Tag Archive for: SENTENCING

, ,

Error Relating to Assessment of 10% Surcharge Must Be Preserved by Objection

Over two dissents, the Fourth Department determined the argument that a probation officer’s affidavit was not sufficient to justify a 10% surcharge must be preserved for appeal.  The Fourth Department wrote:

We disagree with our dissenting colleagues that the issue whether a surcharge of 10% is properly imposed does not require preservation. While this Court has in the past relied on the illegal sentence exception to the preservation requirement of CPL 470.05 (2) when reviewing that issue …, more recent decisions from the Court of Appeals have established that issues regarding restitution require preservation …. In addition, the Court of Appeals has held that the mandatory surcharge set forth in Penal Law § 60.35
(1) is not part of a sentence ….Those cases compel us to conclude that an issue regarding a surcharge imposed on restitution pursuant to Penal Law § 60.27 (8) must be preserved for our review and that we cannot rely on the illegal sentence exception to the preservation requirement.   People v Kirkland, KA 11-01835, 147, 4th Dept, 4-26-13

 

, ,

Restitution Can Not Be Ordered When Not Addressed in Plea Agreement

The Second Department, in the interest of justice, determined the sentencing court should not have imposed restitution because restitution was not addressed in the plea agreement.  The matter was remitted for re-sentencing without restitution. People v Thompson, 2013 NY Slip Op 02770, 2nd Dept, 4-24-13

 

Sentences for Underlying Felony and Bail Jumping Must Be Consecutive Absent Mitigating Factors that Bear Directly on the Manner the Crime Was Committed

In finding the sentencing court used the wrong “mitigating” factors to determine whether the sentence for bail jumping could run concurrently with the sentence for the underlying felony, the Third Department wrote:

Penal Law § 70.25 (2-c) restricts a court’s sentencing discretion when a person who is convicted of bail jumping in the second  degree  also is convicted of the underlying felony in connection with which he or she had been released on bail. Specifically, if indeterminate sentences are imposed upon both the bail jumping charge and the underlying felony, the bail jumping sentence must run consecutively to the other sentence unless the court “finds mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed” (Penal Law § 70.25 [2-c]…).  Here, County Court sought to justify concurrent sentences based upon “the severe penalties, fines, restrictions and state prison sentence [defendant was] earning by [his] antisocial behavior of drinking and driving and failing to come to court, and because [he had pleaded] guilty . . . and waived appeal in another county.” However, these factors have no bearing upon the manner in which the crime was committed … and, therefore, do not support imposing concurrent sentences in this case.  People v Harrison, 105176, 3rd Dept 4-18-22

 

Hearing Required for Motion for Resentencing

The Second Department explained the hearing requirement of Criminal Procedure Law 440.46 (re: a motion for resentencing) as follows:

CPL 440.46(3), provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he provisions of section twenty three of chapter seven hundred thirty eight of the laws of two thousand four shall govern the proceedings on and determination of a motion brought pursuant to this section.” Section 23 of chapter 738 of the Laws of 2004 states, in pertinent part: “The court shall offer an opportunity for a hearing and bring the applicant before it. The court may also conduct a hearing, if necessary, to determine . . . any controverted issue of fact relevant to the issue of sentencing.” The defendant’s presence is not required where the court determines as a matter of law that a defendant is not entitled to relief pursuant to CPL 440.46 …. However, here, the People conceded that the defendant met the statutory requirements for relief pursuant to CPL 440.46, and the question before the court was whether substantial justice dictated that the motion should be denied. Thus, the defendant is entitled to appear before the court and to be given an opportunity to be heard .. . Since the defendant was not brought before the court, and there is no indication that he knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily relinquished that right …, the order appealed from must be reversed, and the matter remitted to the County Court, Suffolk County, for a new determination of the defendant’s motion, to be made after affording him an opportunity to appear before the court, and, if necessary, conducting a hearing … . People v Allen, 2013 NY slip Op 02586, 2011-11680, Ind No 1087/98, 2nd Dept 4-17-13

 

