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VICTIM’S DEATH FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE ASSAULT WAS SUFFICIENTLY LINKED TO DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS.

In affirming defendant’s murder conviction, the Fourth Department concluded the victim’s death five months after the assault was sufficiently linked to defendant’s actions:

… [I]t has long been the rule in New York that ” [i]f a person inflicts a wound . . . in such manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the wound or its unskillful and improper treatment, which were of themselves consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally follow in any case, must in law be deemed to have been among those which were in contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is to be held responsible’ ” … . Thus, “[f]or criminal liability to attach, a defendant’s actions must have been an actual contributory cause of death, in the sense that they forged a link in the chain of causes which actually brought about the death’ ” … . Additionally, the “defendant’s acts need not be the sole cause of death; where the necessary causative link is established, other causes, such as a victim’s preexisting condition, will not relieve the defendant of responsibility for homicide . . . By the same token, death need not follow on the heels of injury” … . People v Pratcher, 2015 NY Slip Op 09730, 4th Dept 12-31-15

CRIMINAL LAW (VICTIM’S DEATH FIVE MONTHS AFTER ASSAULT SUFFICIENTLY LINKED TO DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS)/MURDER (VICTIM’S DEATH FIVE MONTHS AFTER ASSAULT SUFFICIENTLY LINKED TO DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS)

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EVIDENCE OF HOW THE MURDER VICTIM FELT ABOUT DEFENDANT AND EVIDENCE OF STRIFE IN THE COUPLE’S RELATIONSHIP ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW MOTIVE AND IDENTITY.

The First Department determined evidence of how the murder victim felt toward the defendant and evidence of the couple’s “strife and unhappiness” was properly admitted to show the defendant’s motive and was inextricably interwoven with the issue of the identity of the killer:

The court properly admitted testimony from friends of the victim reflecting the victim’s unfavorable perception of defendant’s character, in order to show the victim’s beliefs as part of a showing that the couple had been arguing and that the victim had been attempting to break up with defendant. Proof of the “murder victim’s espoused intention to terminate her relationship with, and stay away from, defendant” was admissible to show the “victim’s state of mind” and was “relevant to the issue of the motive of defendant, who was aware of the victim’s attitude, to kill the victim” … . Hence, the background information about the couple’s “strife and unhappiness” was admissible as “highly probative of the defendant’s motive and [was] either directly related to or inextricably interwoven with the issue of his identity as the killer” … . The friends’ testimony about disputes between defendant and the victim was similarly admissible … . People v Brooks, 2015 NY Slip Op 09379, 1st Dept 12-22-15

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE OF MURDER VICTIM’S STATE OF MIND AND STRIFE BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND VICTIM ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW MOTIVE AND IDENTITY)/EVIDENCE (MURDER VICTIM’S STATE OF MIND AND STRIFE BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND VICTIM ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW MOTIVE AND IDENTITY); PRIOR BAD ACTS (STRIFE IN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND MURDER VICTIM ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW DEFENDANT’S MOTIVE AND IDENTITY)

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Absence of Corroboration of Confession to Attempted Robbery Required Dismissal of Attempted Robbery Count—However Dismissal of the First Degree Murder and Felony Murder Counts, Both of Which Were Based Upon the Attempted Robbery, Was Not Required—The Death Itself Provided the Requisite Corroboration

The Fourth Department, in a detailed decision addressing several substantive issues not summarized here, found there was no proof of the attempted robbery count except defendant’s confession. The absence of corroboration required reversal of the attempted robbery count. However, with respect to the first degree murder and felony murder counts (for which attempted robbery was the underlying felony) the death itself provided sufficient corroboration:

“A person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission made by him [or her] without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed” (CPL 60.50…). With respect to the counts of murder in the first degree and felony murder, it is well settled that “CPL 60.50 does not require corroboration of defendant’s confession to the underlying predicate felony” to sustain a conviction of murder in the first degree or felony murder, when the charge is based on a murder committed in the course of and in furtherance of one of many enumerated felonies … . “The effect of the confession corroboration statute is to require proof of the corpus delicti” … . With felony murder and murder in the first degree, the corpus delicti is a death resulting from someone’s criminality, i.e., a death that did not occur by suicide, disease or accident … . The fact that the victim was found dead as the result of a gunshot wound is sufficient corroboration … .

