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REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER BY RELIGIOUS CORPORATION INVALID, CORPORATION DID NOT SEEK COURT APPROVAL FOR THE TRANSFER 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department determined summary judgment was properly awarded to plaintiff in this action to quiet title. Plaintiff religious corporation was required to get the court’s permission before selling property to defendant. Because plaintiff did not seek leave of court, its transfer of the property to defendant was invalid:

Religious Corporations Law § 12(1) provides that in order to sell any of its real property, a religious corporation must apply for, and obtain, leave of court pursuant to Not-For-Profit Corporation Law § 511 … . “The purpose of this requirement is to protect the members of the religious corporation, the real parties in interest, from loss through unwise bargains and from perversion of the use of the property” … . Here, the plaintiff, a religious corporation subject to the requirements of Religious Corporations Law § 12(1), established, prima facie, that its conveyance of the subject property to the defendants was invalid because it was made without leave of court … . Heights v Schwarz, 2017 NY Slip Op 05707, 2nd Dept 7-19-17

CORPORATION LAW (RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS, REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER, REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER BY RELIGIOUS CORPORATION INVALID, CORPORATION DID NOT SEEK COURT APPROVAL FOR THE TRANSFER 2ND DEPT)/REAL PROPERTY (RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS, REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER, REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER BY RELIGIOUS CORPORATION INVALID, CORPORATION DID NOT SEEK COURT APPROVAL FOR THE TRANSFER 2ND DEPT)/RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS (REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER BY RELIGIOUS CORPORATION INVALID, CORPORATION DID NOT SEEK COURT APPROVAL FOR THE TRANSFER 2ND DEPT)/NOT FOR PROFIT CORPORATION LAW (RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS, REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER, REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER BY RELIGIOUS CORPORATION INVALID, CORPORATION DID NOT SEEK COURT APPROVAL FOR THE TRANSFER 2ND DEPT)

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PETITIONER, WHO WAS ADMITTED TO THE PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM AFTER STARTING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING CONTESTING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ADMISSION, WAS NOT A PREVAILING PARTY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, SHE WAS NOT, THEREFORE, ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department determined petitioner, an inmate who sought admission to the prison nursery program for her and her child, was not entitled to attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Petitioner’s admission to the program had been withdrawn by the prison superintendent (Kaplan) so petitioner brought an Article 78 proceeding with an order to show cause. The judge signed the order to show cause and allowed petitioner’s admission to the program pending a hearing. Before the hearing, the superintendent reversed her prior ruling and allowed petitioner to stay in the program. The Second Department held that petitioner was not a “prevailing party” within the meaning of the EAJA, and, even if she had been a prevailing party, the superintendent’s actions were justified:

We conclude that the Supreme Court properly determined that the petitioner was not a “prevailing party” under CPLR 8601(a) and 8602(f), albeit for a different reason. Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the stipulation entered into between the parties …, which was so-ordered by the court, did not reflect a material change in the legal relationship between the parties because the petitioner’s claims had already been rendered moot by Kaplan’s voluntary decision on December 30, 2014, to vacate her earlier decision removing the petitioner from the Nursery Program … . Furthermore, the petitioner did not achieve prevailing party status by obtaining a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction from the court directing the respondents to admit the [*2]petitioner to the Nursery Program pending the outcome of the proceeding … . Matter of Gonzalez v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 2017 NY Slip Op 05724, 2nd Dept 7-19-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, INMATES, PETITIONER, WHO WAS ADMITTED TO THE PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM AFTER STARTING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING CONTESTING THE DENIAL OF PERMISSION, WAS NOT A PREVAILING PARTY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, SHE WAS NOT, THEREFORE, ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES 2ND DEPT)/ATTORNEYS  (EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, INMATES, PETITIONER, WHO WAS ADMITTED TO THE PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM AFTER STARTING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING CONTESTING THE DENIAL OF PERMISSION, WAS NOT A PREVAILING PARTY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, SHE WAS NOT, THEREFORE, ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES 2ND DEPT)/EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT (ATTORNEY’S FEES, INMATES, PETITIONER, WHO WAS ADMITTED TO THE PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM AFTER STARTING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING CONTESTING THE DENIAL OF PERMISSION, WAS NOT A PREVAILING PARTY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, SHE WAS NOT, THEREFORE, ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES 2ND DEPT)/INMATES (EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, ATTORNEY’S FEES, PETITIONER, WHO WAS ADMITTED TO THE PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM AFTER STARTING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING CONTESTING THE DENIAL OF PERMISSION, WAS NOT A PREVAILING PARTY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, SHE WAS NOT, THEREFORE, ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES 2ND DEPT)