,

Court’s Imposition of Restitution at Sentencing Required Reversal Because Restitution Was Not Part of Plea Agreement

The Second Department determined the trial court’s imposition of restitution at sentencing, where restitution was not part of the plea agreement, required that the defendant be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea or to accept the enhanced sentence:

Although a court is free to reserve the right to order restitution as part of a plea agreement, the plea minutes do not indicate that a plea of guilty was negotiated with terms that included restitution. Accordingly, at sentencing, the defendant should have been “given an opportunity either to withdraw his plea or to accept the enhanced sentence that included both restitution and a prison sentence … or for the court to impose the agreed-upon sentence.  People Poznanski, 2013 NY Slip Op 02272, 2008-06938, Ind No 2672/06, 2nd Dept 4-3-13

 

,

Defendant’s Understanding Guilty Plea Would Result In Only a Year and a Half More in Prison Required Vacation of Plea

At the time defendant pled guilty to conspiracy, his 6-12 year sentence was to run concurrently with previously imposed 41/2 to 9 sentences (for class B felonies) and his understanding was that his minimum time in prison would be extended by only a year and a half.  Subsequently the B-felony convictions were reduced to three years under the Drug Law Reform Act.  The defendant then moved to vacate the conspiracy sentence and conviction but the motion was denied.  The Court of Appeals reversed and wrote:

Defendant’s plea to the conspiracy count was induced by the judge’s specific representation to him that he would thereby extend his minimum incarceratory term by a year and a half only. It simply cannot be said on this record that defendant, who was clearly working toward achieving the earliest release date possible, would have pleaded guilty absent this assurance. Generally, “when a guilty plea has been induced by an unfulfilled promise either the plea must be vacated or the promise honored, but that the choice rests in the discretion of the sentencing court” … .  People v Monroe, 41, CtApp 4-2-13

 

Re-Sentencing Under Drug Law Reform Act—Court Does Not Have Authority to Make Sentences Concurrent if Original Sentences Consecutive

The Court of Appeals ruled that when re-sentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 (DLRA–Criminal Procedure Law 440.46), the sentencing court can not alter multiple drug felony convictions originally imposed consecutively so that they run concurrently.  When the court imposes a determinate sentence under the DLRA “[s]uch resentencing constitutes ‘alteration of the existing sentence as authorized by law’ …, rather than imposition of a new sentence or of an additional term of imprisonment” [see Criminal Procedure Law 70.25].  Therefore the re-sentencing court does not have the power to issue concurrent sentences when the original sentences were consecutive.  People v Norris, No. 39, CtApp 3-21-13

 

,

Failure of Sentencing Court to Inform Defendant of Period of Post-Release Supervision Required Release after Sentence Served

The Department of Corrections cannot remedy a court’s failure to impose a period of post-release supervision.  In this case the prisoner’s habeas corpus petition was granted and the prisoner, who had served his sentence, was released.  The Fourth Department determined that the sentencing court’s statement—“the supervisory period under the violent felony offender sentencing statute will be five years, which means when you come out on parole, you will be on five years of parole at the conclusion of the ten-year sentence”—did not pronounce the period of post-release supervision as required by Criminal Procedure Law 380.20.  People ex rel Finch v Brown, 23, KAH 11-00862, 4th Dept. 3-15-13

 

Judge’s Mistaken Belief Period of Post-Release Supervision Was Mandatory Required Resentencing.

Resentencing was required where the sentencing judge indicated the five-year post-release supervision was mandatory.  There was, however, an applicable exception to the five-year rule which the judge had the discretion to impose.  (Penal Law section 70.45 former [2]).  People vs Whitmore, 104652 Third Dept. 2-14-13

 

,

Waiver of Appeal Invalid, Sentence Excessive.

Defendant’s right to appeal was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived—it was not established that defendant was aware the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty.  Defendant’s sentence was deemed excessive.  The sentence was reduced in the interest of justice in light of defendant’s age, the mitigating facts of the case and defendant’s lack of a juvenile record (youthful offender). People v Maria M. 8726 Ind. 1563/10 First Dept. 1-3-13