The same analysis does not apply to the underlying felony itself. Where, as here, there is no corroboration of a defendant’s confession with respect to the underlying felony, that count of the indictment charging the defendant with the underlying felony must be dismissed … . People v Harper, 2015 NY Slip Op 07064, 4th Dept 10-2-15

 

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Evidence of Shooting Committed by Defendant’s Twin Brother Was Highly Prejudicial and Had No Bearing Upon Defendant’s Guilt—Murder Conviction Reversed

The Second Department determined defendant’s murder convictIon must be reversed because evidence of a shooting committed by defendant’s twin brother should not have been admitted. This highly prejudicial evidence had no bearing on defendant’s culpability:

“Evidence of uncharged crimes or crimes committed by a person other than the defendant is generally inadmissible because it is highly prejudicial with little probative value” … . Here, the evidence of the unrelated shooting was admitted in response to evidence introduced by the defense to show that the defendant and his uncharged accomplices exhibited a calm demeanor shortly after the shooting at the garage and that such a demeanor was inconsistent with the People’s contention that they had been recently involved in a violent crime. The People argued that evidence of the unrelated shooting was relevant to this case on the ground that it showed that the defendant’s identical twin brother had similarly exhibited a calm demeanor after he shot an individual at a bar on a prior occasion.

Evidence that the defendant’s identical twin brother had perpetrated a separate shooting less than two months prior to the shooting in this case was highly prejudicial to the defendant and had no bearing whatsoever on the defendant’s culpability for the crimes charged … . This evidence “served no purpose other than to raise an inference of guilt by association” … . People v Grigoroff, 2015 NY Slip Op 06517, 2nd Dept 8-12-15

 

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Murder Conviction Against the Weight of the Evidence—Strangulation Was the Result of an Attempt to Increase Sexual Pleasure—No Intent to Kill

The Second Department determined that defendant’s conviction for intentional murder was against the weight of the evidence.  The victim died of strangulation, but the defendant’s actions were motivated by the desire to increase sexual pleasure, not by an intent to kill.  People v Davis, 2014 NY Slip Op 03277, 2nd Dept 5-7-14

 

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Insufficient Evidence Defendant “Caused” the Victim’s Death within the Meaning of the Felony Murder Statute—The Victim, Who Was Assaulted by the Defendant, Died of a Heart Attack

The Fourth Department determined there was insufficient evidence to support defendant’s felony murder conviction.  Defendant assaulted the victim during a burglary/robbery.  The victim, who was obese and had heart disease, suffered a fatal heart attack. The Fourth Department held that the People did not present sufficient evidence the defendant caused the victim’s death within the meaning of the felony murder statute:

A person is guilty of felony murder when, during the commission or attempted commission of an enumerated felony, either the defendant or an accomplice “causes the death of a person other than one of the participants” (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]). A person “causes the death” of another person “when the . . . culpable act is a sufficiently direct cause’ of the death so that the fatal result was reasonably foreseeable” … . Such a culpable act is a sufficiently direct cause of death when it is “an actual contributory cause of death, in the sense that [it] forged a link in the chain of causes which actually brought about the death’ ” … . “An obscure or a merely probable connection between an assault and death will, as in every case of alleged crime, require acquittal of the charge of any degree of homicide” … .

Here, we conclude that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was reasonably foreseeable that defendant’s actions, i.e., unlawfully entering the victim’s apartment and assaulting him, would cause the victim’s death. As noted, the victim died of a heart attack, and the injuries inflicted upon him by defendant were not life threatening. Indeed, the most serious injury inflicted was a fractured jaw. Although the Chief Medical Examiner testified for the People at trial that defendant caused the victim’s death, she explained that her opinion in that regard was based on her assertion that, “but for” defendant’s actions, the victim would not have died of a heart attack. As the court properly instructed the jury, however, “more than but for’ causation [is] required” to establish felony murder … . Notably, the Chief Medical Examiner did not testify that defendant’s culpable act was a direct cause of the death or that the fatal result was reasonably foreseeable. We thus conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that defendant committed felony murder, as charged in counts one and two of the indictment, and we therefore modify the judgment accordingly. People v Davis, 2015 NY Slip Op 02628, 4th Dept 3-27-15

 

Actus Reus for Burglary and Murder Not the Same—Consecutive Sentences Valid

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the defendant was properly sentenced to consecutive terms for burglary and murder.  The defendant broke into the victim’s home, dragged her downstairs and murdered her.  The court held that the actus reus for the burglary was completed before the murder:

