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A CON EDISION TRANSFORMER MINI PAD WHICH ENCROACHED SIX INCHES ONTO PLAINTIFFS’ PROPERTY WAS A TRESPASS ENTITLING PLAINTIFFS TO NOMINAL DAMAGES; THE STICKER ON THE TRANSFORMER WARNING TO STAY THREE FEET AWAY FROM THE TRANSFORMER WAS A NUISANCE, AN INTANGIBLE INTRUSION, NOT A TRESPASS (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the installation of a transformer mini pad by Con Edison which encroached six inches onto plaintiffs’ property was a trespass and defendant was liable for nominal damages of $1. The sticker on the mini pad warning people to stay three feet away was not a trespass. Rather the warning was an intangible intrusion constituting a nuisance:

 “‘[A] trespass claim represents an injury to the right of possession'” … . “[C]ourts have precluded trespass claims where the entry or intrusion was intangible, such as the occurrence of vibrations, shading of a plaintiff’s property, or a permeating odor or vapors of gasoline” … . “Generally, intangible intrusions, such as by noise, odor, or light alone, are treated as nuisances, not trespass [because] they interfere with nearby property owners’ use and enjoyment of their land, not with their exclusive possession of it”… .

“[N]ominal damages are presumed from a trespass even where the property owner has suffered no actual injury to his or her possessory interest” … . “Nominal damages are defined as a trifling sum awarded to a plaintiff in an action where there is no substantial loss or injury to be compensated, but still the law recognizes a technical invasion of his [or her] rights or a breach of the defendant’s duty” … . “These are formal damages as distinguished from real or substantial ones” … . Shrage v Con Edison Co., 2023 NY Slip Op 02694, Second Dept 5-17-23

Practice Point: A Con Edison transformer which encroached six inches onto plaintiffs’ land was a trespass entitled plaintiffs to nominal damages.

Practice Point: The sticker on the transformer warning to stay three feet away was a nuisance, an intangible intrusion, not a trespass.

 

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THE SOLE MEMBER OF AN LLC WHICH OWNS THE PROPERTY HAS AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY; AN INSURER WHICH ACCEPTS PAYMENT ON A POLICY AFTER LEARNING OF THE INSURED’S ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATIONS WAIVES THE RIGHT TO RESCIND THE POLICY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined: (1) plaintiff, as the sole member of an LLC which owned the property, had an insurable interest in the property; and (2) defendant’s accepting payment on the policy after defendant was aware of plaintiff’s alleged misrepresentations waived defendant’s right to rescind the policy:

… [A]s the sole owner of the LLC, the plaintiff had an insurable interest in the subject property, since destruction of the subject property would necessarily cause economic detriment to the plaintiff (see Insurance Law § 3401 …).

… “The continued acceptance of premiums by an insurance carrier after learning of sufficient facts which allow for the rescission of the policy, constitutes a waiver of the right to rescind” … . Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the defendant waived its right to assert the plaintiff’s misrepresentations as a basis for rescinding the policy, since the defendant renewed the policy and accepted a premium payment after it discovered the misrepresentations. Sabharwal v Hyundai Mar. & Fire Ins. Co., Ltd., 2023 NY Slip Op 02690, Second Dept 5-17-23

Practice Point: The sole member of an LLC which owns real property has an insurable interest in the property.

Practice Point: An insurer which accepts payment on a policy after learning of the insured’s alleged misrepresentations waives the right to rescind the policy.

 

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DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE TO A LEVEL ONE BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN AT LIBERTY FOR 17 YEARS WITHOUT REOFFENDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant was entitled a downward departure to level one because he had been at liberty for 17 years without reoffending:

In light of the purpose of SORA, which is to assess the risk that the offender poses while at liberty, lengthy periods during which the defendant has been at liberty after the offense are significant in determining the risk of reoffense and the danger posed in the event of reoffense … . Since these periods are not taken into account in the risk assessment instrument, they are a permissible ground for departure … . Here, the defendant was released from prison for the underlying sex offense in 2002. In the time between his release and the SORA hearing, which was held in 2019, the defendant was at liberty for approximately 17 years without reoffending. In light of the lengthy amount of time without reoffense, we designate the defendant a level one sex offender … . People v Gurley, 2023 NY Slip Op 02686, Second Dept 5-17-23

Practice Point: Here the defendant was entitled to a downward departure to a level one sex offender because he had been at liberty for 17 years without reoffending.

