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THE RECORDED CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE 15-YEAR-OLD DEFENDANT AND HIS FATHER IN THE POLICE INTERVIEW ROOM IS PROTECTED BY PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s murder convictions, determined the recorded conversation between the 15-year-old defendant and his father in the interview room at the police station was protected by parent-child privilege and should have been suppressed. The defendant had requested a lawyer and the police had left the interview room at the time the conversation was recorded:

We conclude that a parent-child privilege did arise under the circumstances of this case … . The application of the privilege is not dependent on a finding of police misconduct … . … [W]e recognize, as other courts have, that a young defendant will naturally look to a parent “as a primary source of help and advice” …  The statements defendant now seeks to suppress were made in an attempt to utilize his father as such a source of assistance. “It would not be consistent with basic fairness to exact as a price for that assistance, his acquiescence to the overhearing presence of government agents” … . People v Kemp, 2023 NY Slip Op 00776, Fourth Dept 2-10-23

Practice Point: Here the Fourth Department recognized a parent-child privilege and suppressed a recorded conversation between the 15-year-old defendant and his father which took place in the police interview room. The defendant had just requested a lawyer and the police had left the room. But the recording equipment was still operating.

 

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THE PLAINTIFF MADE A LEFT TURN IN FRONT OF DEFENDANT WHEN DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAINTIFF’S AFFIDAVIT ALLEGING DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED TO GO AROUND ANOTHER VEHICLE WAS BASED ON SPECULATION WHICH IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this intersection traffic accident case should have been granted. Plaintiff made a left turn in front of defendant who had the right of way:

… [D]efendant met his initial burden of establishing that he was not negligent because he had the right-of-way while traveling along Route 5, was operating his vehicle in a lawful and prudent manner, and was traveling at a lawful rate of speed, and that there was nothing he could have done to avoid the accident, which occurred when plaintiff suddenly turned left into defendant’s lane of travel … . We further conclude that plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact in opposition to the motion … . Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the deposition testimony did not raise an issue of fact whether defendant was negligently passing another vehicle on the right in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1123 at the time of the collision. Although there is conflicting deposition testimony concerning the precise lane in which defendant was traveling at the time of the collision, there is no dispute that defendant never changed lanes while driving along Route 5 at the time of the collision. Thus, plaintiff’s assertion that defendant unsafely attempted to go around another vehicle at the time of the accident ” ‘is based on speculation and is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment’ ” … . Gomez v Buczynski, 2023 NY Slip Op 00771, Fourth Dept 2-10-23

Practice Point: The traffic accident was caused by plaintiff’s making a left turn in front of defendant’s oncoming car when defendant had the right of way. Plaintiff’s affidavit alleging defendant was attempting to go around another car at the time of the accident was based on speculation which was not sufficient to defeat defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

 

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THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED THAT EVEN IF DEFENDANT WAS ILLEGALLY FRISKED AND DETAINED OUTSIDE OF HIS VEHICLE, THE DEPUTY’S SEEING COCAINE ON THE DRIVER’S SEAT PROVIDED PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE; THE TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED THE OBSERVATION OF THE DRUGS WAS A PRODUCT OF THE ILLEGAL FRISK AND DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the motion to suppress evidence seized from a vehicle was properly denied. After observing what appeared to be a drug transaction the defective called for assistance. As one of the deputies approached defendant’s vehicle, defendant got out and walked toward the deputy. The deputy frisked the defendant, found nothing and told defendant to wait behind his vehicle. The deputy then walked to defendant’s vehicle where he saw a rolled up dollar bill and white powder on the driver’s seat. The dissent argued the deputy did not have reasonable suspicion of a crime when defendant was frisked and his observation of the drugs in the car was a product of the illegal detention of defendant:

The court properly determined that, based on the totality of the observations by the detective, which he communicated with the deputy … , the deputy had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in a drug transaction … . In any event, “the seizure of [the items inside the vehicle] was not the result of the allegedly illegal detention of defendant, who was outside the parked vehicle when the police officer approached and detained him” … . Even if the deputy had not detained defendant, he could have simply walked up to the vehicle, looked in the window, and observed the drugs in plain view on the driver’s seat. Contrary to defendant’s further contention, the deputy’s observations of the rolled-up dollar bill and white powdery substance provided probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of drugs … . People v Messano, 2023 NY Slip Op 00769, Fourth Dept 2-10-23

Practice Point: Here the defendant was frisked and detained as he walked toward the deputy from his car. The deputy then looked inside defendant’s car a saw drugs. The majority held that even if defendant was illegally detained outside the car, the deputy’s observation of the drugs justified the search. The two-justice dissent argued the observation of the drugs was the product of the illegal detention.

