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CITY’S POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR THE ACTIONS OF A CITY BUS DRIVER WAS BASED ON RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR, THEREFORE A NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION ACTION WAS NOT VIABLE AND THE DRIVER’S PERSONNEL FILE WAS NOT DISCOVERABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the city’s motion to vacate the order compelling disclosure of the city bus driver’s personnel file should have been granted. Plaintiff alleged she was injured when she fell on a city bus. The city acknowledged that the driver was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. Therefore the city’s potential liability was based upon respondeat superior, and a negligent hiring and retention action was not viable. Therefore the personnel records were not discoverable:

“Generally, where an employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment, the employer is liable for the employee’s negligence under a theory of respondeat superior, and a plaintiff may not proceed with a cause of action to recover damages for negligent hiring and retention”… . In light of the defendants’ formal concession that the bus driver was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred, the personnel records of the bus driver are not discoverable… . Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to show any other basis to justify granting her request for the personnel records, as “any prior acts of carelessness or incompetence of the defendant’s employee would not be admissible at trial” … . Therefore, the additional discovery sought by the plaintiff is not relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to evidence relevant to the issue of the driver’s alleged negligence … . Trotman v New York City Tr. Auth., 2019 NY Slip Op 00631, Second Dept 1-30-19

 

PLAINTIFF’S PRO SE LEGAL MALPRACTICE COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AND LIMITS ON PLAINTIFF’S ABILITY TO ENGAGE IN FUTURE VEXATIOUS LITIGATION PROPERLY IMPOSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly dismissed plaintiff’s pro se legal malpractice action and properly limited plaintiff’s ability to file additional motions:

“Public policy generally mandates free access to the courts” … . Although a pro se litigant is afforded ” some latitude,'” he or she is not entitled to rights greater than any other litigant and may not disregard court rules or deprive an adversary of rights normally enjoyed by an opposing party … . Accordingly, “when a litigant is abusing the judicial process by harassing individuals solely out of ill will or spite, equity may enjoin such vexatious litigation” … . Here, the plaintiff’s pattern of vexatious and duplicative motion practice warranted the modest limitation of directing the plaintiff to bring future motions via order to show cause … . Strujan v Kaufman & Kahn, LLP, 2019 NY Slip Op 00630, Second Dept 1-30-19

 

PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED UNLOADING A TRUCK, HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should have been granted. Plaintiff was injured when a truck was being unloaded:

A hydraulic lift was being used to lower the flooring materials in pallets, or “skids,” weighing approximately 2,500 to 3,000 pounds, from the bed of the truck to the ground, an elevation of approximately four feet. One of the skids, which had been loaded onto the lift, fell off the lift and struck the plaintiff. …

” Labor Law § 240(1) was designed to prevent those types of accidents in which the scaffold, hoist, stay, ladder or other protective device proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person'” … . The plaintiff’s evidence established, prima facie, that the … defendants violated Labor Law § 240(1) by failing to provide an appropriate safety device to secure the subject materials as they were being lowered, and that this failure was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury … . Ramos-Perez v Evelyn USA, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 00629, Second Dept 1-30-19

 

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EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT USED HIS FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WITNESS (DEFENDANT’S COUSIN) TO INDUCE THE WITNESS’S REFUSAL TO TESTIFY WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT INTRODUCTION OF THE WITNESS’S PRIOR STATEMENTS AT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the evidence presented at the Sirois hearing was sufficient to warrant the conclusion that a witness, defendant’s cousin, refused to testify because of the actions of the defendant. Therefore statements made by the defendant’s cousin were properly admitted at trial:

The People presented phone records evidencing the dates and the content of certain calls made by the cousin to other individuals while the cousin was incarcerated at Riker’s Island, and calls by the defendant to other individuals believed to be family members. The People contended these calls demonstrated that the defendant and other family members secured the cousin’s agreement not to testify against the defendant. The People also represented to the Supreme Court that they planned to offer the testimony of an inmate who knew the defendant and his family, who claimed, among other things, that the defendant had told him that the defendant had “put the wolves out” on the cousin to keep him from testifying, and that the defendant was confident that he would beat the charges as a result. According to the People, the inmate subsequently refused to testify at the hearing out of fear. An Assistant District Attorney testified at the hearing as to the substance of her interview of the inmate, which had taken place the day before. …

