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STEP ONE OF DEFENDANT’S BATSON CHALLENGE PROPERLY REJECTED AS VAGUE AND CONCLUSORY; THERE WAS NO CONCEPCION BARRIER TO AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S STEP-ONE RULING; THE REQUEST FOR THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined defendant’s step one Batson challenge was properly rejected as a vague and conclusory assertion that did not create a so-called Concepcion problem. The dissent argued the scenario presented a classic Concepcion problem. The court noted that the cross-racial identification jury instruction should have been given but found the error harmless:

… [D]efense counsel stated that the prospective juror in question was the “only black juror” who had not already been dismissed for cause and there was “no indication” that the juror would be “anything other than fair and impartial to both sides.” After considering defendant’s argument at step one, the court observed that defendant had failed to demonstrate a discriminatory pattern of strikes and denied his application without prompting the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral reason at step two … . Insofar as the court based its reasoning on the erroneous notion that a discriminatory pattern of strikes must be shown, that reasoning was flawed … . Nevertheless, because defendant failed to establish a prima facie case at step one, the court properly denied his application without further inquiry … .

Our dissenting colleague concludes that we have a Concepcion problem (see generally People v Concepcion, 17 NY3d 192, 197-198 [2011]), but we respectfully disagree. Whether a defendant has demonstrated a discriminatory pattern of peremptory strikes goes to the issue of whether that defendant has established a prima facie case at step one of the Batson inquiry (see generally Bolling, 79 NY2d at 324). Because the court relied on that ground in denying the application, Concepcion does not preclude us from affirming the judgment on the same ground, i.e., that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case at step one … . …

Where, as here, “a witness’s identification of the defendant is at issue, and the identifying witness and defendant appear to be of different races, a trial court is required to give, upon request, during final instructions, a jury charge on the cross-race effect” … . People v Boyd, 2020 NY Slip Op 03342, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

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IT MAY HAVE BEEN ERROR TO ALLOW THE VICTIM TO TESTIFY ACCOMPANIED BY A DOG, BUT THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED; ALTHOUGH THE PROSECUTOR MADE AN IMPROPER COMMENT IT DID NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL; PROSECUTORS ADMONISHED THAT THEIR ROLE IS TO ENSURE JUSTICE IS DONE, NOT SIMPLY SEEK CONVICTIONS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, affirming defendant’s conviction, noted that allowing the adult victim to testify accompanied by a dog may have been an error but was unpreserved. The court also found that a remark made by the prosecutor was improper (but not reversible error) and took the opportunity to address prosecutorial misconduct generally:

We conclude that defendant’s contention that the court abused its discretion when it permitted the adult victim to testify while accompanied by a dog is unpreserved because defendant did not object to that arrangement … . … Even assuming, arguendo, that defense counsel erred in not objecting to the court’s decision to let the victim testify while accompanied by a dog … , we conclude that the failure to object did not amount to ineffective assistance … .

… [I]t was improper for the prosecutor on summation to characterize defense counsel’s summation as evincing “a Brock Turner mentality”—inflaming the passions of the jury by specifically referring to a recent sexual assault case of nationwide notoriety that involved allegations similar to those made against defendant … .

… [W]e … take this opportunity to remind the People that ” [i]t is not enough for [a prosecutor] to be intent on the prosecution of [the] case. Granted that [the prosecutor’s] paramount obligation is to the public, [he or she] must never lose sight of the fact that a defendant, as an integral member of the body politic, is entitled to a full measure of fairness. Put another way, [the prosecutor’s] mission is not so much to convict as it is to achieve a just result’ ” … . To that end, we emphasize that “[p]rosecutors play a distinctive role in the search for truth in criminal cases. As public officers they are charged not simply with seeking convictions but also with ensuring that justice is done. This role gives rise to special responsibilities—constitutional, statutory, ethical, personal—to safeguard the integrity of criminal proceedings and fairness in the criminal process” … . People v Carlson, 2020 NY Slip Op 03336, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

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NEW YORK DETERMINED TO BE AN INCONVENIENT FORUM IN THIS CUSTODY MATTER (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department noted the record was sufficient to allow the appellate court to determine whether New York was an inconvenient forum in this custody matter. Mother had moved to California with the child after father abused mother in New York. Father filed the custody petitions in New York. After considering the statutory factors the Fourth Department found New York to be an inconvenient forum. With respect to one of the factors–the location of the relevant evidence–the court wrote:

The location of relevant evidence and, to some extent, the ability of the court in each state to decide matters expeditiously also favor California as the appropriate forum. The majority of the evidence pertaining to the best interests analysis in this custody matter is located in California. Although evidence relating to certain domestic violence incidents is, as noted above, more readily available in New York, most other relevant information regarding the child’s best interests, such as her school performance, response to therapy, the indigenous tribe she belongs to, and her relationship with her extended family, is in California … . It does not appear that the child has any connection with New York other than the father and a paternal grandmother. Further, the Attorney for the Child in New York was having trouble providing effective representation to the child inasmuch as it was difficult to communicate with the child by telephone … . Matter of Coia v Saavedra, 2020 NY Slip Op 03325, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