 

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THE WITNESS’S TRIAL TESTIMONY THAT HE DID NOT SEE THE PERPETRATOR’S FACE AND DID NOT SEE THE DEFENDANT FIRE A GUN MERELY FAILED TO CORROBORATE OR BOLSTER THE PEOPLE’S CASE, IT DID NOT CONTRADICT OR DISPROVE ANY EVIDENCE; THEREFORE THE PROSECUTOR SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO IMPEACH THE WITNESS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the prosecutor should not have been allowed to impeach her own witness because the witness’s testimony merely failed to corroborate or bolster the People’s case, it did not contradict or disprove any evidence. The witness testified he did not see the perpetrator’s face and did not see defendant fire a gun:

” … [B]efore a party may impeach its own witness, the testimony on a ‘material fact’ must ‘tend[ ] to disprove the party’s position or affirmatively damage[ ] the party’s case'” … . “Trial testimony that the witness has no knowledge of or cannot recall a particular event, whether truthful or not, does not affirmatively damage the People’s case” … . People v Sams, 2023 NY Slip Op 02684, Second Dept 5-17-23

Practice Point: In order to impeach their own witness, the witness’s testimony must have contradicted or disproved the People’s case. Here the witness’s testimony that he did not see the perpetrator’s face and did not see the defendant fire a gun merely failed to corroborate or bolster the People’s case, it did not disprove or contradict any evidence. Even if the testimony was untrue, the People should not have been allowed to impeach their own witness.

 

A SENTENCE CANNOT BE ALTERED AFTER THE DEFENDANT HAS BEGUN SERVING IT; HERE THE AMENDED UNIFORM SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT FORM DID NOT MERELY CORRECT AN INADVERTENT MISTAKE, IT ALTERED THE SENTENCE AND WAS THEREFORE INVALID (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined the amended uniform sentence and commitment form which was filed after defendant had begun serving his sentence was invalid. Defendant was originally sentenced for three felonies, two of which were to run consecutively with the third. By operation of law, the two which were to run consecutively with the third ran concurrently with each other. The amended uniform sentence and commitment form purported to have all three sentences run consecutively:

… [T]he defendant correctly contends that his legal sentence was improperly altered, in violation of CPL 430.10, by the amended uniform sentence and commitment form after he began serving his sentence. At sentencing, the County Court identified the sentences which were to run consecutively when it stated that, “[i]n other words, [the attempted murder count] and the [assault count] are to run consecutively to the [intentional murder count].” Contrary to the People’s contention, the court did not, at any point during the sentencing proceeding, specify how the attempted murder count and the assault count were to run with respect to each other. As a result, the sentences imposed on those counts run concurrently as a matter of law (see Penal Law § 70.25[1][a] …). Thus, the original uniform sentence and commitment form reflected the sentence unambiguously imposed by the court during the sentencing proceeding. The record does not indicate that the court misspoke or that its failure to specify that the terms of imprisonment imposed on the intentional murder, attempted murder and assault counts were all to run consecutively to each other was accidental. Therefore, the amended uniform sentence and commitment form effected an improper alteration of the defendant’s sentence in violation of CPL 430.10 … . People v Parsley, 2023 NY Slip Op 02683, Second Dept 5-17-23

Practice Point: Although a court may correct an inadvertent sentencing mistake, it cannot alter a sentence once defendant has begun serving it. Here there was no indication the original sentence, indicating the sentences for two of the three felonies were to run concurrently, was a mistake, so the amended sentence, indicating all three sentences were to run consecutively, was invalid.

 

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A LOCAL LAW WHICH CURTAILED THE POWER OF AN ELECTED OFFICER TO ACT WAS DEEMED INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS NOT SUBJECT TO A PUBLIC REFERENDUM (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over an extensive dissent, determined a Local Law which curtailed to power of an elected officer to act was invalid because it was not subject to a public referendum. The decision and the dissent are too detailed to fairly summarize here:

Chapter 263 is substantively invalid on its face because the supermajority requirement continually curtails the power of a local officer to act … . This goes to the wisdom and merit of the local law. “Unless specifically provided by statute or charter provisions, one [local] legislature may not bind the hands of its successors in areas relating to governmental matters” … . “A local law . . . which . . . has the effect of curtailing the power of such elective officers . . . becomes operative only after approval by the majority of the qualified” voters … , since it “curtail[s] each legislator’s relative ability to cast the deciding vote” … . To rule otherwise in the instant case would bind the hands of the Town Board and the public indefinitely, merely because years in the past, no one saw fit to challenge a law which would only have practical effect years in the future…. . * * *

The power of the Town Board cannot be limited indefinitely merely because there was a procedure which would have allowed for the passage of such a provision, and although that procedure was not followed, the four-month statute of limitations for challenging procedural defects had passed. This was not a mere procedural defect. Rather, the Town Board imposed a continuing illegal infringement on the rights of future members of the Town Board, and a continuing infringement upon the rights of the voters. Hoehmann v Town of Clarkstown, 2023 NY Slip Op 02606, Second Dept 5-15-23

Affirmed by the Court of Appeals: Hoehmann v Town of Clarkstown, 2023 NY Slip Op 02750, CtApp 5-19-23

Practice Point: Here, a local law which curtailed the power of elective officers was invalid because it was not subject to a public referendum.

 

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AN ORDER TO EFFECT SERVICE OF PROCESS IN A MANNER WHICH CANNOT BE COMPLIED WITH PRECLUDES PERSONAL JURISDICTION; PETITIONER DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ELECTION FRAUD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined: (1) the order to show cause specified a method of service which could not be complied with; therefore personal jurisdiction over Williams was not obtained: (2) election fraud on Williams part was not demonstrated:

Since the method of service provided in the order to show cause was jurisdictional in nature, and the affidavit of service is deficient on its face for identifying an address for mailing purportedly obtained from a document that did not exist, the court should have granted that branch of Williams’s motion which was, in effect, to dismiss the amended petition for lack of personal jurisdiction. …

“A candidate’s designating petition or independent nominating petition ‘will be invalidated on the ground of fraud if there is a showing that the entire petition is permeated with fraud'” … . “Absent permeation with fraud, a designating [or independent nominating] petition may be invalidated where the candidate has participated in or is chargeable with knowledge of the fraud” … . Here, Stark [petitioner] failed to meet her burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the designating petition was permeated with fraud or that Williams participated in or was chargeable with knowledge of any fraud … . Matter of Stark v Williams, 2023 NY Slip Op 02583, Second Dept 5-11-23

Practice Point: If an order to show cause directs service of process to be made in a manner which cannot be complied with, personal jurisdiction is precluded even if the affidavit of service purports to have complied with the order.

 

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UGELL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED AS A CANDIDATE FOR TOWN SUPERVISOR; THE FACT THAT UGELL IS A TOWN JUSTICE IS NOT DISQUALIFYING; ELECTION FRAUD MUST BE PROVEN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, LACKING HERE (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Ugell, a town justice, should not have been disqualified as a candidate for town supervisor. The fact that Ugell is a town justice was not disqualifying. There was no clear and convincing evidence of election fraud:

The petitioners presented no basis to disqualify Ugell under Election Law § 6-122. The fact that Ugell is subject to the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct (22 NYCRR) part 100 as a Town Justice does not disqualify him from running for the office of Town Supervisor … .

“The proper evidentiary standard for proving fraud in an Election Law proceeding is clear and convincing evidence” … . “[A]s a general rule, a petition for an opportunity to ballot will be invalidated on the ground of fraud only if there is a showing that the entire petition is permeated with fraud” … . “The inclusion of a candidate’s name on a designating petition, without his or her consent, may constitute fraud”… . Here, in light of the conflicting and, in part, incredible testimony, the Supreme Court erred in determining that the petitioners established, by clear and convincing evidence, fraud so as to warrant invalidating the designating petition … . Moreover, the petitioners failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, “actual deception of the voters or members of the party involved” … . Matter of King v Ugell, 2023 NY Slip Op 02601, Second Dept 5-11-23

Practice Point: The fact that Ugell was a town justice did not disqualify him from running for town supervisor. Election fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, lacking here.

 

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THE FRANCHISOR, TOYOTA, DID NOT EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE FRANCHISEE’S, PLAZA TOYOTA’S, DAILY OPERATIONS; THEREFORE TOYOTA COULD NOT BE HELD VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR PLAZA TOYOTA’S NEGLIGENCE; HERE A WHEEL FELL OFF PLAINTIFF’S CAR AFTER IT WAS SERVICED AT PLAZA TOYOTA (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint against the franchisor, here Toyota, for the negligence of the franchisee car dealership, Plaza Toyota, should have been dismissed. After the plaintiff’s car was worked on at Plaza Toyota, a front wheel fell off:

Supreme Court erred in denying the Toyota defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims insofar as asserted against them. “In determining whether a defendant, as a franchisor, may be held vicariously liable for the acts of its franchisee, the most significant factor is the degree of control that the franchisor maintains over the daily operations of the franchisee or, more specifically, the manner of performing the very work in the course of which the accident occurred” … .

Here, affidavits submitted by the Toyota defendants in support of their motion established, prima facie, that they lacked the requisite control over the manner in which Plaza Toyota serviced vehicles … . Caceres v Toyota Motor N. Am., Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 02492, Second Dept 5-10-23

Practice Point: A franchisor can be held vicariously liable for the negligence of a franchisee only if the franchisor exercises control over the franchisee’s daily operations, not the case here.

 

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STRIKING A PEDESTRIAN IS NEGLIGENCE PER SE; FAILING TO SEE WHAT THERE IS TO SEE IS NEGLIGENCE; ANY COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ON PLAINTIFF’S PART IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED; PLAINTIFF PEDESTRIAN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this pedestrian-vehicle traffic accident case should have been granted. Striking a pedestrian is a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law which is negligence per se. In addition a driver is expected to see what there is to be seen. Defendant was in the middle lane of traffic when plaintiff was struck:

The plaintiff demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability through the submission of evidence that established the defendant driver was negligent in failing to see what there was to be seen and in failing to exercise due care in avoiding the collision with the plaintiff (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 [a] …).. By the defendant driver’s own admissions at his deposition, he never saw the plaintiff before the defendants’ vehicle struck the plaintiff; in fact, upon impact, the defendant driver thought “maybe a tire or something . . . hit [the defendants’] car,” and when he first saw the plaintiff, the plaintiff was lying on the pavement. Moreover, the record demonstrates that the road was flat, the weather was clear, and visibility was good. Further, the defendants’ vehicle was traveling in the middle lane of three southbound lanes, when it made contact with the plaintiff who was crossing from the right side of the road, “giving the defendant driver ample time to notice plaintiff crossing the street” … . Beityaaghoob v Klein, 2023 NY Slip Op 02488, Second Dept 5-10-23

Practice Point: Under the facts in this pedestrian-vehicle traffic accident case, striking plaintiff pedestrian was negligence per se (a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law) and defendant’s acknowledged failure to see the plaintiff constituted negligence. Any comparative negligence on plaintiff’s part is not to be considered. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted.

 

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