You are here: / SEARCH OF VEHICLE

Tag Archive for: SEARCH OF VEHICLE

,

Odor of Burnt Marijuana Provided Probable Cause to Search Defendant and Vehicle

The Third Department determined that, upon a valid traffic stop, the odor of burnt marijuana detected by officers Denise and Knoetgen provided probable cause for the search of the vehicle and its occupants:

As for the propriety of the … pat down and/or search of defendant, “it is well established that [t]he odor of marihuana emanating from a vehicle, when detected by an officer qualified by training and experience to recognize it, is sufficient to constitute probable cause to search a vehicle and its occupants” … . Here, both Denise and Knoetgen testified that they smelled burnt marihuana emanating from defendant’s clothing and the vehicle in which he was riding. Even accepting that Denise’s experience in detecting this distinctive odor was not sufficiently developed at the suppression hearing, we are satisfied that Knoetgen, as a drug recognition expert and a K-9 drug detection officer, possessed the requisite training and experience to do so. Further, and as noted previously, Knoetgen testified that the driver of the vehicle admitted that he and defendant had smoked marihuana prior to being pulled over for the underlying traffic violation … . As the circumstances presented and the observations made by the troopers provided probable cause for Knoetgen’s pat down/search of defendant, we discern no basis upon which to suppress the drugs subsequently seized from defendant’s pant leg. People v Rasul, 2014 NY Slip Op 07378, 3rd Dept 10-30-14

 

,

Police Did Not Demonstrate They Had a “Founded Suspicion Criminality Was Afoot” Before Asking For and Receiving Defendant’s Permission to Search His Car

The Fourth Department determined the police failed to demonstrate they had a “founded suspicion that criminality was afoot” when they asked defendant for permission to search his car.  The marijuana and firearm found in the search should have been suppressed:

The law is well settled that the police may not ask an occupant of a lawfully stopped vehicle if he or she has any weapons unless they have a founded suspicion that criminality is afoot … . It is equally well settled that the police may not ask for consent to search a vehicle absent that same degree of suspicion … . Here, as both defendant and the People recognize, the legality of the police conduct turns on whether the officer who engaged defendant at the side of his vehicle smelled or observed marihuana in the vehicle before asking defendant whether he had any guns or drugs and before asking for consent to search. We conclude that there is no basis in the record to support the court’s finding that the officers smelled marihuana as soon as they approached the vehicle.  People v Wideman, 2014 NY Slip Op 06698, 4th Dept 10-3-14

 

,

People Failed to Demonstrate Seizure of Heroin from Defendant’s Impounded Vehicle Was Pursuant to a Standard Inventory Search—Heroin Should Have Been Suppressed

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined that heroin seized from inside defendant’s vehicle after a stop for speeding should have been suppressed.  The defendant was arrested at the scene of the stop based upon an outstanding warrant. The People failed to demonstrate the heroin was found pursuant to a standard inventory search of the impounded vehicle:

Following a lawful arrest of the driver of a vehicle, “the police may impound the car, and conduct an inventory search, where they act pursuant to ‘reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith'” … . To this end, “courts have insisted that an inventory search be conducted according to a familiar routine procedure and that the procedure meet two standards of reasonableness” … . Specifically, the procedures must be “designed to meet the legitimate objectives of the search while limiting the discretion of the officer in the field” … .

Here, the transcript of the … suppression hearing fails to support a determination that the conduct of the police was reasonable. Although not fatal to their argument against suppression …, the People failed to offer a copy of the State Police procedure manual into evidence. Additionally, the People also failed to ask any substantive questions of their witnesses so as to otherwise establish (1) that the State Police had a standardized procedure, (2) that such procedure was reasonable, and (3) that it was followed here. People v Leonard, 2014 NY Slip Op 05468, 3rd Dept 7-24-14

 

,

Defendant Did Not Demonstrate Standing to Challenge Search of Vehicle

The Third Department determined the defendant did not demonstrate he had standing to contest the inventory search of a vehicle, parked and empty at the time the police seized it, which turned up a weapon.  A police officer had seen the defendant driving the vehicle just before it was seized and a confidential informant had told the police where the defendant kept a handgun in the vehicle. Because the People did not rely solely on the statutory presumption of possession of a weapon (Penal Law 265.15 (3)) the defendant needed to allege and demonstrate standing.  Because the defendant did not own the vehicle and denied driving it on the day it was seized, he was unable to challenge the search:

A defendant seeking to suppress evidence has the burden to allege and, if disputed, establish standing to challenge a search … . “Standing exists where a defendant was aggrieved by a search of a place or object in which he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy” … . While a defendant is entitled to “automatic standing” if the People “rely solely on the statutory presumption [of possession of a weapon] contained in Penal Law § 265.15 (3) to establish his [or her] guilt” …, defendant here cannot rely on that exception to his burden regarding standing. The People did not depend entirely upon the statutory presumption of standing, but had other evidence, including one officer who witnessed defendant driving the vehicle and the CI who provided information that defendant had a handgun in the vehicle and where within the vehicle the gun would be located … . Inasmuch as defendant did not own the BMW and denied that he was driving it on the day in question, he failed to allege any legitimate expectation of privacy in that vehicle. People v Anderson, 2014 NY Slip Op 04269, 3rd Dept 6-12-14

 

,

Automobile Exception to Warrant Requirement Applied

The Third Department determined the police had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the glove box of defendant’s car based upon information provided by a confidential informant:

…[T]here was probable cause for the search of the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, which permits a search of a vehicle where there is probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found inside … . Following defendant’s arrest, the information furnished by the confidential informant provided the police with probable cause to believe that there was a large quantity of ecstasy in the glove box. Inasmuch as the police were authorized to conduct a warrantless search of defendant’s vehicle, County Court properly denied his suppression motion. People v Portelli, 2014 NY Slip Op 02467, 3rd Dept 4-10-14

 

,

Probable Cause to Search Vehicle for a Weapon After Defendant’s Arrest Provided by Identified Citizen Informant

The Fourth Department determined a weapon was properly seized from a vehicle after defendant’s valid arrest based on information from an identified citizen informant:

It is well settled that, “ ‘where police have validly arrested an occupant of an automobile, and they have reason to believe that [it] may contain evidence related to the crime for which the occupant was arrested or that a weapon may be discovered or a means of escape thwarted, they may contemporaneously search the passenger compartment, including any containers found therein’ ” … .Here, as noted, there is no dispute that defendant was lawfully stopped and arrested. Rather, the issue before us is whether the police lawfully searched the vehicle defendant was driving. Even assuming, without deciding, that the police did not conduct a lawful inventory search, we conclude that a search was authorized because the police had probable cause to believe that a gun was inside the vehicle. Probable cause arose from the information provided to the police by the identified citizen informant, who stated that she observed one of the occupants of defendant’s vehicle in possession of what appeared to be a handgun used in the abduction of her boyfriend. “An identified citizen informant is presumed to be personally reliable” …  and, here, the informant had a sufficient basis of knowledge inasmuch as she personally observed the weapon in question… . People v Holmes, 95, 4th Dept 3-21-14

 

,

No Probable Cause to Search Car Interior After Occupants Were Out of the Car and Patted Down

The Second Department determined the police officer who stopped the car in which defendant was a passenger did not have probable cause to search the interior of the car after the occupants were out of the car and had been patted down.  The court explained the relevant law:

” [A] police officer acting on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and on an articulable basis to fear for his [or her] own safety may intrude upon the person or personal effects of the suspect only to the extent that is actually necessary to protect himself [or herself] from harm'” … . Therefore, “absent probable cause, it is unlawful for a police officer to invade the interior of a stopped vehicle once the suspects have been removed and patted down without incident, as any immediate threat to the officers’ safety has consequently been eliminated” … . A “narrow exception” to this rule exists in circumstances where:

” following a lawful stop, facts revealed during a proper inquiry or other information gathered during the course of the encounter lead to the conclusion that a weapon located within the vehicle presents an actual and specific danger to the officer’s safety sufficient to justify further intrusion, notwithstanding the suspect’s inability to gain immediate access to that weapon'”… . People v Baksh, 2014 NY Slip Op 00112, 2nd Dept 1-8-14

 

,

Harmless Error Rule Should Not Have Been Applied to Guilty Plea

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Graffeo, the Court of Appeals, over a dissent, declined to apply the harmless error rule to a guilty plea.  In this driving-while-intoxicated case, the defendant moved to suppress an open bottle of rum and a crack pipe which were found in the car he was driving during an inventory search. The motion was denied. Defendant told the court he wanted to plead guilty because he “was not planning to go to trial if [he] got a negative ruling” on the motion.  On appeal, the inventory search was deemed invalid, but the Appellate Division ruled the error “harmless.”  In reversing, the Court of Appeals wrote:

