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Inventory Search of Impounded Vehicle Proper

In upholding the validity of an inventory search of defendant’s vehicle, the Fourth Department explained the analytical criteria:

It is well settled that, “[w]hen the driver of a vehicle is arrested, the police may impound the car, and conduct an inventory search, where they act pursuant to reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith’ ” … . Thus, “[h]aving arrested the defendant [in] a public [parking lot], the officers were thereafter entitled to impound the vehicle” … . Furthermore, “[i]t is settled law that the police may search an impounded vehicle to inventory its contents” … . “Such searches, conducted as routine procedures, are permitted to protect an owner’s property while it remains in police custody, to protect the police against false claims for missing property and to protect the police from potential danger” … . Here, the police officers properly impounded the vehicle that defendant drove to the scene of the crime and performed an inventory search of that vehicle pursuant to a reasonable Cheektowaga Police Department procedure, during which they discovered the handgun. Consequently, the court properly refused to suppress the evidence seized during that inventory search. People v Tardi, 2014 NY Slip Op 07880, 4th Dept 11-14-14

 

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People Failed to Demonstrate Seizure of Heroin from Defendant’s Impounded Vehicle Was Pursuant to a Standard Inventory Search—Heroin Should Have Been Suppressed

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined that heroin seized from inside defendant’s vehicle after a stop for speeding should have been suppressed.  The defendant was arrested at the scene of the stop based upon an outstanding warrant. The People failed to demonstrate the heroin was found pursuant to a standard inventory search of the impounded vehicle:

Following a lawful arrest of the driver of a vehicle, “the police may impound the car, and conduct an inventory search, where they act pursuant to ‘reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith'” … . To this end, “courts have insisted that an inventory search be conducted according to a familiar routine procedure and that the procedure meet two standards of reasonableness” … . Specifically, the procedures must be “designed to meet the legitimate objectives of the search while limiting the discretion of the officer in the field” … .

Here, the transcript of the … suppression hearing fails to support a determination that the conduct of the police was reasonable. Although not fatal to their argument against suppression …, the People failed to offer a copy of the State Police procedure manual into evidence. Additionally, the People also failed to ask any substantive questions of their witnesses so as to otherwise establish (1) that the State Police had a standardized procedure, (2) that such procedure was reasonable, and (3) that it was followed here. People v Leonard, 2014 NY Slip Op 05468, 3rd Dept 7-24-14

 

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Defendant Did Not Demonstrate Standing to Challenge Search of Vehicle

The Third Department determined the defendant did not demonstrate he had standing to contest the inventory search of a vehicle, parked and empty at the time the police seized it, which turned up a weapon.  A police officer had seen the defendant driving the vehicle just before it was seized and a confidential informant had told the police where the defendant kept a handgun in the vehicle. Because the People did not rely solely on the statutory presumption of possession of a weapon (Penal Law 265.15 (3)) the defendant needed to allege and demonstrate standing.  Because the defendant did not own the vehicle and denied driving it on the day it was seized, he was unable to challenge the search:

A defendant seeking to suppress evidence has the burden to allege and, if disputed, establish standing to challenge a search … . “Standing exists where a defendant was aggrieved by a search of a place or object in which he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy” … . While a defendant is entitled to “automatic standing” if the People “rely solely on the statutory presumption [of possession of a weapon] contained in Penal Law § 265.15 (3) to establish his [or her] guilt” …, defendant here cannot rely on that exception to his burden regarding standing. The People did not depend entirely upon the statutory presumption of standing, but had other evidence, including one officer who witnessed defendant driving the vehicle and the CI who provided information that defendant had a handgun in the vehicle and where within the vehicle the gun would be located … . Inasmuch as defendant did not own the BMW and denied that he was driving it on the day in question, he failed to allege any legitimate expectation of privacy in that vehicle. People v Anderson, 2014 NY Slip Op 04269, 3rd Dept 6-12-14

 

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Harmless Error Rule Should Not Have Been Applied to Guilty Plea

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Graffeo, the Court of Appeals, over a dissent, declined to apply the harmless error rule to a guilty plea.  In this driving-while-intoxicated case, the defendant moved to suppress an open bottle of rum and a crack pipe which were found in the car he was driving during an inventory search. The motion was denied. Defendant told the court he wanted to plead guilty because he “was not planning to go to trial if [he] got a negative ruling” on the motion.  On appeal, the inventory search was deemed invalid, but the Appellate Division ruled the error “harmless.”  In reversing, the Court of Appeals wrote:

The harmless error rule was “formulated to review trial verdicts” (People v Grant, 45 NY2d at 378).  It requires an appellate court to assess the quantum and nature of the People’s proof of guilt independent of erroneously admitted evidence and the causal effect, if any, that the introduction of that evidence had on the fact finder’s verdict … .  Harmless error therefore can be “difficult to apply to guilty pleas” — especially in cases involving “an improper denial of a pretrial motion to suppress” — since “a defendant’s decision to plead guilty may be based on any factor inside or outside the record” (People v Grant, 45 NY2d at 378379).  Consequently, convictions premised on invalid guilty pleas generally are not amenable to harmless error review (see id.).

The Grant doctrine is not absolute, however, and we have recognized that a guilty plea entered after an improper court ruling may be upheld if there is no “reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the plea” (id. at 379).  Although a failure to suppress evidence may detrimentally influence a defendant’s plea negotiations, a concession of guilt may be treated as valid if the defendant articulates a reason for it that is independent of the incorrect pre-plea court ruling (see id. at 379-380) or an appellate court is satisfied that the decision to accept responsibility “was not influenced” by the error… . * * *

Certainly, there may be instances where the failure to grant suppression does not affect a defendant’s decision to plead guilty because the challenged proof is cumulative or too trivial.  In this case, however, the denial of the motion to suppress could not be viewed as harmless and the guilty plea must be vacated. People v Wells, 188, CtApp 11-14-13

 

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Inventory Search Which Included Removal of Seat Panels and Speakers Okay

Over a substantial dissent by Judge Rivera, the Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Piggot, determined a vehicle search after a DWI arrest, in which an illegal weapon was found, was a valid inventory search.  The defendant had argued that the removal of seat panels that were askew and a speaker system demonstrated that the search was not a inventory search because the search was focused on finding contraband:

Following a lawful arrest of a driver of a vehicle that is required to be impounded, the police may conduct an inventory search of the vehicle. The search is “designed to properly catalogue the contents of the item searched” …. However, an inventory search must not be “a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence” …. To guard against this danger, the search must be conducted pursuant to an established procedure “clearly limiting the conduct of individual officers that assures that the searches are carried out consistently and reasonably” …. “While incriminating evidence may be a consequence of an inventory search, it should not be its purpose” …. The People bear the burden of demonstrating the validity of the inventory search ….

Here the People proffered written guidelines, the officer’s testimony regarding his search of the vehicle, and the resulting list of items retained. Although defendant takes issue with the officer’s removal of the speakers by arguing that such action was a ruse designed to search for drugs, the officer’s testimony that it was police protocol to remove any owner-installed equipment, was accepted by the hearing court and we perceive no grounds upon which to overturn that determination. * * *

It was reasonable for the officer to check in the seat panels that were askew as part of his inventory. The fact that the officer knew that contraband is often hidden by criminals in the panels did not invalidate the entire search… .  People v Padilla, No 114, CtApp, 6-6-13

SUPPRESSION

 

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