In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Read, over a dissent, the Court of Appeals determined the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by failing to give the adverse inference charge with respect to a hand-written police report (“scratch 61”) which could not be located. The opinion explains the history of the sanctions appropriate when Rosario material is not turned over to the defense. With respect to nonwillful loss or destruction of Rosario material, the court explained the defendant must demonstrate prejudice, not demonstrated under the facts here:

…[O]ur rule is clear: nonwillful, negligent loss or destruction of Rosario material does not mandate a sanction unless the defendant establishes prejudice … . If prejudice is shown, the choice of the proper sanction is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who may consider the degree of prosecutorial fault … . The focus, though, is on the need to eliminate prejudice to the defendant … . Here, defendants did not establish prejudice, as is their burden. Defendants fault the trial judge for not analyzing prejudice when he denied their request for an adverse inference charge, but they did not even mention the word. … The judge essentially (and correctly) ruled that inadvertent loss alone was insufficient to require a sanction. Of course, it is difficult to imagine how defendants might have been prejudiced by the loss of the scratch 61, as the defense attorneys and the judge all no doubt knew. A scratch 61 is a handwritten complaint report that [was] placed in a bin for typing, likely by a civilian employee of the police department. Defendants were provided the typewritten complaint report, which would have differed from the scratch 61 only if the typist made a mistake — i.e., the handwritten scratch 61 is not subject to editing before typing. People v Martinez…, 13, 14, CtApp 2-18-14