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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ACTION AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION STEMMING FROM THE ALLEGED RAPE OF PLAINTIFF ON SCHOOL GROUNDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a late notice of claim should have been granted for the negligent supervision and negligent infliction of emotional distress causes of action against the Department of Education stemming from the the sexual assault of the plaintiff on school grounds:

The DOE had actual knowledge, within the statutory period or a reasonable time thereafter, of the facts constituting [the] claims, which arose as a result of the alleged rape that occurred on September 28, 2017 … . Furthermore, in light of the DOE’s actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claims of negligent supervision and negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff met her initial burden of establishing a lack of substantial prejudice to the DOE in maintaining a defense with respect to those claims … . In opposition, the DOE failed to make a particularized evidentiary showing that it would be substantially prejudiced if the late notice with respect to those claims was allowed … . “[W]here there is actual notice and an absence of prejudice, the lack of a reasonable excuse will not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim” … . Doe v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 03768, Second Dept 7-8-20

 

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TENANT’S MOTION TO REMOVE AN EVICTION PROCEEDING FROM CIVIL COURT AND CONSOLIDATE IT WITH A BREACH-OF-LEASE ACTION IN SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; LEASE PROVISIONS PRECLUDED THE COUNTERCLAIMS AND EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THE EVICTION PROCEEDING, BUT THAT RELIEF IS AVAILABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff’s (tenant’s) motion pursuant to CPLR 602(b) to remove a summary proceeding (eviction proceeding) from Civil Court and consolidate it with the breach-of-lease proceeding in Supreme Court should have been granted:

On January 1, 2015, the plaintiff executed a five-year commercial lease with the defendant for a condominium unit in a building in Brooklyn for the purpose of operating a medical practice on the premises. In May 2017, the defendant commenced a summary proceeding against the plaintiff in the Civil Court, Kings County, to recover possession of the premises and unpaid rent. In October 2017, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant in the Supreme Court, Kings County, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of the lease. The plaintiff also moved, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 602(b) to remove the summary proceeding from the Civil Court to the Supreme Court and to consolidate it with the instant action. … Although the Civil Court is the preferred forum for the resolution of landlord-tenant disputes when the tenant may obtain full relief in a summary proceeding … , here, the lease provisions preclude the plaintiff from asserting counterclaims in the summary proceeding and the equitable relief sought by the plaintiff in the Supreme Court is unavailable to it in the summary proceeding in Civil Court … . Barkagan v S&L Star Realty, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 03759, Second Dept 7-8-20

 

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FAMILY COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING THE REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT IN CONTEMPLATION OF DISMISSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s request for an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal in this juvenile delinquency proceeding:

The Family Court has broad discretion in determining whether to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal … . Although, as it is often stated, a respondent is not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because this was his or her “first brush with the law” … , a respondent’s criminal and disciplinary history is nevertheless relevant to a court’s discretionary determination of whether to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal … . Other relevant factors include, but are not necessarily limited to, a respondent’s history of drug or alcohol use … , a respondent’s association with gang activity … , a respondent’s academic and school attendance record … , the nature of the underlying incident … , a respondent’s decision to accept responsibility for his or her actions … , any recommendations made in a probation or mental health report … , the degree to which the respondent’s parent or guardian is involved in the respondent’s home and academic life … , and the ability of the respondent’s parent or guardian to provide adequate supervision … .

Here, the Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant’s application pursuant to Family Court Act § 315.3(1) for an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal. This proceeding constituted the appellant’s first contact with the court system, the appellant took responsibility for his actions, and the record demonstrates that he had learned from his mistakes. Matter of Brian M., 2020 NY Slip Op 03785, Second Dept 7-8-20

 

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PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) 1304 AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT HAD DEFAULTED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE DECISION ILLUSTRATES THE LEVEL OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1304 WHICH IS REQUIRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank was not entitled to summary judgment in this foreclosure action. Plaintiff did not demonstrate compliance with the notice provisions of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1304 and did not demonstrate defendant defaulted. The decision illustrates the level of strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 which is required by the courts:

The version of RPAPL 1304(2) as it existed at that time required that the 90-day notice provide a list of five housing counseling agencies “that serve the region where the borrower resides.” …

… Here, the notice prepared by the plaintiff listed, as one of the required five housing counseling agencies, an agency located more than 300 miles away from the defendants’ residence. … [I]t is the plaintiff’s burden, on its motion for summary judgment, to demonstrate its strict compliance with the applicable provisions of RPAPL 1304. By failing to submit evidence that the Watertown agency served the region wherein the defendants resided, the plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and thus its motion for such relief should have been denied … . …

Additionally, the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff for the purpose of demonstrating that it properly served its 90-day notice did not specify that the notice was served in an envelope that was separate from any other mailing or notice (see RPAPL 1304 [2]). While the plaintiff attempted to remedy this deficiency in its reply papers, even assuming that its reply affidavit may properly be considered … , that affidavit contained only a conclusory assertion that the mailing was done in a separate envelope, with no assertion by the affiant that she had any personal knowledge of the actual mailing or proof of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed … .

The plaintiff also failed to establish, prima facie, the defendants’ default in payment. While the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff made the requisite showing that the affiant was familiar with the plaintiff’s recordkeeping practices and procedures with respect to the defendants’ payment history, the affiant failed to submit any business record substantiating the alleged default. Conclusory affidavits lacking a factual basis are without evidentiary value … . USBank N.A. v Haliotis, 2020 NY Slip Op 03819, Second Dept 7-8-20

 

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE POLICE OFFICER, ANSWERING A CALL, ACTED RECKLESSLY IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether the defendant police officer (McMahon) acted recklessly in this traffic accident case. The officer, responding to a call, passed a line of cars by straddling the yellow line without siren or lights and struck plaintiff as plaintiff was attempting to make a left turn:

“[T]he reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) only applies when a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation engages in the specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b). Any other injury-causing conduct of such a driver is governed by the principles of ordinary negligence”… . Conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b) includes disregarding regulations governing the direction of movement or turning in specified directions … .

Here, the defendants established that the reckless disregard standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 was applicable to McMahon’s conduct because he was responding to a radio call of a motor vehicle accident with unknown injuries … . However, the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because their moving papers presented a triable issue of fact regarding whether McMahon was reckless in straddling the double-yellow line to pass a row of vehicles without using his warning siren or lights when he collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle … . Rodriguez-Garcia v Southampton Police Dept., 2020 NY Slip Op 03813, Second Dept 7-8-20

 

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IN THIS BATSON CHALLENGE CASE, THE MAJORITY HELD THE DEFENSE’S FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE PROSECUTOR’S STATED REASON FOR EXCLUDING A PROSPECTIVE JUROR, I.E. THAT THE PROSPECTIVE JUROR WAS NOT AFRICAN-AMERICAN, PRECLUDED APPEAL ON THAT ISSUE; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE THREE-STEP BATSON PROCEDURE WAS NOT FOLLOWED WITH RESPECT TO THAT JUROR, REQUIRING REVERSAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined defendant’s Batson challenges were properly handled by the court and properly denied. The defense challenged the exclusion of several African-American potential jurors. With respect to one of the potential jurors, Putsam, the prosecutor answered the challenge by simply saying Putsam was not African-American. Although all three stages of a Batson challenge were addressed with respect to the other challenged jurors, nothing further was argued with respect to Putsam. The dissent argued the required three-step process was not followed with Putsam, requiring reversal and a new trial:

A review of the trial transcript leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Supreme Court engaged in all three analytical steps required by Batson v Kentucky and our corresponding case authorities. The defendant made no argument of any kind as to juror Pustam during step three. Accordingly, she has failed to preserve the specific argument which she raises for the first time on appeal, which is based, in part, at least, on facts that are outside the record, to wit, that Pustam’s Trinidadian heritage qualifies as “African-American.” Indeed, any appellate consideration of this new argument would require this Court to (1) assume facts not within this record; and (2) more importantly, ignore the fact that defense counsel did not dispute or challenge the People’s contention that Pustam was not “African-American.”

The Court of Appeals has been clear that “[w]hen, as here, a party raises an issue of a pattern of discrimination in excluding jurors, and the court accepts the race neutral reasons given, the moving party must make a specific objection to the exclusion of any juror still claimed to have been the object of discrimination … . The defendant’s failure to discuss juror Pustam at all during step three suggests that counsel was not challenging any comment or determination made by the Supreme Court during step two as to Pustam. Similarly, the court’s exception noted unilaterally on the record at the conclusion of step three failed to preserve any “specific” argument for the defendant on appeal, as is expressly required by the Court of Appeals. Therefore, without preservation, our analysis of this appeal cannot reach the cases of People v Pescara (162 AD3d 1772) and People v Chance (125 AD3d 993), cited by the dissent in support of a Batson reversal on the basis of skin color. People v Taylor, 2020 NY Slip Op 03807, Second Dept 7-8-20

 

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PROPER FOUNDATION FOR EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE FINDING THAT THE TESTED SUBSTANCES CONTAINED COCAINE WAS NOT LAID AND THE TESTIMONY WAS THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE; CONVICTIONS ON TWO DRUG-POSSESSION COUNTS REVERSED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction on two drug possession counts, determined the People did not provide a proper foundation for the testimony of two experts who tested the substances alleged to contain cocaine:

The opinion testimony by these experts was inadmissible, because the People failed to lay a foundation for the competence of the testimony. “[A]n expert who tests a substance for the presence of cocaine may not rely solely upon a test involving a comparison of the substance at issue to a known standard when the accuracy of the known standard is not established” … . Here, the evidence adduced at trial reflected that Lin and Lopez each tested the purity of a sample of the substance recovered from the defendant by using a test which relied upon a comparison to a known standard. The People failed to introduce any direct evidence as to the accuracy of the standard used for comparison. Although an expert’s testimony that a substance contains cocaine is admissible when it is “not based solely upon comparative tests using a known standard but also on a series of other tests not involving known standards” … , here, the People failed to establish that either Lin or Lopez performed any other tests that did not involve comparison to a known standard. Thus, the Supreme Court should not have permitted their testimony, and a new trial is required on the counts charging criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree … . People v Campbell, 2020 NY Slip Op 03800, Second Dept 7-8-20

 

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PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) 1304 AND 1306 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; PROOF REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED IN SOME DEPTH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff loan services company (Aurora/Nationstar) did not demonstrate compliance with the notice requirements of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 13O4 and 1306. Therefore, Aurora’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted. The court, noting that “lack of notice’ may be raised at any time, explained defendant did not waive the “lack of notice” defense because defendant denied the plaintiff’s complaint-allegations of compliance and raised the issue in opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The Second Department further found defendant was not entitled to summary judgment because “lack of notice” was not demonstrated as a matter of law. The decision provides a valuable explanation of the proof requirements for compliance with RPAPL 1304 and 1306:

In support of its motions, Aurora submitted the affidavit of Jerrell Menyweather, a document execution specialist employed by Nationstar, along with a copy of a 90-day notice addressed to the defendant, and a proof of filing statement pursuant to RPAPL 1306 from the New York State Banking Department. Although Menyweather stated in the affidavit that the RPAPL notices were sent to the defendant at her last known address and the subject property, Menyweather did not have personal knowledge of the mailing, and Aurora failed to provide any documents to prove that the notices were actually mailed … . Aurora also failed to submit a copy of any United States Post Office document indicating that the notices were sent by registered or certified mail as required by the statute … . Furthermore, Menyweather did not aver that he was familiar with Aurora’s mailing practices and procedures, and therefore did not establish proof of a standard office practice and procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed … . Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Matles, 2020 NY Slip Op 03793, 7-8-20

 

DEFENDANT’S INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY REQUIRED A MORE PROBING COLLOQUY BEFORE ACCEPTING THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE WAIVER OF APPEAL, PLEA VACATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea to murder, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Manzanet-Daniels, determined defendant’s intellectual disability required a more probing colloquy to ensure defendant understood the ramifications of the plea and the waiver of appeal:

Defendant’s psychological assessments cast serious doubt about his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea. DOE records showed defendant to have been diagnosed as mentally retarded and to suffer from “severe academic delays.” The records indicated that with an IQ of only 56, defendant had “extremely low” “general cognitive ability,” with “overall thinking and reasoning abilities” in the bottom 0.2%. Those records further indicated that defendant’s verbal comprehension, perceptual reasoning, working memory, and processing speed were “extremely low,” in the bottom 0.2 to 2%.

The CPL 390 report, ordered by the trial court in aid of sentencing, confirmed the doubts regarding defendant’s mental capacity and ability to understand or participate in the proceedings. Doctors at Bellevue observed defendant to suffer from an intellectual disability with “extremely low” intellectual functioning. Defendant’s IQ placed him in the bottom one percentile as compared to his peers. The report noted that defendant’s limited cognitive abilities placed him at increased risk of impulsive behavior without regard to the consequences of his actions. People v Patillo, 2020 NY Slip Op 03754, Second Dept 7-2-20

 

FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO A JUROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Departing, ordering a new trial, determined defendant’s for cause challenge to a juror should have been granted:

The challenged panelist stated that he could not be “fully fair” if defendant did not testify and “defend himself,” and that it might be difficult for him to acquit a defendant who did not testify, because then “we only get one side.” This reflected a state of mind likely to preclude the rendering of an impartial verdict (see CPL 270.20[1][b]), and the court did not elicit an unequivocal assurance that he would set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence … . When the court asked if he would “hold it against” defendant if defendant did not testify, he responded “No, not hold it against him, but —- I don’t know.” When the court further asked whether defendant’s failure to testify would trouble the panelist to the point where he could not give defendant a fair trial, he responded “I think I’ll be able to give him a fair trial.” Although expressions such as “I think” are not disqualifying, here the panelist’s responses, viewed as a whole, fell short of the required express and unequivocal declarations … . “If there is any doubt about a prospective juror’s impartiality, trial courts should err on the side of excusing the juror, since at worst the court will have replaced one impartial juror with another” … . People v Laverpool, 2020 NY Slip Op 03745, First Dept 7-2-20

 

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