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CONSECUTIVE PERIODS OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION VIOLATED THE PENAL LAW; ERROR DID NOT NEED TO BE PRESERVED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department noted that consecutive periods of postrelease supervision violated the Penal Law and the issue did not need to be preserved:

County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of postrelease supervision in violation of Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) … . Although defendant failed to preserve that contention for our review, the lack of preservation “is of no moment, inasmuch as we cannot allow an illegal sentence to stand” … . We therefore modify the judgment by directing that the periods of postrelease supervision imposed shall run concurrently. People v Hyde, 2020 NY Slip Op 03319, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

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RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT AND MENACING A POLICE OFFICER CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department reversed two of defendant’s convictions as against the weight of the evidence.  Defendant was charged with reckless endangerment first degree and menacing a police officer. It was alleged defendant fired a weapon during a foot chase. The two officers heard a gunshot but no bullet or casing was found:

… [T]he jury would have had to resort to sheer speculation to find that defendant displayed or fired a weapon, much less that he fired a weapon intentionally. The officers’ testimony that they “heard” a gunshot from some distance away does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt, for purposes of the menacing charge, that defendant visually displayed the weapon that discharged the shot. Nor does such testimony prove beyond a reasonable doubt, for purposes of the reckless endangerment charge, that the shot was fired toward the officers and thereby created a grave risk of death to them. Indeed, the second officer’s testimony that he “believed” that defendant had shot at the officers is speculative and is contradicted by his contemporaneous statement that the gun might have discharged accidentally. People v Thomas, 2020 NY Slip Op 03318, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

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THE TITLE INSURANCE POLICY GAVE THE INSURER THE RIGHT TO PROSECUTE A TITLE CLAIM BUT NOT THE OBLIGATION TO PROSECUTE A TITLE CLAIM; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT ALLEGING DEFENDANT BREACHED THE POLICY BY NOT PROSECUTING THE CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s action against a title insurance company should have been dismissed based upon the language of the policy. Plaintiff had requested that defendant take action against a party plaintiff believed was using plaintiff’s land. Defendant refused. The title insurance policy gave defendant the right but not the obligation to bring such an action:

A dismissal of a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) is warranted if “the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law” … . Plaintiffs alleged that defendant breached section 5 (b) of the policy, which provides, in relevant part, that defendant “shall have the right . . . to institute and prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any other act that in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish the Title, as insured, or to prevent or reduce loss or damage to the Insured.” Defendant’s “right” to prosecute an action is not equivalent to an “obligation” … . Inasmuch as the policy submitted by defendant on the motion did not require defendant to prosecute the action against the property owner, defendant is entitled to dismissal of the complaint insofar as it sought attorneys’ fees and costs that plaintiffs had already incurred for the prosecution of that action … . We further conclude that defendant is entitled to a declaration that it is not obligated to pay for the attorneys’ fees and costs necessary to prosecute that action in the future … . Irma Straus Realty Corp. v Old Republic Natl. Tit. Ins. Co., 2020 NY Slip Op 03307, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED SOLE CUSTODY TO FATHER, SHOULD NOT HAVE SANCTIONED MOTHER FOR PERJURY ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED IN A DIFFERENT COURT PROCEEDING, AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED RELIEF NOT REQUESTED BY A PARTY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined: (1) father should not have been awarded sole custody of the children for 60 days because no change of circumstances was alleged or demonstrated; (2) the court should not have, sua sponte, directed a child be deprived of cell phone and other electronic devices and be barred from outside-the-home activities; (3) the court should not have have directed mother to pay a fine to father for perjury; (4) the court did not have the authority to sanction mother for frivolous conduct (perjury); (5) the court should not have awarded attorney’s fees to father:

… [T]he court summarily punished the mother by sanctioning her after it determined that she committed perjury during her testimony before a Judicial Hearing Officer in Family Court with respect to the temporary order of protection and during her testimony at the hearing on the petition before Supreme Court. Assuming, arguendo, that perjury would support a finding of contempt, we conclude that the court could not properly find the mother in criminal contempt based on her testimony in Family Court, nor could the court summarily punish the mother for civil or criminal contempt based on that testimony, inasmuch as it occurred out of the court’s “immediate view and presence” … . Insofar as the order may be deemed to sanction the mother for civil or criminal contempt that occurred in the presence of Supreme Court, we conclude that, because “due process requires that . . . the contemnor be afforded an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’ ” … , and the court failed to provide notice that it was considering finding the mother in contempt or an opportunity to be heard thereon, the court erred in imposing such sanction … . …

Assuming, arguendo, that sanctions for frivolous conduct may be based on a party’s perjury, we conclude that the regulation permitting the imposition of such sanctions specifically provides that it “shall not apply to . . . proceedings in the Family Court commenced under article . . . 8 of the Family Court Act” … . …