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CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A DOG BITE AT CITY ANIMAL SHELTER 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department determined the city, which operated an animal shelter, was not liable for a dog-bite injury to infant plaintiff. The Second Department held that the operation of the shelter was a government function and there was no special relationship between the city and the plaintiff. Therefore the city was entitled to immunity from liability:

It is undisputed that the City operates the Shelter pursuant to a statutory mandate. Specifically, Agriculture and Markets Law § 114 (former § 115) requires, inter alia, that each town or city that issues dog licenses “shall . . . establish and maintain a pound or shelter for dogs” … . This provision is contained in article 7 of the Agriculture and Markets Law, which states that the purpose of the article “is to provide for the licensing and identification of dogs, the control and protection of the dog population and the protection of persons, property, domestic animals and deer from dog attack and damage” … .

The City’s act of providing an animal shelter constitutes a governmental function and, therefore, it cannot be held liable absent the existence of a special relationship between it and the plaintiffs giving rise to a special duty of care … . ” A special relationship can be formed in three ways: (1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation'” … . Abrahams v City of Mount Vernon, 2017 NY Slip Op 05699, 2nd Dept 7-19-17

ANIMAL LAW (CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A DOG BITE AT CITY ANIMAL SHELTER 2ND DEPT)/MUNICIPAL LAW (ANIMAL SHELTER, DOG BITE, CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A DOG BITE AT CITY ANIMAL SHELTER 2ND DEPT)/IMMUNITY (CITY ANIMAL SHELTER, DOG BITE, CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A DOG BITE AT CITY ANIMAL SHELTER 2ND DEPT)/DOG BITES (MUNICIPAL LAW, CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A DOG BITE AT CITY ANIMAL SHELTER 2ND DEPT)

DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE CONFIGURATION AT THE TOP OF THE STAIRS AND THE ABSENCE OF A HANDRAIL WERE NOT DANGEROUS CONDITIONS WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S FALL, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant property owners did not establish the configuration of the area at the top of the basement stairs and the absence of a handrail were not dangerous conditions and were not proximate causes of plaintiff’s fall down the stairs. Defendants’ summary judgment motion should not have been granted:

The plaintiff alleged that the size and the configuration of the landing at the top of the basement staircase constituted a dangerous condition since there was insufficient room to safely close the bedroom door. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendants were negligent in failing to provide a handrail on either side of the staircase. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that a dangerous condition did not exist and that, in any event, the negligence alleged in the complaint was not a proximate cause of the accident. In support of their motion, the defendants submitted, inter alia, their own deposition testimony and that of the plaintiff. …

The owner of property has a duty to maintain his or her property “in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk” … .”[An] owner, however, has no duty to protect against an open and obvious condition provided that, as a matter of law, the condition is not inherently dangerous” … . “The issue of whether a dangerous condition is open and obvious is fact-specific, and usually a question for a jury” … . Lee v Acevedo, 2017 NY Slip Op 05586, 2nd Dept 7-12-17

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE CONFIGURATION AT THE TOP OF THE STAIRS AND THE ABSENCE OF A HANDRAIL WERE NOT DANGEROUS CONDITIONS WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S FALL, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 2ND DEPT)/SLIP AND FALL (DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE CONFIGURATION AT THE TOP OF THE STAIRS AND THE ABSENCE OF A HANDRAIL WERE NOT DANGEROUS CONDITIONS WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S FALL, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 2ND DEPT)/OPEN AND OBVIOUS  (SLIP AND FALL, DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE CONFIGURATION AT THE TOP OF THE STAIRS AND THE ABSENCE OF A HANDRAIL WERE NOT DANGEROUS CONDITIONS WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S FALL, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 2ND DEPT)

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STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS NOT PROVEN, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED 2ND DEPT.

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank did not present sufficient proof that the notice requirements of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1304 were met:

… [W]here, as here, the plaintiff in a residential foreclosure action alleges in its complaint that it has served an RPAPL 1304 notice on the borrowers, a plaintiff moving for summary judgment must “prove its allegation by tendering sufficient evidence demonstrating the absence of material issues as to its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304” … .

Here, in moving for summary judgment, the plaintiff failed to submit an affidavit of service or proof of mailing by the post office evincing that it properly served the defendant pursuant to RPAPL 1304 … . Moreover, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the unsubstantiated and conclusory statement of a vice president of the plaintiff that “a 90-day default letter was sent in accordance with [ ] RPAPL 1304” was insufficient to establish that the required notice was mailed to the defendant by first-class and certified mail… . Since the plaintiff failed to satisfy its prima facie burden with respect to RPAPL 1304, its motion for summary judgment should have been denied regardless of the sufficiency of the defendant’s opposition papers … . M&T Bank v Joseph, 2017 NY Slip Op 05587, 2nd Dept 7-12-17

FORECLOSURE (STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS NOT PROVEN, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED 2ND DEPT)/EVIDENCE (FORECLOSURE, STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS NOT PROVEN, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED 2ND DEPT)/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) (FORECLOSURE, STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS NOT PROVEN, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED 2ND DEPT)

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EVIDENCE OF ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, PRESENCE IS NOT ENOUGH 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department, under a weight of the evidence analysis, determined the evidence of the appellant’s liability as an accomplice in this juvenile delinquency proceeding was insufficient. The complainant testified appellant was present during the assault and theft by another. Presence is not enough:

A determination premised upon accessorial liability requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acted with the mental culpability necessary to commit the act charged and that, in furtherance thereof, he solicited, requested, commanded, importuned, or intentionally aided the principal to commit such act… . “A person’s mere presence at the scene of the crime, even with knowledge of its perpetration, cannot render him or her accessorially liable for the underlying criminal conduct” … .  Here, we agree with the appellant that the Family Court’s finding of accessorial liability was against the weight of the credible evidence. The appellant is alleged to have been an accomplice with another youth who punched the complainant in the face and took his iPhone. However, at the fact-finding hearing, when asked about the appellant’s actions at the time of the assault and robbery, the complainant testified that the appellant was standing near the perpetrator and watched the incident occur. The presentment agency’s evidence with respect to the crimes of robbery in the second degree, robbery in the third degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, and attempted assault in the third degree established only that the appellant was present at the scene of the offense… . Accordingly, the determination of the Family Court with respect to those crimes was against the weight of the evidence, and the order of disposition must be modified accordingly. Matter of Justin M., 2017 NY Slip Op 05605, 2nd Dept 7-12-17

FAMILY LAW (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, EVIDENCE OF ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, PRESENCE IS NOT ENOUGH 2ND DEPT)/JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (FAMILY COURT, EVIDENCE OF ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, PRESENCE IS NOT ENOUGH 2ND DEPT)/CRIMINAL LAW (FAMILY LAW, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, EVIDENCE OF ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, PRESENCE IS NOT ENOUGH 2ND DEPT)/EVIDENCE (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, EVIDENCE OF ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, PRESENCE IS NOT ENOUGH 2ND DEPT)/ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY  (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, EVIDENCE OF ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, PRESENCE IS NOT ENOUGH 2ND DEPT)

EVEN ONE INSTANCE OF EXCESSIVE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A NEGLECT FINDING 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department, affirming Family Court, noted that even one instance of excessive corporal punishment is sufficient support for a neglect finding:

“Although parents have a right to use reasonable physical force against a child in order to maintain discipline or to promote the child’s welfare, the use of excessive corporal punishment constitutes neglect” … Even “a single incident of excessive corporal punishment is sufficient to support a finding of neglect” … .

Here, contrary to the father’s contention, a preponderance of the evidence supported the Family Court’s finding that the father neglected the subject child by inflicting excessive corporal punishment … . The father admitted that on June 17, 2014, he hit the child once with a wooden ruler, and other credible evidence established that the child sustained visible marks and swelling on his left forearm as a result, and that this was not an isolated incident … . Matter of Tarelle J. (Walter J.), 2017 NY Slip Op 05600, 2nd Dept 7-12-17

FAMILY LAW (EVEN ONE INSTANCE OF EXCESSIVE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A NEGLECT FINDING 2ND DEPT)/NEGLECT (FAMILY LAW, EVEN ONE INSTANCE OF EXCESSIVE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A NEGLECT FINDING 2ND DEPT)/CORPORAL PUNISHMENT (FAMILY LAW, NEGLECT, EVEN ONE INSTANCE OF EXCESSIVE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A NEGLECT FINDING 2ND DEPT)

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PUTATIVE FATHER’S REQUEST FOR A DNA PATERNITY TEST SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined putative father’s request for a DNA paternity test should not have been denied:

… [T]he Orange County Department of Social Services filed a paternity petition against the appellant on behalf of the mother of the subject child, alleging him to be the father of the child, who was born in 2007. The appellant requested a genetic marker test, commonly known as a DNA test. After a hearing, the Family Court determined that the appellant was estopped from contesting paternity, in effect, denied his application for a DNA test, and entered an order of filiation adjudicating the appellant to be the father of the child.

Contrary to the Family Court’s determination, the appellant should not have been estopped from contesting his paternity of the child. Considering the lack of a relationship between the appellant and the child, there was no evidence that “the child would suffer irreparable loss of status, destruction of her family image, or other harm to her physical or emotional well-being” if the DNA test were administered and it was ultimately shown that the appellant was not the biological father of the child … .

Accordingly, we cannot conclude that a genetic marker test of the appellant’s and the child’s DNA would be contrary to the best interests of the child. Commissioner of Social Servs. v Dorian E.L., 2017 NY Slip Op 05590, 2nd Dept 7-12-17

FAMILY LAW (PATERNITY, PUTATIVE FATHER’S REQUEST FOR A DNA PATERNITY TEST SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED 2ND DEPT)/PATERNITY (PUTATIVE FATHER’S REQUEST FOR A DNA PATERNITY TEST SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED 2ND DEPT)/DNA TEST (PUTATIVE FATHER’S REQUEST FOR A DNAPATERNITY TEST SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED 2ND DEPT)

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INSUFFICIENT PROOF DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM A DANGEROUS MENTAL DISORDER WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined the evidence at this civil commitment hearing supported a finding defendant was not suffering from a “dangerous mental disorder,” but rather was “mentally ill,” within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 330.20:

… County Court accepted the appellant’s plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect to the charge of strangulation in the second degree. After the court issued an examination order pursuant to CPL 330.20(3), the appellant was remanded to Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric … , where he was evaluated by three psychiatric examiners. Two of the examiners found him to be suffering from a dangerous mental disorder, while the third determined that he was mentally ill. * * *

The opinions expressed by the People’s experts were based, in large part, upon speculation and an overly narrow focus on the appellant’s conduct during the relatively brief period of time between the instant offense and the time when the appellant began taking medication. As evidenced by the unrebutted testimony of the appellant’s experts, the appellant has had no history of relapses into violent behavior. Moreover, he had no notable history of substance or alcohol abuse, had always been compliant with treatment, both during the 18-month period he was released on bail and during his subsequent time at Mid-Hudson, and had a positive support system. Therefore, the preponderance of the record evidence did not support the conclusion of the People’s experts that the appellant suffered from a dangerous mental disorder…  Contrary to the County Court’s determination, the preponderance of the evidence adduced at the hearing demonstrated only that the appellant was mentally ill … .