… [T]the People “demonstrate[d] by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant, by violence, threats or chicanery, caused [the] witness’s unavailability” … . Misconduct is not limited to threats or intimidation; it can also include situations where, as here, the People established by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant used his close personal relationship with his cousin and/or threats to pressure him not to testify … . People v Walton, 2019 NY Slip Op 00623, Second Dept 1-30-19

 

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DEFENSE COUNSEL GAVE DEFENDANT THE WRONG INFORMATION ABOUT THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE SHOULD HE GO TO TRIAL, DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS THEREFORE NOT VOLUNTARY, EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT FOR APPEAL APPLIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined: (1) the plea was not voluntary because defendant was given the wrong information about the possible maximum sentence if he went to trial; and (2) the error is an exception to the preservation requirement for appeal because defendant could not have known of the error at the time of the plea:

The Court of Appeals … has carved out an exception to the preservation doctrine “because of the actual or practical unavailability of either a motion to withdraw the plea’ or a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction,'” in certain instances, reasoning that ” a defendant can hardly be expected to move to withdraw his plea on a ground of which he has no knowledge'” … . Moreover, the defendant’s contention that his plea of guilty was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent survives his valid appeal waiver … . …

Here, the defendant’s plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The record demonstrates that the defendant was not presented with legitimate alternatives about the maximum sentence he faced in the event he chose to reject the People’s plea offer and was convicted after trial. … On this record, given the difference between the incorrect maximum aggregate sentence of 3 to 5 years that defense counsel communicated to the defendant, the actual maximum aggregate sentence of 2 to 4 years, and the bargained-for sentence of 1½ to 3 years, the threat of a higher sentence rendered the defendant’s plea involuntary … . People v Keller, 2019 NY Slip Op 00620, Second Dept 1-30-19

 

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DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASES SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, THE JURY FOUND DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT BUT FURTHER FOUND THE NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL, HOWEVER, THE NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE WERE INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict in this slip and fall case should have been granted:

The plaintiff alleged that after entering the auditorium to attend the showing of a movie at the defendant’s multiplex theater, she entered a row of seats, slipped on what she believed to be popcorn oil, and fell. After the movie ended, the plaintiff realized that she was injured when she had difficulty rising from her seat.

… [T]he jury rendered a verdict finding that the defendant was negligent, but that such negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries.

Where, as here, the issues of negligence and proximate cause were inextricably interwoven, the jury’s finding that the defendant was negligent, but that such negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries, was not supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence … . The plaintiff, and her friend who accompanied her on the day of the accident, both consistently testified that the plaintiff slipped and fell on an oily substance on the floor of the auditorium. The defendants failed to submit any evidence to refute this testimony. Thus, the plaintiff’s motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the jury verdict should have been granted. Mitchell v Quincy Amusements, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 00430, Second Dept 1-23-19

 

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BANK WAS ENTITLED TO A LIEN ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE SUBROGATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in this action to quiet title, determined that HSBC Bank was entitled to summary judgment on its counterclaim to impose an equitable lien on the subject property:

Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, where the “premises of one person is used in discharging an obligation owed by another or a lien upon the premises of another, under such circumstances that the other would be unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefit thus conferred, the former is entitled to be subrogated to the position of the obligee or lien-holder” … .  …

[The] submissions established that HSBC, as assignee of the FA mortgage, which secured the loan proceeds used to satisfy the Berkshire mortgage, which secured the loan proceeds used to satisfy the plaintiff’s mortgage obligation to Ocwen, was entitled to be put in the place of Ocwen as holder of the mortgage lien in the sum of $207,566.25 … . Lombard v Yacoob, 2019 NY Slip Op 00427, Second Dept 1-23-19

 

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SERVICE DIRECTIONS IN THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DEPRIVED SUPREME COURT OF JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s failure to comply with the service directions in an order to show cause required the denial of the motion to hold defendant in contempt:

… [T]he service requirements set forth in the order to show cause … , were jurisdictional in nature. The plaintiff’s undisputed failure to comply with these requirements by serving the order to show cause pursuant to CPLR 308(4), instead of CPLR 311-a, deprived the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff’s order to show cause … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the defendant may challenge the validity of the [subsequent] order … , on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction to enter the order … . Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion to hold the defendant in contempt for failure to comply with the order … , should have been denied. Boucan NYC Café, LLC v 467 Rogers, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 00416, Second Dept 1-23-19

