED (THIRD DEPT))

August 23, 2018

Tag Archive for: Third Department