Defendant was convicted of burglary for unlawfully entering the victim’s dwelling, with the aggravating factors of causing physical injury to the victim (§ 140.30 [2]), and using or threatening the immediate use of a dangerous instrument (§ 140.30 [3]), i.e., a butcher knife. Defendant was charged with intentionally causing the victim’s death by repeatedly stabbing her with a butcher knife. It is well established that, in considering whether sentences must run concurrently under Penal Law § 70.25 (2), “the court must determine whether the [actus reus] element is, by definition, the same for both offenses (under the first prong of the statute), or if the [actus reus] for one offense is, by definition, a material element of the second offense (under the second prong)” … . “[W]hen the actus reus is a single inseparable act that violates more than one statute, single punishment must be imposed” … . Although the actus reus elements of the burglary counts and the murder count overlap under the facts presented here, we nevertheless conclude that the People “establish[ed] the legality of consecutive sentencing by showing that the acts or omissions’ committed by defendant were separate and distinct acts” … . The evidence established that, after defendant entered the apartment through a window that he smashed with a cinder block, he dragged the victim from her bed and down the stairs to the living room, where he killed her. People v Brahney, 2015 NY Slip Op 02227, 4th Dept 3-20-15

 

 

Attempted Murder and Attempted Robbery Convictions, Under the Facts, Required Concurrent, Not Consecutive, Sentences—Applicable Law Described in Some Depth

The Second Department determined defendant, who was convicted of attempted murder and attempted robbery, must be sentenced to concurrent, not consecutive, terms of imprisonment for those two offenses.  The defendant displayed a handgun and demanded money from the victim.  When the victim refused, the defendant struck and shot the victim:

Penal Law § 70.25(2) provides that concurrent sentences must be imposed “for two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other.” “Thus, sentences of imprisonment imposed for two or more offenses may not run consecutively (1) where a single act constitutes two offenses, or (2) where a single act constitutes one of the offenses and a material element of the other” … . However, “trial courts retain consecutive sentence discretion when separate offenses are committed through separate acts, though they are part of a single transaction” … .

Here, consecutive sentences may not be imposed because the act which constituted the offense of attempted murder in the second degree was a material element of the offense of attempted robbery in the first degree. A person is guilty of attempted murder in the second degree when, with intent to commit murder, he or she engages in conduct which tends to cause the death of another person (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25[1]). A person is guilty of attempted robbery in the first degree, under the Penal Law section charged here, when he or she attempts to forcibly steal property and is armed with a deadly weapon (see Penal Law § 160.15[2]). A person forcibly steals when he or she, in the course of committing a larceny, uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of the property or to compel the owner to deliver the property (see Penal Law § 160.00[1], [2]). Here, the actus reus of the attempted murder charge was the firing of three shots at Moore, and the actus reus of the attempted robbery charge was the use or threatened use of physical force to attempt to steal property while armed with a deadly weapon. The act which constitutes attempted murder in the second degree is subsumed within the element of using force. Thus, the act constituting attempted murder in the second degree can be a material element of attempted robbery in the first degree … .

In addition, the People have failed to establish that the acts constituting the attempted robbery in the first degree were separate and distinct from the acts constituting the attempted murder in the second degree … . Here, consecutive sentences could not be imposed because it is impossible to determine whether the firing of three gun shots at Moore, which formed the basis of the verdict of guilt on the attempted murder charge, was also the use of force which formed the basis of the jury’s verdict of guilt on the attempted robbery charge … . Therefore, the People have failed to establish that the acts constituting attempted robbery in the first degree were separate and distinct from those constituting attempted murder in the second degree. People v Grant, 2014 NY Slip Op 08859, 2nd Dept 12-17-14

 

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Son of Sam Law Required Murderer’s Police Pension Be Paid to Daughter and Estate of the Murder Victim

The Second Department determined that the “Son of Sam Law” required that the pension to which a convicted murderer was entitled be paid to the estate of the murder victim.  The plaintiff is the daughter of the murder victim.  The murderer is plaintiff’s father. The father fraudulently transferred his pension rights to his second wife.  Plaintiff, individually and as the administrator of her mother’s estate, procured a wrongful death judgment against her father. The court affirmed Supreme Court’s ruling that the transfer of the pension to the father’s second wife was fraudulent under Florida law (where the transfer was made) and the “Son of Sam Law” trumped the Retirement and Social Security Law such that the father’s pension was payable to the plaintiff:

