In reversing the conviction, the Second Department determined that the acquittal on a rape count rendered the conviction on a related “endangering the welfare of a child” count “against the weight of the evidence.”  The Second Department also ruled that questions posed by defense counsel did not “open the door” to questioning by the prosecutor about prior “bad acts” which the trial court had ruled off limits in a Sandoval hearing.  The Second Department further ruled that an exception to the “rape shield law” was applicable and evidence the complainant had sex with defendant’s brother should have been admitted because it was relevant to a defense-theory alleging the brother had committed acts with which the defendant was charged. In ordering a new trial on one of the counts, the Second Department found that “the cumulative effect of certain trial errors deprived defendant of a fair trial…”.  In discussing the Sandoval error, the Second Department wrote: 

The purpose of a Sandoval hearing is to provide the defendant with “definitive advance knowledge of the scope of cross-examination as to prior conduct to which he will be subjected,” so that the defendant can decide whether to take the witness stand … . In the interest of fairness, a trial court’s authority to change its Sandoval ruling is limited once the defendant has decided to testify in good faith reliance on that ruling … . “When a defendant testifies to facts that are in conflict with the precluded evidence, he opens the door on the issue in question, and he is properly subject to impeachment by the prosecution’s use of the otherwise precluded evidence” … .

With respect to the rape shield law, the Second Department wrote:

A woman’s character or reputation for chastity is irrelevant to a charge that she was sexually abused … . Thus, the Rape Shield Law, codified in CPL 60.42, provides that “[e]vidence of a victim’s sexual conduct shall not be admissible in a prosecution for an offense or an attempt to commit an offense defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law [i.e., sex offenses].” CPL 60.42 also provides five statutory exceptions. The first four exceptions allow the admission into evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct in narrowly defined factual circumstances, which are inapplicable here … . The fifth exception, however, “vest[s] discretion in the trial court” … . Pursuant to CPL 60.42(5), evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct may be introduced upon a determination by the court that such evidence is “relevant and admissible in the interests of justice” (CPL 60.42[5]…). The Court of Appeals has recognized that, “in the interests of justice,” evidence of a complainant’s sexual conduct may be admissible if it is relevant to a defense … . In contrast, such evidence must be precluded if it does not tend to establish a defense to the crime, and will only harass the victim and possibly confuse the jurors … .  People v Fisher, 2013 NY Slip Op 01847, 2011-06453, Ind No 3421/09, 2nd Dept. 3-20-13​