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Audiotaped Sworn Statement of Witness Admitted Because Defendant Caused Witness to Be Unavailable

After a Sirois hearing, the trial court found sufficient circumstantial evidence that the defendant had caused a witness’ unavailability and allowed in evidence (in the People’s case-in-chief) an audio recording of the witness.  In affirming, the Second Department wrote:

…[T]he Supreme Court properly admitted a sworn audiotaped statement from Timothy Dixon as evidence during the People’s case. A witness’s out-of-court statements may be admitted as part of the People’s direct case where the People “demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant, by violence, threats or chicanery, caused [the] witness’s unavailability”…. “Recognizing the surreptitious nature of witness tampering and that a defendant engaging in such conduct will rarely do so openly, resorting instead to subterfuge, the court can rely on and the prosecution can use circumstantial evidence in making the requisite determination”…. People v Leggett, 2013 NY Slip OP 04028, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

 

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Post-Offense “Bad Acts” Erroneously Admitted (Harmless Error)

The Second Department determined bad acts committed after the charged crime should not have been admitted, although the error was deemed harmless:

The Supreme Court …improvidently exercised its discretion in permitting the admission of evidence relating to two bad acts allegedly committed by the defendant subsequent to the charged crime, since the probative value of such evidence was minimal, and was outweighed by its prejudicial effect… . People v Addison, 2013 NY Slip Op 04015, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

 

Analysis Where Two or More Insurance Companies Insure the Same Risk and Insured

The Second Department explained the legal analysis when two or more insurance companies cover the same risk for the same insured:

“In insurance contracts the term other insurance’ describes a situation where two or more insurance policies cover the same risk in the name of, or for the benefit of, the same person”… .. “[W]here there are multiple policies covering the same risk, and each generally purports to be excess to the other, the excess coverage clauses are held to cancel out each other and each insurer contributes in proportion to its limit amount of insurance”… . This rule is inapplicable where it “clearly distort[s] the plain meaning of the terms of the policies of insurance”…. “In contrast, however, if one party’s policy is primary with respect to the other policy, then the party issuing the primary policy must pay up to the limits of its policy before the excess coverage becomes effective” … .  Murname Bldg Contrs Inc v Zurich Am Ins Co, 2013 NY Slip Op 03874, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

 

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Sellers Had No Duty to Disclose Recorded Easement—Caveat Emptor

In affirming Supreme Court’s ruling that the defendants had no duty to disclose a recorded easement to the buyers pursuant to the doctrine of caveat emptor, the Second Department wrote:

“New York adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor and imposes no duty on the seller or the seller’s agent to disclose any information concerning the premises when the parties deal at arm’s length, unless there is some conduct on the part of the seller or the seller’s agent which constitutes active concealment” …. “Mere silence on the part of the seller, without some affirmative act of deception, is not actionable as fraud”…. ” To maintain a cause of action to recover damages for active concealment, the plaintiff must show, in effect, that the seller or the seller’s agents thwarted the plaintiff’s efforts to fulfill his responsibilities fixed by the doctrine of caveat emptor”…. “Where the facts represented are not matters peculiarly within the party’s knowledge, and the other party has the means available to him of knowing, by the exercise of ordinary intelligence, the truth or the real quality of the subject of the representation, he must make use of those means, or he will not be heard to complain that he was induced to enter into the transaction by misrepresentations”…. Schottland v Brown Harris Stevens Brooklyn, LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 03982, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

 

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Only Sellers’, Not Buyers’, Agent Can Be Liable for Failure to Disclose Lead Paint Dangers

In dismissing a complaint seeking damages pursuant to the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act (RLPHRA) for the failure to make disclosures regarding the dangers of lead paint, the Second Department noted that only seller’s agents, not buyer’s agents, can be held liable under the act:

The statutory language of the RLPHRA “is unambiguous with regard to the liability of real estate agents; only seller’s agents are liable” for the failure to ensure compliance with its provisions… . Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, it would be contrary to the unambiguous language of the statute to construe 24 CFR 35.86 so as to impose a duty on an agent or representative of a buyer… . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the …defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. Felix v Thomas R Stachecki Gen Contr, LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 03966, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

 

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Out-Of-Possession Landlord Not Liable for Missing Light in Stairwell

The Second Department determined the out-of-possession landlord could not be liable for a missing light in a stairwell, the alleged cause of plaintiff’s fall:

“An out-of-possession landlord’s duty to repair a dangerous condition on leased premises is imposed by statute or regulation, by contract, or by a course of conduct”… . Here, the defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that it was an out-of-possession landlord, that it was not contractually obligated to maintain the lighting at the premises or repair the alleged hazardous condition, that it did not endeavor to perform such maintenance, and that it did not violate any relevant statute or regulation… . Grimaldi v 221 Arlington Realty, LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 03969, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

SLIP AND FALL

 

Appreciation of Value of Marital Residence Should Have Been Reduced by Cost of Improvements

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have reduced the distributive award based upon the appreciation in value of the marital residence during the marriage by the equitable share of the marital debt incurred in making improvements to the residence:

While the marital residence was the plaintiff’s separate property, the Supreme Court directed the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of $102,500 as a distributive award based on the appreciation in value of the marital residence that was attributable to the efforts of both parties in physically improving the property during the marriage (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][1][d][3]…). Although the defendant’s counsel noted at trial that the defendant’s distributive award based on the appreciation of the marital residence should be reduced by the defendant’s equitable share of the marital debt incurred in financing the improvements to the residence, the Supreme Court improperly failed to do so… . Szewczuk v Szewczuk, 2013 NY Slip Op 03987, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

 

“Economic Necessity” Justified Relocation

The Second Department determined the mother’s relocation was in the best interests of the child based upon “economic necessity:”

“[E]conomic necessity . . . may present a particularly persuasive ground for permitting the proposed move”… .. Here, the mother demonstrated that she was not able to meet her living expenses while residing in Queens, and the father conceded that he did not regularly pay his share of the childcare expenses. The mother also demonstrated that, if she were permitted to relocate, her mother would assist with the childcare and that she and the child would be able to reside, at a reduced rent, in her mother’s home, located only blocks from where the child would attend school. While the father’s loss of weekly weekday contact with the child is neither trivial nor insignificant…, the relocation is not a great distance and the visitation schedule devised by the court in this case allows for the continuation of a meaningful relationship between the father and the child… . Matter of Sahagun v Alix, 2013 NY Slip Op 04009, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

 

Family Court Award of Sole Custody to Mother Reversed, Sole Custody Awarded to Father

The Second Department reversed Family Court, which awarded sole physical custody to the mother, and awarded sole physical custody to the father:

Here, the Family Court’s award of sole physical custody to the mother lacked a sound and substantial basis in the record. In awarding the mother custody, the Family Court gave undue weight to its finding that the mother would be more likely than the father to foster a meaningful relationship between the subject children and the noncustodial parent. Furthermore, the Family Court failed to give sufficient weight to the forensic mental health evaluation, which indicated that the mother was not suitable for physical custody of the children and to its own finding that it was in the children’s best interests for them to remain away from Sherlock [the mother’s boyfriend] at all times. Under the totality of the circumstances, including the founded concerns with respect to Sherlock and the attendant risk his relationship with the mother posed to the safety and well-being of the subject children, the best interests of the children would be served by awarding the father sole physical custody ….Matter of James AS v Cassandra AS, 2013 NY Slip Op 03995, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

 

No Basis in Record for Denying Noncustodial Parent Visitation

After affirming a derivative neglect finding against the mother based upon excessive corporal punishment of a sibling, the Second Department determined Family Court should not have denied her visitation:

Absent extraordinary circumstances, such as where visitation would be detrimental to the child’s well-being, a noncustodial parent has a right to reasonable visitation privileges… . Here, the Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in failing to provide the mother with any visitation, either unsupervised or supervised, with Keith W., since there were no extraordinary circumstances justifying the denial of the mother’s right to reasonable visitation… .  Matter of Jacob P, 2013 NY Slip Op 04007, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

 

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