“Under the full faith and credit clause . . . , where collateral attack on the ground of fraud would be permitted in the courts of the foreign State in which the judgment had been rendered, our courts will entertain a similar challenge” … . Here, Florida law permits a collateral attack on the defendant’s transfer of his pension to [second wife] on the ground that it constituted a fraudulent transfer … . * * *

Next, we reject [the second wife’s] contention that the defendant’s pension is not subject to execution or attachment by virtue of section 110(2) of the Retirement and Social Security Law or under certain provisions of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (see Administrative Code of City of NY §§ 13-181, 13-212, 13-264). As [the second wife] correctly contends, section 110(2) of the Retirement and Social Security Law provides that the right of a person to a pension “[s]hall not be subject to execution, garnishment, attachment, or any other process whatsoever” (Retirement and Social Security Law § 110[2]). In 2001, however, the Legislature amended the Son of Sam law to subject the “[f]unds of a convicted person” to an action for damages by a crime victim, a crime victim’s representative, or certain other persons (L 2001, ch 62, § 1; see Executive Law § 632 a[1][a], [c], [d]; [3]). The phrase “funds of a convicted person” was broadly defined as “all funds and property received from any source” (Executive Law § 632 a[1][c] [emphasis added]).

We conclude, for the reasons stated by our colleagues in the Appellate Division, [3rd] Department [97 AD3d 235]…, that the defendant’s pension is subject to execution under the Son of Sam law. Both the clear statutory language and the legislative history of the 2001 amendments to the Son of Sam law evince the Legislature’s intent to permit crime victims to recover assets from convicted persons, including pensions, regardless of the source of the convicted person’s funds … . As the [3rd] Department concluded, a contrary holding would “directly thwart[ ] the Legislature’s stated intent of holding convicted criminals financially … . Kane v Galtiere, 2014 NY Slip Op 07476, 2nd Dept 11-5-14

 

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Confusing Jury Instruction Re: the Justification Defense Required Reversal of Murder Conviction in the Interest of Justice/Defendant’s Attorney Should Have Been Allowed to Testify at the Suppression Hearing—There Was a Question of Fact Whether the Attorney Called and Told the Police He Represented the Defendant and Defendant Should Not Be Questioned

The First Department reversed defendant's murder conviction in the interests of justice because of a confusing jury instruction.  The trial court did not make it clear to the jurors that the use of deadly force can be justified in defense of a robbery.   The First Department also noted that defendant's lawyer should have been allowed to testify at the suppression hearing because it was alleged the lawyer called the police station, informed officer Risorto he was representing defendant, and told officer Risorto the defendant should not be questioned:

In its main charge, the court instructed the jury that “[t]he only difference between the law of self-defense to repel a robbery as opposed to assault [is that] in repelling the robbery, the person has no duty to retreat.” This is an incorrect statement of the law because it ignores an additional critical difference between the two grounds for justification, namely, that deadly physical force may be permissible to defend against a robbery even if the alleged robber is using only physical force, and not deadly physical force (see People v Fuller, 74 AD2d at 879 [“a person is justified in using deadly physical force if he reasonably believed it necessary to use such force in order to resist his victim's imminent use of [mere] physical force against himself, in the course of a robbery attempt”]; People v Davis, 74 AD2d 607, 609 [2d Dept 1980] [jury should have been told that the defendant was justified in using deadly physical force if he reasonably believed it necessary to do so to resist the imminent use of physical force against him in the course of a robbery attempt]). The court's error was exacerbated when it repeated this erroneous statement in response to a jury note requesting further instructions on the defense of justification. * * *

The Court of Appeals has held that “an attorney enters a criminal matter and triggers the indelible right to counsel when the attorney . . . notifies the police that the suspect is represented by counsel” … . Once the police have reason to know that the suspect is represented by counsel in the case under investigation, the right to counsel cannot be waived unless the suspect does so in the presence of counsel … . An attorney does not need to enter the case in person, but can communicate his representation to the police by phone, “at which point the police are required to cease all questioning” … .

Here, the court erred in precluding defense counsel from testifying about the critical conversation with Risorto. The police testimony, along with defense counsel's affirmation, raised questions as to what defense counsel actually said to Risorto and, in particular, whether defense counsel told Risorto that he “represented” defendant in the case for which defendant was to be questioned. The court should not have made a factual finding that implicitly accepted Risorto's account, without giving defendant the opportunity to challenge that account. People v McTiernan, 2014 NY Slip Op 05363, 1st Dept 7-17-14

 

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