In awarding attorney’s fees to the father, the court did not state, and we cannot determine on this record, whether it did so based upon the custodial stipulation between the parties or pursuant to statute. Consequently, we are unable ” to determine whether the award was within the proper exercise of the court’s discretion’ ” … . Ritchie v Ritchie, 2020 NY Slip Op 03316, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

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LOCAL LAW PROHIBITING SHORT-TERM RENTAL OF PROPERTIES WHERE THE OWNER DOES NOT RESIDE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A REGULATORY TAKING (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff’s constitutional attack on a Local Law which prohibited short-term rental of properties where the owner did not reside did not constitute a regulatory taking of the property:

In 2012, petitioner-plaintiff (plaintiff) purchased a single-family residence (subject premises) located in respondent-defendant Town of Grand Island (Town) for the purpose of renting it out on a short-term basis, i.e., for periods of less than 30 days. Plaintiff never resided at the subject premises. In 2015, the Town enacted Local Law 9 of 2015 (Local Law 9), which amended the Town Zoning Code to prohibit short-term rentals in certain zoning districts, except where the owner also resided on the premises. The Town enacted the law in response to significant adverse impacts to the community that it found were caused by permitting short-term rental of residential properties to occur. Local Law 9 contained a one-year amortization period—which could be extended up to three times upon application—during which preexisting short-term rental properties could cease operation. * * *

… [P]laintiff did not submit evidence establishing that, due to the prohibition under Local Law 9 on short-term rentals, the subject premises was not capable of producing a reasonable return on his investment or that it was not adaptable to other suitable private use. Instead, plaintiff’s submissions showed a “mere diminution in the value of the property, . . . [which] is insufficient to demonstrate a [regulatory] taking” … . Matter of Wallace v Town of Grand Is., 2020 NY Slip Op 03301, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

ALTHOUGH THE PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER STATUS WAS AUTHORIZED AND LEGAL, THE APPELLATE DIVISION EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO FIND DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER AND REDUCED HIS SENTENCE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, exercising its discretion, determined, although authorized and legal, defendant should not have been sentenced as a persistent felony offender. The Fourth Department reduced his sentence. The court noted that defendant had been offered a much shorter sentence as part of a plea bargain:

Even where the sentencing court does not err as a matter of law in adjudicating a defendant to be a persistent felony offender, “[t]he Appellate Division, in its own discretion, may conclude that a persistent felony offender sentence is too harsh or otherwise improvident” … . “A determination by the Appellate Division to vacate a harsh or severe persistent felony offender finding is authorized by CPL 470.20 (6), which grants the Appellate Division discretion to modify sentences in the interest of justice without deference to the sentencing court” … . …

Despite defendant’s frequent involvement with law enforcement, he has only two prior felony convictions: one in 1981 for burglary in the second degree and one in 2002 for driving while intoxicated. Moreover, a sentence of 20 years to life is a particularly harsh penalty in light of the People’s final pretrial plea offer of 6 to 9 years’ incarceration. Thus, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, we modify the judgment by vacating the finding that defendant is a persistent felony offender and we hereby modify the sentences imposed and sentence defendant as a second felony offender by reducing the sentence imposed for arson in the third degree under count one of the indictment to an indeterminate term of incarceration of 3 to 6 years and reducing the sentences imposed for menacing a police officer or peace officer under counts two, four, five, and seven of the indictment to determinate terms of incarceration of 7 years followed by 5 years of postrelease supervision. People v Garno, 2020 NY Slip Op 03311, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

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UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MORTGAGE, THE DEATH OF THE BORROWER DID NOT ACCELERATE THE DEBT; BECAUSE THE DEBT WAS NOT ACCELERATED THE INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS FOR THE SIX YEARS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WERE STILL OWING AND THE ACTION WAS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the foreclosure action should not have been dismissed as time-barred, noting that the death of the borrower did not accelerate the debt. Therefore the installment payments due during the six year prior to commencing the action were still owing:

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [4]). Here, the note provided that decedent agreed to repay the loan in monthly installments from September 2007 to August 2032. “[W]ith respect to a mortgage payable in installments, there are separate causes of action for each installment accrued, and the [s]tatute of [l]imitations [begins] to run, on the date each installment [becomes] due” … . Plaintiff commenced this foreclosure action on September 15, 2017. Therefore, recovery for the installments due within the six years prior to that date, i.e., September 15, 2011, is not barred by the statute of limitations. To the extent that plaintiff seeks recovery for installments due before that date, recovery is barred by the statute of limitations … . * * *

We reject defendants’ contention that the debt accelerated automatically upon decedent’s death. The mortgage provides that there is a default upon decedent’s death, but it does not provide that the death of decedent would automatically accelerate the debt. Rather, the mortgage provides that the lender may accelerate the debt upon a default and, here, defendants did not establish that plaintiff chose to accelerate the debt at any time before the complaint was filed … . Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy. FSB v Deliberto, 2020 NY Slip Op 03297, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

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