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Tag Archive for: MULTIPLICITY

Criminal Law, Evidence

Multiplicitous Indictment Counts Dismissed/Warrantless Search of Impounded Vehicle Upheld

The Third Department determined several counts of an indictment stemming from a fatal car accident (involving reckless driving under the influence) were multiplicitous and further determined the warrantless search of the impounded vehicle was valid:

An indictment “is multiplicitous when a single offense is charged in more than one count” (People v Alonzo, 16 NY3d 267, 269 [2011]). Accordingly, “[a]n indictment cannot charge a defendant with more than one count of a crime that can be characterized as a continuing offense unless there has been an interruption in the course of conduct” … . “Where each count requires proof of an element not essential to the other, [however,] an indictment is not multiplicitous” … .

Counts 2, 5 and 8 of the indictment charged defendant with vehicular manslaughter in the first degree pursuant to Penal Law § 125.13 (3), which requires proof that defendant (1) committed the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree and (2) had been convicted within the preceding 10 years of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (see Penal Law § 125.13 [3]). Counts 1, 4 and 7 of the indictment charged defendant with aggravated vehicular homicide pursuant to Penal Law § 125.14 (3), which requires proof that defendant (1) committed the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, (2) engaged in reckless driving and (3) had previously been convicted of a Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 violation within the preceding 10 years. As relevant here, a person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree when he or she operates a motor vehicle in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), (3) or (4-a) thereby causing the death of another person (see Penal Law § 125.12 [1]).

In our view, these charges were predicated upon the same statutory provisions (see Penal Law §§ 125.13 [3]; 125.14 [3]), act and victim, differing only in the nature of defendant’s impairment. In this regard, defendant was alleged to have been driving while per se intoxicated (counts 1 and 2), in an intoxicated condition (counts 4 and 5) and impaired by a combination of drugs or alcohol and drugs (counts 7 and 8) (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1192 [2], [3], [4-a]). The essential elements of both crimes do not address the specific manner in which defendant was impaired; rather, they include only a single offense of some form of impaired driving as defined within Penal Law § 125.12 (1). Accordingly, counts 4 and 7 should have been dismissed as multiplicitous of count 1, and counts 5 and 8 must be dismissed as multiplicitous of count 2 … . * * *

Testimony at the suppression hearing established that, at the request of law enforcement, defendant’s vehicle was removed from the accident scene and taken to an unsecured lot, where it remained for several hours until it was transported — at the direction of a Rensselaer County deputy sheriff — to a secure impound lot. While defendant does not contest the initial towing from the accident scene, he claims that the seizure of the vehicle from the unsecured lot to the secured lot was unconstitutional. We disagree. “It is well settled that once the police possess a reasonable belief that the vehicle was, in some way, associated with the crime and that a search of the vehicle would produce the fruits, instrumentalities, contraband or evidence of the crime the police can conduct[] a warrantless search and seizure of the vehicle” … . Here, the vehicle was moved from a lot where it was easily accessible to any member of the public to the secure lot only after it became clear that it was involved in a fatal accident. People v Hoffman, 2015 NY Slip Op 05976, 3rd Dept 7-9-15

 

July 9, 2015
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Criminal Law

Indictment Dismissed after Trial as Multiplicitous and Duplicitous/Grand Larceny Can Not Be Based Upon the Violation of a Regulation that Is Civil in Nature

The Fourth Department reversed defendant’s conviction and dismissed the indictment in a prosecution alleging public assistance fraud in the operation of a daycare home.  The indictment charged the defendant with grand larceny, falsifying business records and offering a false instrument for filing.  Essentially, the charges alleged the defendant billed for services provided by an unlicensed care-giver, and billed for services which were not provided.  The Fourth Department held that the entire indictment was rendered multiplicitous and duplicitous by the trial evidence.  In addition, the court determined that the grand larceny count could not be based upon the violation of a regulation requiring the presence of a licensed assistant.

With respect to multiplicity and duplicity, the court wrote:

Prosecutors and grand juries must steer between the evils known as duplicity’ and multiplicity.’ An indictment is duplicitous when a single count charges more than one offense . . . It is multiplicitous when a single offense is charged in more than one count . . . A duplicitous indictment may fail to give a defendant adequate notice and opportunity to defend; it may impair his [or her] ability to assert the protection against double jeopardy in a future case; and it may undermine the requirement of jury unanimity, for if jurors are considering separate crimes in a single count, some may find the defendant guilty of one, and some of the other. If an indictment is multiplicitous it creates the risk that a defendant will be punished for, or stigmatized with a conviction of, more crimes than he [or she] actually committed” … . An indictment that is not duplicitous on its face may be rendered so based upon the trial evidence … .

Here, the People correctly concede that counts 5 through 7, 9, 15 through 17, and 19 of the indictment are duplicitous and multiplicitous inasmuch as they are based on “distinct but not identifiable vouchers.” Those counts are all based on the same time period and the same vendor number and, according to the People, there is no way to identify which voucher refers to which count … .  …

With respect to the remaining counts of the indictment, we agree with defendant that counts 8, 10, 18, and 20 of the indictment were rendered duplicitous by the trial evidence.. . . As noted above, the People alleged that defendant submitted vouchers for monies to which she was not entitled because, at various dates and times, she (1) billed for hours when neither she nor her certified assistant were at the daycare, and (2) she billed for hours when the children were not at the daycare. There is no basis in the record to determine, with respect to each of those counts, whether the jury convicted defendant based upon the first act (billing for hours when the children were watched by uncertified assistants) or the second act (billing for hours when the children were not at daycare), or whether certain jurors convicted defendant upon the former and others upon the latter. Thus, “it is impossible to verify that each member of the jury convicted defendant for the same criminal act”… .