 

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PLAINTIFF ALLEGED HE WAS DENIED PROPER MEDICAL CARE IN THE NIAGARA COUNTY JAIL AND SUED THE JAIL DOCTOR, THE COUNTY AND THE SHERIFF; THE CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING THE VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFF’S CIVIL RIGHTS PURSUANT TO 42 USC 1983 SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS; OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION WERE DEEMED TIME-BARRED; ACTIONS ALLEGING THE COUNTY WAS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF THE SHERIFF WERE DISMISSED; THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE COUNTY AND SHERIFF WERE NOT DEEMED “UNITED IN INTEREST” (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined some causes of action should have been dismissed and others should not have been dismissed in this action against the county, county employees and sheriff alleging plaintiff was denied proper medical care while he was an inmate in the Niagara County Jail. The medical malpractice and negligence causes of action against a doctor employed by the county were time-barred pursuant to General Municipal Law 50-d (one year and ninety days). The causes of action against the doctor and the county alleging civil rights violations pursuant to 42 USC 1983 properly survived motions to dismiss. But the 42 USC 1983 cause of action against the sheriff should have been dismissed because the sheriff had no personal involvement in plaintiff’s medical care. The relation-back doctrine was improperly invoked for time-barred causes of action against the sheriff because the county and the sheriff are not united interest (the county is not vicariously liable for the acts of the sheriff and the sheriff’s department does not have an identity separate from the county). The negligent investigation cause of action should have been dismissed because New York does not recognize it. Claims alleging the county was vicariously liable for the acts of the sheriff should have been dismissed because plaintiff did not allege there was a local law imposing such a responsibility. Prezioso v County of Niagara, 2023 NY Slip Op 00768, Fourth Dept 2-10-23

Practice Point: Plaintiff alleged he was denied proper medical care in the Niagara County Jail. Plaintiff’s causes of action alleging a violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 USC 1983 survived dismissal. The confusing relationship between the county and the sheriff resulted in the dismissal of several causes of action. The one-year-ninety day statute of limitations in the General Municipal Law applied to some causes of action. Absent a local law to the contrary, a county is not vicariously liable for the acts of the sheriff. The decision is worth reading because of the sheer number of unique issues which arise in suits against counties, county employees and county sheriffs.

 

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THE JUDGE’S FAILURE TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT IN THIS CUSTODY CASE PRECLUDED APPELLATE REVIEW; MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT),

The Fourth Department, remitting the matter to Family Court, determined the judge’s failure to make findings of fact in this custody case precluded appellate review:

The court, in the order on appeal, however, failed to make any factual findings whatsoever to support the award of primary physical custody. It is “well established that the court is obligated ‘to set forth those facts essential to its decision’ ” … . Here, the court completely failed to follow that well-established rule when it failed to issue any factual findings to support its initial custody determination … , nor did it make any findings with respect to the relevant factors that it considered in making a best interests of the child determination … . “Effective appellate review, whatever the case but especially in child visitation, custody or neglect proceedings, requires that appropriate factual findings be made by the trial court—the court best able to measure the credibility of the witnesses” … . Matter of Ianello v Colonomos, 2023 NY Slip Op 00767, Fourth Dept 2-10-23

Practice Point: Here in this custody case the judge did not make findings of fact, which precluded appellate review. The case was sent back.

 

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DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO INVESTIGATE THE ROBBERY VICTIM’S STATEMENT THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT ONE OF THE PERPETRATORS; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined defendant did not receive effective assistance counsel in that counsel did not investigate the robbery victim’s statement which indicated defendant was not one of the perpetrators:

… [T]he second victim’s hearing testimony that defendant was not present during the shooting is consistent with his initial statement to law enforcement, and it is also “wholly consistent with the theory pursued by [defense] counsel [at trial], namely that defendant was not present at the shooting and that the crime was instead committed by [different] individual[s]”… . Additionally, although the motion court chose to … discredit the second victim’s testimony, with respect to whether the second victim ever named for him the two individuals that the second victim believed carried out the attempted robbery, there is no evidence in the hearing record contrary to the second victim’s testimony that he would have named those individuals at trial had he been called … .

… [T]he hearing record discloses no tactical reason for defense counsel’s failure to interview the second victim … . Inasmuch as defendant established that defense counsel “did not fully investigate the case and did not collect the type of information that a lawyer would need in order to determine the best course of action” … , we conclude that defense counsel’s deficient conduct was “sufficiently egregious and prejudicial as to compromise [the] right to a fair trial” … . People v Everson, 2023 NY Slip Op 00761, Fourth Dept 2-10-23

Practice Point: Although defense counsel may have made an appropriate strategic decision re: whether to call the robbery victim as a witness, counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the victim’s statement that defendant was not one of the perpetrators.

 

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THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE LEFT IT TO THE AGENCY TO DETERMINE FATHER’S VISITATION AND SHOULD NOT HAVE MADE THERAPEUTIC COUNSELING A PREREQUISITE FOR VISITATION (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court determined (1) the judge should not have left it to the agency to decide whether father should receive visitation, and (2) father’s participation in therapeutic counseling should not have been made a prerequisite to unsupervised overnight weekend visitation:

… [T]he court erred in failing to set an appropriate supervised visitation schedule by implicitly leaving it to the agency to determine whether the father would receive any such visitation … .