Accordingly, the County Court’s findings of fact must be vacated and the matter remitted to the County Court, Orange County, for the entry of a finding that the appellant is mentally ill pursuant to CPL 330.20(1)(d), and the issuance of such further orders as may be appropriate under the Mental Hygiene Law and CPL 330.20(7). Matter of Eric F., 2017 NY Slip Op 05594, 2nd Dept 7-12-17

CRIMINAL LAW (CIVIL COMMITMENT, INSUFFICIENT PROOF DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM A DANGEROUS MENTAL DISORDER WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 2ND DEPT)/MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, CIVIL COMMITMENT, INSUFFICIENT PROOF DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM A DANGEROUS MENTAL DISORDER WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 2ND DEPT)/MENTAL ILLNESS (CRIMINAL LAW, INSUFFICIENT PROOF DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM A DANGEROUS MENTAL DISORDER WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 2ND DEPT)

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UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, PETITIONER, AN INMATE WHO WAS INITIALLY DENIED ENTRY INTO A PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM FOR HER AND HER CHILD, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE DENIAL 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department that petitioner’s request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) was properly denied. Although petitioner’s application to participate in the prison’s nursery program was improperly denied and she and her child were subsequently admitted to the program by Supreme Court, the facts did not justify the award of attorneys’ fees:

In March 2015, the petitioner moved pursuant to the New York State Equal Access to Justice Act (CPLR art 86; hereinafter the EAJA) for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses. In an order dated August 31, 2015, the Supreme Court denied the petitioner’s motion on the grounds that the respondents’ decision to deny her application for admission to the Nursery Program was “substantially justified” and that “special circumstances make an award unjust” (CPLR 8601[a]). The petitioner appeals.

Under the EAJA, “a court shall award to a prevailing party, other than the state, fees and other expenses incurred by such party in any civil action brought against the state, unless the court finds that the position of the state was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust” (CPLR 8601[a]). An award of attorneys’ fees under the EAJA is generally left to the sound discretion of the Supreme Court … . “The determination of whether the State’s position was substantially justified is committed to the sound discretion of the court of first instance and is reviewable as an exercise of judicial discretion” … .

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in concluding that the respondents’ position was substantially justified, notwithstanding the court’s underlying conclusion that the respondents’ determination to deny the petitioner’s application for admission to the Nursery Program should be annulled … . In particular, the evidence in support of the respondents’ position would satisfy a reasonable person that it was not “desirable for the welfare of [the] child” to remain with the petitioner for purposes of the EAJA … . Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, although the court found that the respondents failed to consider certain factors, including the petitioner’s current achievements and the supervised nature of the Nursery Program, there was no evidence in the record that the respondents “willfully ignored” those factors. Moreover, this is not a case where the respondents failed to conduct any assessment as to whether the subject child’s welfare would best be served by remaining with the petitioner … . Matter of Losurdo v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 2017 NY Slip Op 05603, 2nd Dept 7-12-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW (EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, ATTORNEYS’ FEES, UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, PETITIONER, AN INMATE WHO WAS INITIALLY DENIED ENTRY INTO A PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM FOR HER AND HER CHILD, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE DENIAL 2ND DEPT)/CORRECTIONS LAW (EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, ATTORNEYS’ FEES, UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, PETITIONER, AN INMATE WHO WAS INITIALLY DENIED ENTRY INTO A PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM FOR HER AND HER CHILD, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE DENIAL 2ND DEPT)/ATTORNEYS (EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, ATTORNEYS’ FEES, UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, PETITIONER, AN INMATE WHO WAS INITIALLY DENIED ENTRY INTO A PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM FOR HER AND HER CHILD, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE DENIAL 2ND DEPT)/EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT (ATTORNEYS’ FEES, UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, PETITIONER, AN INMATE WHO WAS INITIALLY DENIED ENTRY INTO A PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM FOR HER AND HER CHILD, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE DENIAL 2ND DEPT)

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