With respect to grand larceny based upon the violation of a regulation, the court wrote:

Count one of the indictment alleges that, between October 1, 2007 and July 30, 2008, defendant “stole property having a value in excess of [$3,000], to wit: a sum of money, belonging to [DSS].” Under Penal Law § 155.05 (1), “[a] person steals property and commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself [or herself] or to a third person, he [or she] wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.” Larceny includes “obtaining property by false pretenses” (§ 155.05 [2] [a]). A defendant commits larceny by false pretenses when he or she “obtain[s] possession of money of another by means of an intentional false material statement about a past or presently existing fact upon which the victim relied in parting with the money” … .

Here, the People alleged that defendant committed larceny by false pretenses by charging for times when unlicensed assistants were watching the children in violation of OCFS regulations, and by billing for times when the children were not receiving daycare services. We question whether submitting vouchers for daycare services rendered by an uncertified assistant falls within the definition of larceny. OCFS’s regional manager testified that, although it is a “regulatory violation” for an uncertified assistant to watch children at a group day care, the regulations do not state that daycare providers are not permitted to bill for services rendered by an uncertified assistant. Indeed, the DSS special investigator referred to those hours as “billable” on his charts, although unauthorized by the regulations.

Even assuming, arguendo, that billing for services provided by an uncertified assistant constitutes a “wrongful[ ] tak[ing]” within the meaning of Penal Law § 155.05 (1), we note that “[c]onduct which is wrongful in the civil context is not necessarily wrongful’ within the meaning of the larceny statutes” … .  People v Casiano, 2014 NY Slip Op 03362, 4th Dept 5-9-14

 

May 9, 2015
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Criminal Law

Rape and Incest Counts Rendered Indictment Multiplicitous/Trial Testimony Rendered Counts Duplicitous

The Second Department determined the trial testimony rendered some of the rape and incest counts duplicitous.  The defendant’s daughter testified she was raped once a week for three weeks every month.  The court determined that where the jury found the defendant guilty of all three crimes charged within a particular month, the counts were not duplicitous because the jury would have had to vote unanimously on all three crimes.  However, where the defendant was convicted of only one or two of the crimes charged for a particular month, it was impossible to know whether the jury voted unanimously on the same alleged crimes.  In addition the court noted that some of the counts charging rape and incest were based on the same conduct, rendering the indictment multiplicitous as well:

“Each count of an indictment may charge one offense only” (CPL 200.30[1]). A count that, in violation of the statute, charges more than one offense, “is void for duplicity” … . “The proscription against duplicitous counts . . . seeks [inter alia] to prevent the possibility that individual jurors might vote to convict a defendant of that count on the basis of different offenses,’ in effect, permitting a conviction even though a unanimous verdict was not reached”… . “Where a crime is completed by a discrete act, and where a count in the indictment is based on the repeated occurrence of that act over a course of time, the count includes more than a single offense and is duplicitous” … . “Even if a count is valid on its face, it is nonetheless duplicitous where the evidence presented to the grand jury or at trial makes plain that multiple criminal acts occurred during the relevant time period, rendering it nearly impossible to determine the particular act upon which the jury reached its verdict” … .

The younger daughter testified that the defendant had sexual intercourse with her once, on Tuesday or Wednesday, every week for the first three weeks of each month during the period at issue, while skipping the fourth week, because she was menstruating. The verdict sheet presented to the jury contained three counts for each month at issue. The first count for each month described the alleged crime as occurring on or about the first of the subject month to on or about the last day of the month. The second count for each month provided the same description as the first count for each month, but also stated that the alleged crime was “separate and distinct from the act mentioned and described” in the first count for that month. The third count provided the same description as the first count for each month, but also stated that the alleged crime was “separate and distinct from the acts mentioned and described” in the first and second counts for that month.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, where the jury convicted the defendant of all three of the counts for the same month, it is clear, based on the younger daughter’s testimony, that they were unanimous in convicting him of each of the three different crimes. However, as the People correctly concede, where the defendant was convicted of only one or two of the counts charging rape or incest in a particular month, it is impossible to determine whether the jury unanimously found the defendant guilty of the same crime, because neither the wording on the verdict sheet, nor the jury charge, linked “the testimony of vaginal intercourse sequentially or otherwise to the different counts of the indictment”… . People v Jean, 2014 NY Slip Op 03534, 2nd Dept 5-14-14

 

May 14, 2014
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Appeals, Criminal Law

Multiplicitous Indictment Count Dismissed in the Interest of Justice.

The Fourth Department dismissed one count of an indictment finding the indictment “multiplicitous” (charging a single offense in more than one count).  The error was not preserved but the Court reviewed the issue “in the interest of justice.”  People vs Quinn, 1131, KA 11-00278 Fourth Dept. 2-8-13

 

February 8, 2013
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