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Defendant’s Having Unprotected Sex with Partner After Defendant’s HIV-Positive Diagnosis Did Not Constitute “Depraved Indifference”

The Court of Appeals determined that the “depraved indifference” standard in the first degree reckless endangerment statute was not met by the facts.  Defendant had (consensual) unprotected sex with his partner after the defendant was diagnosed as HIV positive.  The defendant’s partner was subsequently diagnosed as HIV positive:

Depraved indifference is a culpable mental state which means the same thing in the murder and reckless endangerment statutes … . As we explained in People v Suarez (6 NY3d 202, 212 [2005]), “[a] defendant may be convicted of [a depraved indifference crime] when but a single person is endangered in only a few rare circumstances”; specifically, where the defendant exhibits “wanton cruelty, brutality or callousness directed against a particularly vulnerable victim, combined with utter indifference to the life or safety of the helpless target of the perpetrator’s inexcusable acts” (id. at 213). Here, there is no evidence that defendant exposed the victim to the risk of HIV infection out of any malevolent desire for the victim to contract the virus, or that he was utterly indifferent to the victim’s fate .. . People v Williams, 2015 NY Slip Op 01485, CtApp 2-19-15

 

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Defendant’s Actions In Driving Under the Influence and Causing a Collision Did Not Support Convictions for Offenses Requiring Proof of a Depraved Indifference to Human Life

The Second Department determined that there was insufficient proof of “depraved indifference” to support defendant’s convictions for first degree assault and reckless endangerment stemming from a collision with a vehicle driven by Petrone:

Depraved indifference is ” best understood as an utter disregard for the value of human life—a willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply doesn’t care whether grievous harm results or not'” … . It is embodied in conduct that is ” so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law imposes upon a person who intentionally causes [serious physical injury to] another'” … .

The issue of whether a defendant possessed a state of mind evincing depraved indifference to human life is highly fact-sensitive, requiring a case-by-case analysis … . Here, the prosecution’s witnesses established that the defendant’s vehicle, without braking, collided into the back of Petrone’s vehicle while both were traveling eastbound in the left lane on Northern Boulevard. The collision was of such force that both vehicles left the roadway and flipped over. Moreover, the testimony of the forensic toxicologist demonstrated that, at the time of the accident, the defendant was significantly impaired due to his ingestion of six different drugs, including methadone. Nevertheless, the evidence of the defendant’s conduct did not support a finding of depraved indifference. The defendant was not driving well in excess of the speed limit, he was not driving the wrong way into oncoming traffic, he had not failed to obey traffic signals, and there was no evidence that he was driving erratically prior to the collision … . Under these factual circumstances, the prosecution failed to establish that the defendant possessed an “utter disregard for the value of human life” or that he “simply [did not] care whether grievous harm result[ed] or not” from his actions … . Consequently, there is simply no “valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences [that] could lead a rational person to the conclusion” … that the defendant acted with depraved indifference to human life when he caused the injuries to Petrone… . People v Jakobson, 2014 NY Slip Op 05354. 2nd Dept 7-16-14

 

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“Depraved Indifference” Standard Not Met/HIV Positive Defendant Did Not Disclose Status to Victim

The Fourth Department determined the evidence before the grand jury did not demonstrate defendant had acted with “depraved indifference to human life” (Reckless Endangerment, First Degree). The defendant, who was HIV positive, had unprotected sex with the victim without disclosing his HIV status:

…[W]e conclude that the evidence before the grand jury, viewed in the light most favorable to the People …, was legally insufficient to support a finding that defendant acted with depraved indifference to human life (see Penal Law § 120.25…).  Specifically, the evidence established that defendant engaged in unprotected sex with the victim on two to four occasions without disclosing his HIV positive status.

Shortly after their sexual relationship ended, defendant told the victim that a former sexual partner had tested positive for HIV and urged the victim to be tested.  The victim was diagnosed as HIV positive several months later.  We conclude that, although defendant may have acted with indifference to the victim’s health, his conduct lacked the “ ‘wanton cruelty, brutality, or callousness’ ” required for a finding of depraved indifference toward a single victim … .  Defendant told the police that he did not disclose his HIV positive status to the victim because he was “afraid [the victim] would not want to be with” him, and that he “loved [the victim] so very much.”  Defendant wrote a letter apologizing to the victim because he was “so upset” and “felt terrible.”  The fact that defendant encouraged the victim to be tested for HIV indicates that defendant “was trying, however weakly and ineffectively,” to prevent any grave risk that might result from his conduct … .  We thus conclude that, “while the evidence certainly shows that defendant cared much too little about [the victim]’s safety, it cannot support a finding that [he] did not care at all” … .