… “Although a court may include a directive to obtain counseling as a component of a custody or visitation order, the court does not have the authority to order such counseling as a prerequisite to custody or visitation” … . Matter of Bonilla-Wright v Wright, 2023 NY Slip Op 00756, Fourth Dept 2-10-23

Practice Point: Family Court cannot delegate its authority to determine whether father will receive visitation or its authority to set up a visitation schedule. Therapeutic counseling can not be made a prerequisite for visitation or custody.

 

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THE JUDGE FAILED TO INQUIRE FURTHER DURING THE PLEA ALLOCUTION WHEN DEFENDANT SAID HE DID NOT VIOLATE THE ORDER OF PROTECTION INTENTIONALLY; THERE IS NO NEED TO PRESERVE A DEFECTIVE-ALLOCUTION ERROR; CONVICTION REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction of an aggravated family offense by guilty plea, determined the judge should have inquired further when defendant stated he did not intend to violate the order of protection when he sent a letter to the protected person. A defective allocution will be considered on appeal in the absence of preservation:

… [A]fter acknowledging his awareness of the valid and effective order of protection directing him to have no contact with the protected person, defendant stated that he “didn’t intentionally violate” the order of protection by sending the protected person a letter and instead asserted that any violation “was unintentional.” Following an off-the-record discussion between defendant and defense counsel, defendant admitted that sending the letter did, in fact, violate the order of protection, but the court did not inquire, and defendant never clarified, whether his conscious objective was to disobey the order of protection … . Contrary to the People’s assertion, which “conflates the culpable mental states for acts done ‘intentionally’ … and those done ‘knowingly’ … , this is not a case in which defendant’s “further statements removed any doubt regarding th[e requisite] intent” … . People v Vanwuyckhuyse, 2023 NY Slip Op 00754, Fourth Dept 2-10-23

Practice Point: The defendant said he did not intend to violate the order of protection during the plea allocution and the judge did not make the required inquiry. An allocution error need not be preserved for appeal by moving to withdraw the plea. The conviction was reversed.

 

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THE REVIVED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR LAWSUITS ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE PURSUANT TO THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT (CVA) DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Bannister, determined the revived statute of limitations for law suits based upon sexual abuse under the Child Victims Act (CVA) did not violate due process:

… [I]t is well settled that “a claim-revival statute will satisfy the Due Process Clause of the [New York] State Constitution if it was enacted as a reasonable response in order to remedy an injustice” … . Addressing the second prong of that standard first—i.e., whether the statute “remed[ied] an injustice”—the Court of Appeals recognized that, “[i]n the context of a claim-revival statute, there is no principled way for a court to test whether a particular injustice is ‘serious’ or whether a particular class of plaintiffs is blameless; such moral determinations are left to the elected branches of government” … . Here, as evidenced by the legislative history of the CVA, the legislature considered the need for “justice for past and future survivors of child sexual abuse” and the need to “shift the significant and lasting costs of child sexual abuse to the responsible parties” … . Specifically, the legislative history noted the significant barriers those survivors faced in coming forward with their claims, including that child sexual abuse survivors may not be able to disclose their abuse until later in life after the relevant statute of limitations has run because of the mental, physical and emotional injuries sustained as a result of the abuse … . As explained in the Senate Introducer’s Memorandum in Support, “New York currently requires most survivors to file civil actions . . . against their abusers by the age of 23 at most, long before most survivors report or come to terms with their abuse, which has been estimated to be as high as 52 years old on average” … .. Because the statutes of limitat ions left “thousands of survivors” of child sexual abuse unable to sue their abusers, the legislature determined that there was an identifiable injustice that needed to be remedied … . PB-36 Doe v Niagara Falls City Sch. Dist., 2023 NY Slip Op 00598, Fourth Dept 2-3-23

Practice Point: The revived statute of limitations in the Child Victims Act is constitutional.

 

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THE JUDGE’S FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION RENDERED DEFENDANT’S ADMISSION TO A PROBATION VIOLATION INVALID; THE ISSUE WAS CONSIDERED ON APPEAL DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE ADMISSION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined the judge’s failure to inform defendant of postrelease supervision rendered the admission invalid. The issue may be raised on appeal despite the absence of a motion to withdraw the plea:

Defendant contends that his admission was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent because County Court failed to inform him at any time that he would be subject to postrelease supervision if the court sentenced him to prison. We agree. The People contend that defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of his admission is not preserved for our review, inasmuch as he failed to move to withdraw his admission, but we reject that contention. Although defendant pleaded guilty to a probation violation, as opposed to a crime, “where a trial judge does not fulfill the obligation to advise a defendant of postrelease supervision during the plea allocution, the defendant may challenge the plea as not knowing, voluntary and intelligent on direct appeal, notwithstanding the absence of a postallocution motion” … . People v Bell, 2023 NY Slip Op 00594, Fourth Dept 2-3-23

Practice Point: Here the judge did not inform the defendant of postrelease supervision before he admitted to a probation violation. The admission was reversed on appeal despite the absence of a motion to withdraw the admission.

 

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