 

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A CORPORATION’S REGISTRATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS NO LONGER DEEMED CONSENT TO BE SUED IN NEW YORK, FORD’S AND GOODYEAR’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE SUIT STEMMED FROM A ROLLOVER ACCIDENT IN VIRGINIA (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in full-fledged opinion by Justice Brathwaite-Nelson, determined that a products liability case (stemming from a traffic accident in Virginia) against Ford, the manufacturer of the vehicle which rolled over, and Goodyear, the manufacturer of a tire which allegedly failed, could not be brought in New York. The plaintiffs alleged general jurisdiction over both companies based upon business done generally in New York and registration with the NY Department of State. The plaintiffs did not allege long-arm jurisdiction. Neither the vehicle nor the tire was manufactured or purchased from the defendants in New York. The plaintiff had purchased the vehicle from a New York nonparty and had used the vehicle in New York.

We consider on these appeals whether, following the United States Supreme Court decision in Daimler AG v Bauman (571 US 117), a foreign corporation may still be deemed to have consented to the general jurisdiction of New York courts by virtue of having registered to do business in New York and appointed a local agent for the service of process. We conclude that it may not. * * *

We agree with those courts that asserting jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on the mere registration and the accompanying appointment of an in-state agent by the foreign corporation, without the express consent of the foreign corporation to general jurisdiction, would be “unacceptably grasping” under Daimler (Daimler AG v Bauman, 571 US at 138).

The Court of Appeals does not appear to have … relied upon its consent-by-registration theory since International Shoe was decided. We think that this is a strong indicator that its rationale is confined to that era … and that it no longer holds in the post-Daimler landscape. We conclude that a corporate defendant’s registration to do business in New York and designation of the secretary of state to accept service of process in New York does not constitute consent by the corporation to submit to the general jurisdiction of New York for causes of action that are unrelated to the corporation’s affiliations with New York. Aybar v Aybar, 2019 NY Slip Op 00412, Second Dept 1-23-19

CPLR 3211(a)(8)

 

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MERE DENIAL OF THE ALLEGATIONS IN A FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS THE OWNER AND HOLDER OF THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ASSERT THE DEFENSE THAT THE PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING, PRECEDENT TO THE CONTRARY OVERRULED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Castro, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined that a denial of the allegations in a foreclosure complaint that the plaintiff is the owner and holder of the note and mortgage is not sufficient to assert that plaintiff lacks standing, a defense that is waived if not asserted:

… [T]he issue of standing is waived absent some affirmative statement on the part of a mortgage foreclosure defendant, which need not invoke magic words or strictly adhere to any ritualistic formulation, but which must clearly, unequivocally, and expressly place the defense of lack of standing in issue by specifically identifying it in the answer or in a pre-answer motion to dismiss. A mere denial of factual allegations will not suffice for this purpose. * * *

Taken to its logical conclusion, the … defendants’ position would mean that their denials preserve all conceivable affirmative defenses that can be parsed from reading the factual allegations of the complaint in conjunction with their corresponding and conclusory denials, so that these defenses may be raised at some subsequent point in the case. Such a result would render the obligation under CPLR 3018(b) to specifically plead affirmative defenses in the answer meaningless, delay the legislatively favored prompt adjudication of the defenses at an early point in the litigation, and cause prejudice and surprise to plaintiffs. Moreover, the practical realities of mortgage foreclosure litigation are that foreclosure complaints invariably allege that the plaintiff is the holder and/or assignee of the note, and answering defendants reflexively deny (or deny knowledge as to the truth of) most or all of the allegations in their responsive pleadings. Were such denials by themselves sufficient to place standing in issue, then standing would effectively become a prima facie element of the plaintiffs’ claims in all contested foreclosure actions, an unwarranted consequence. Rather, if a defendant in a foreclosure action genuinely believes that she or he has a basis upon which to contest standing, it is not too much to ask her or him to specifically and affirmatively assert that position in the answer as the CPLR requires.

To the extent that some decisions of our Court have strayed from the foregoing principles by indicating that a mere denial in the answer of factual allegations set forth in the complaint will suffice to place standing in issue, thereby injecting uncertainty into this formerly settled area … . US Bank N.A. v Nelson, 2019 NY Slip Op 00494, Second Dept 1-23-19

 

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