We further conclude that the grand jury evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People …., also did not establish that defendant’s conduct presented a grave risk of death to the victim (see Penal Law § 120.25…).  The victim’s physician, an infectious disease expert, testified that the ability to treat HIV has increased dramatically over the past 15 years, with over 20 different antiviral medications available for treatment.  The expert testified that although an HIV positive diagnosis may have been tantamount to a death sentence in the past, with treatment, the prognosis today is “outstanding,” particularly when a patient promptly learns that he or she is infected and seeks treatment.  Indeed, the expert testified that patients with HIV who take their medication, eat well, do not smoke, and reduce their alcohol intake can live a “very healthy, normal lifestyle,” and he expected a similar prognosis for the victim.  We thus conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the People failed to establish that defendant’s reckless conduct posed a grave or “very substantial” risk of death to the victim… .  People v Williams, 1196, 4th Dept 11-15-13

 

Shooting Accomplished With Two Weapons Constituted a Single Continuing Offense/Indictment Not Duplicitous

Over a dissent, the Fourth Department determined a shooting accomplished with more than one weapon did not constitute two distinct offenses, but rather constituted a continuing offense, and, therefore, the indictment was not duplicitous:

It is well established that, “ ‘[w]here an offense may be committed by doing any one of several things, the indictment may, in a single count, group them together and charge the defendant with having committed them all, and a conviction may be had on proof of the commission of any one of the things, without proof of the commission of the others’ ” … .  Contrary to the position of the dissent, we conclude that the evidence at trial established that the multiple shots fired from two separate firearms “constitute[d] a single uninterrupted assault rather than a series of distinct criminal acts . . . , and the assault ‘occurred over a short time frame, without apparent abeyance, and was triggered by a single incident of anger’ ” … .  “The fact that more than one dangerous instrument allegedly was used by the defendant[], and more than one [shot] was [fired] causing the [victim] several injuries, does not transform this single criminal incident into multiple assaults or acts of [reckless endangerment] which must be charged by separate counts” … .  We respectfully disagree with the position of the dissent that there were separate impulses with an abeyance between them.  Rather, the evidence established that defendant assaulted the victim and his fiancée in an attempt to seek revenge for the fiancée’s alleged assault on defendant’s sister. There was one motive and one impulse:  to seek revenge.  We see no distinction between a situation in which an assaulting defendant takes the time to reload one weapon and one in which the assaulting defendant takes the time to obtain a second weapon with the single impulse of continuing the ongoing assault.

With respect to the count of reckless endangerment in the first degree, the conduct encompassed by that count was the act of endangering the life of the victim’s fiancée, who was in the vicinity of the victim the entire time defendant was shooting at the victim. “Where . . . a crime by its nature as defined in the Penal Law may be committed either by one act or by multiple acts and can be characterized as a continuing offense over time, the indictment may charge the continuing offense in a single count” … .  Under the circumstances of this case, the crime of reckless endangerment “involved a continuing offense” and could therefore encompass multiple acts in one count without being duplicitous … .  In our view, the fact that the multiple shots were fired from two separate firearms did not transform this continuing offense into two separate offenses.  We disagree with the dissent’s assumption that the fiancée was “potentially out of harm’s way” when she sought refuge in a vehicle during the barrage of gunshots inasmuch as the vehicle was still in the vicinity of the gunshots.  “[R]eckless endangerment is a conduct specific . . . crime,” and here the conduct underlying that count of the indictment was the firing of multiple gunshots in the vicinity of the fiancée … .  We thus conclude that the indictment was not rendered duplicitous by the court’s instruction that the jury could find defendant guilty of the assault and reckless endangerment charges if it found that defendant used either firearm or both.   We reject the view of the dissent that “ ‘there were two distinct shooting incidents’ ” … .  People v Flanders, 963, 4th Dept 11-8-13

 

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Evidence Insufficient to Support Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree—No One In Line of Fire

The Fourth Department reversed defendant’s conviction for reckless endangerment in the first degree in a shooting case where there was no evidence anyone was near the line of fire:

“A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct [that] creates a grave risk of death to another person” (Penal Law § 120.25). The evidence at trial established only that defendant stood on a street corner and fired up to five shots from a handgun. The People “presented no evidence that any person . . . ‘was in or near the line of fire’ ” so as to create a grave risk of death to any such person… .  People v Stanley, 757, 4th Dept 7-5-13

 

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Throwing Objects Off Balcony Evinces Depraved Indifference.

The defendant, who claimed to have been intoxicated at the time, threw bottles and plates off a 26th floor hotel balcony overlooking 7th Avenue during morning rush hour.  He was convicted of first degree reckless endangerment, which requires a “depraved indifference to human life.” In affirming the conviction, the First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Friedman, included a substantive discussion of the relationship among the legal concepts “depraved indifference,” ” recklessness,” and “specific intent to cause harm.”  In addition, the Court found sufficient “exigent circumstances” to justify the warrantless entry by the police into defendant’s hotel room. People v Green, 7860, Ind. 4295/05 First Dept. 1-22-13.

 

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