The harmless error rule was “formulated to review trial verdicts” (People v Grant, 45 NY2d at 378).  It requires an appellate court to assess the quantum and nature of the People’s proof of guilt independent of erroneously admitted evidence and the causal effect, if any, that the introduction of that evidence had on the fact finder’s verdict … .  Harmless error therefore can be “difficult to apply to guilty pleas” — especially in cases involving “an improper denial of a pretrial motion to suppress” — since “a defendant’s decision to plead guilty may be based on any factor inside or outside the record” (People v Grant, 45 NY2d at 378379).  Consequently, convictions premised on invalid guilty pleas generally are not amenable to harmless error review (see id.).

The Grant doctrine is not absolute, however, and we have recognized that a guilty plea entered after an improper court ruling may be upheld if there is no “reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the plea” (id. at 379).  Although a failure to suppress evidence may detrimentally influence a defendant’s plea negotiations, a concession of guilt may be treated as valid if the defendant articulates a reason for it that is independent of the incorrect pre-plea court ruling (see id. at 379-380) or an appellate court is satisfied that the decision to accept responsibility “was not influenced” by the error… . * * *

Certainly, there may be instances where the failure to grant suppression does not affect a defendant’s decision to plead guilty because the challenged proof is cumulative or too trivial.  In this case, however, the denial of the motion to suppress could not be viewed as harmless and the guilty plea must be vacated. People v Wells, 188, CtApp 11-14-13

 

,

Case Sent Back to Suppression Court to Determine Whether Police Had Sufficient Reason for Asking About Drugs and Weapons After Traffic Stop

The Fourth Department sent the case back for a determination whether the police had a founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify an inquiry about the presence of drugs of weapons after a traffic stop:

We agree with defendant that Supreme Court erred in refusing to suppress the gun recovered from the vehicle based upon the inevitable discovery doctrine.  The testimony at the suppression hearing established that, during a lawful traffic stop, one of the police officers asked defendant whether there were any drugs or weapons in the vehicle before instructing defendant to exit the vehicle.  After defendant admitted to having marihuana on his person, the police officer asked defendant to exit the vehicle and, following suspicious behavior by another occupant of the vehicle, searched the vehicle and found a gun in plain view.  Notably, the court did not address whether the officer had the requisite founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify an inquiry concerning the presence of drugs or weapons in the vehicle … . Instead, the court refused to suppress the gun on the ground that the police “could” have taken various actions after the traffic stop that would have inevitably led to the discovery of the gun.  The People, – however, did not raise the inevitable discovery doctrine as a ground for denying suppression of the gun, nor did they meet their burden of “demonstrat[ing] a very high degree of probability that normal police procedures would have uncovered the challenged evidence independently of [a] tainted source”… . People v Sykes, 849, 4th Dept 10-4-13

STREET STOPS, SUPPRESSION

Papers Sufficient to Require Suppression Hearing—No Need to Allege Expectation of Privacy Where Police Act Illegally

In finding defendant’s papers were sufficient to require a suppression hearing (re: the suppression of a gun), the Second Department noted that the defendant was not required to demonstrate he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area the gun was found because the motion alleged the gun was seized as a result of illegal police conduct:

A motion to suppress evidence must state the grounds of the motion and contain sworn allegations of fact supporting such grounds (see CPL 710.60[1]…). “It is fundamental that a motion may be decided without a hearing unless the papers submitted raise a factual dispute on a material point which must be resolved before the court can decide the legal issue” (…see CPL 710.60[3][b],,,). In testing the sufficiency of a defendant’s factual allegations, a court should consider “(1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) defendant’s access to information” … .

Here, the allegations in the defendant’s papers, when considered in the context of the information provided by the People, raised a factual dispute requiring a hearing … . Contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s motion papers contained the requisite sworn allegations of fact … . Moreover, the defendant was not required to demonstrate that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area where the gun was found …, since, under both the defendant’s and the People’s versions of events, the dispositive issue was whether the gun was recovered as a direct result of unlawful police action …. In light of the foregoing, the County Court should not have denied suppression without conducting a hearing. Accordingly, we remit the matter to the County Court, Suffolk County, for a hearing and a new determination thereafter of that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to suppress physical evidence.  People v Jennings, 2013 NY Slip Op 06384, 2nd Dept 10-2-13

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy