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THE JUDGE REMOVED ELEMENTS OF THE CHARGED OFFENSES FROM THE JURY’S CONSIDERATION, NEW TRIAL ORDERED.

The Fourth Department determined the trial judge took away consideration of elements of the charged offenses from the jury and ordered a new trial. Defendants were charged with assault (on a police officer) and obstructing governmental administration. The charges arose when one of the defendants tried to stop police officers from entering her home and a struggle ensued. The assault charge required proof the police were performing a lawful duty and the arrest was authorized. The obstruction charge required proof the police were performing a governmental function. When defense counsel asked a police officer whether a warrant was necessary to enter defendants' home, the judge wouldn't allow the question and instructed the jury no search warrant was required. “The court thereby improperly removed the abovementioned elements from the jury's consideration …”. People v O'Dell, 2016 NY Slip Op 02262, 4th Dept 3-25-16

CRIMINAL LAW (JUDGE REMOVED ELEMENTS OF THE CHARGED OFFENSES FROM THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, JUDGE REMOVED ELEMENTS OF THE CHARGED OFFENSES FROM THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)

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INADEQUATE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL REQUIRED REVERSAL; PRESERVATION OF THIS ISSUE NOT NECESSARY.

The Fourth Department reversed Family Court's finding respondent had willfully violated a court order because of an insufficient waiver of the right to counsel. The court noted that a prior decision requiring preservation of the right-to-counsel issue should no longer be followed:

Although the Support Magistrate properly advised respondent that he had the right to counsel (see Family Ct Act § 262 [a] [vi]), we agree with respondent that the Support Magistrate failed to make a ” searching inquiry' ” to ensure that his waiver of the right to counsel was a knowing, voluntary and intelligent choice, and thus that he was denied his right to counsel … . We therefore reverse the order and remit the matter to Family Court for a new hearing. To the extent that our decision in Matter of Huard v Lugo (81 AD3d 1265… requires preservation of a contention that the Support Magistrate erred in allowing the respondent to proceed pro se at a fact-finding hearing, that decision is no longer to be followed. Matter of Girard v Neville, 2016 NY Slip Op 01947, 4th Dept 3-18-16

FAMILY LAW (INADEQUATE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL REQUIRED REVERSAL, PRESERVATION OF THIS ISSUE NOT NECESSARY)/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (FAMILY LAW, INADEQUATE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL REQUIRED REVERSAL, PRESERVATION OF THIS ISSUE NOT NECESSARY)/APPEALS (FAMILY LAW, INADEQUATE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL REQUIRED REVERSAL, PRESERVATION OF THIS ISSUE NOT NECESSARY)

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EXPRESSION OF OPPOSITION TO A PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DID NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST PRECLUDING VILLAGE OFFICIALS FROM PARTICIPATING IN A SEQRA REVIEW; PLANNING BOARD DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO RESCIND A NEGATIVE DECLARATION AFTER PERMITS WERE ISSUED.

The Fourth Department determined two village officials did not have a conflict of interest which would preclude their participation in a State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) review of a development project. The two had expressed opposition to the project before and after their elections, but expression of opinion does not create a conflict of interest. The Fourth Department upheld the annulment of resolutions which stated the proposed project would adversely affect the environment. The planning board had previously found no adverse impact (a negative declaration) and had issued permits. The board did not have the authority to rescind the negative declaration at that point:

… [T]he Board lacked authority to rescind its negative declaration under the circumstances of this case. Here, the Board was authorized to rescind its negative declaration “prior to its decision to undertake, fund, or approve an action,” and the Board made its decision to approve the action, i.e., the Project, when it issued the requisite special permits … . Matter of Pittsford Canalside Props., LLC v Village of Pittsford, 2016 NY Slip Op 01929, 4th Dept 3-18-16

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (EXPRESSION OF OPPOSITION TO A PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DID NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST PRECLUDING VILLAGE OFFICIALS FROM PARTICIPATING IN SEQRA REVIEW)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (PLANNING BOARD DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO RESCIND NEGATIVE DECLARATION AFTER PERMITS ISSUED)/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (EXPRESSION OF OPPOSITION TO A PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DID NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST PRECLUDING VILLAGE OFFICIALS FROM PARTICIPATING IN SEQRA REVIEW)/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (PLANNING BOARD DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO RESCIND NEGATIVE DECLARATION AFTER PERMITS ISSUED)

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JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON THE DEADLY-FORCE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED.

The Fourth Department reversed defendant's assault and manslaughter convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the jury should have been charged on the “deadly force” justification defense. There was evidence defendant acted to defend her brother who was struck with a champagne bottle. The assault with the bottle could constitute deadly force, justifying the use of deadly force in defense:

… [T]he court erred in denying her request to charge the jury on justification using deadly physical force in defense of a third party for the assault count. There was a reasonable view of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, that the first victim was using deadly physical force by striking defendant's brother in the head with a champagne bottle when defendant assaulted her … . We further agree with defendant that the error in failing to give the justification charge on the assault count requires reversal of the manslaughter count as well. Although the court instructed the jury on justification for that count, there was a “significant factual relationship” between the two counts … , particularly on the issue whether defendant was the initial aggressor (see Penal Law § 35.15 [1] [b]). We therefore reverse the judgment and grant a new trial on both … . People v James, 2016 NY Slip Op 01946, 4th Dept 3-18-16

CRIMINAL LAW (JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED ON THE DEADLY-FORCE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/EVIDENCE (ASSAULT WITH A CHAMPAGNE BOTTLE CONSTITUTED USE OF DEADLY FORCE, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED ON THE DEADLY-FORCE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE)/JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (CRIMINAL LAW, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED ON THE DEADLY-FORCE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)

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GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REDUCED TO PETIT LARCENY, PROOF OF VALUE OF STOLEN PROPERTY INSUFFICIENT.

The Fourth Department, in the interest of justice, reduced defendant's grand larceny to petit larceny because of insufficient proof of the value of the stolen property:

The value of stolen property is “the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the crime” (Penal Law § 155.20 [1]). It is well settled that “a victim must provide a basis of knowledge for his [or her] statement of value before it can be accepted as legally sufficient evidence of such value” … . Furthermore, “[c]onclusory statements and rough estimates of value are not sufficient” to establish the value of the property … . “Although a victim is competent to supply evidence of original cost' . . . , evidence of the original purchase price, without more, will not satisfy the People's burden' ” … .

Here, the victim testified that several specific items were taken, but the only evidence of the value of those items was the victim's testimony regarding the purchase price of some of them, and her hearsay testimony regarding a purported expert's appraisal of some of the property, which was based solely on her description of certain jewelry to the purported expert. Based on the evidence of value in the record, we cannot conclude “that the jury ha[d] a reasonable basis for inferring, rather than speculating, that the value of the property exceeded the statutory threshold” of $3,000 … . People v Slack, 2016 NY Slip Op 01930, 4th Dept 3-18-16

CRIMINAL LAW (GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REDUCED TO PETIT LARCENY, PROOF OF VALUE INSUFFICIENT)/EVIDENCE (GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REDUCED TO PETIT LARCENY, PROOF OF VALUE INSUFFICIENT)/GRAND LARCENY (GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REDUCED TO PETIT LARCENY, PROOF OF VALUE INSUFFICIENT)

PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE OF THE COMPLAINT.

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff in a breach of contract action should have been allowed to amend its ad damnum clause:

… Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying its motion to amend the ad damnum clause from $77,585.50 to $111,331.13, and we therefore modify the order by granting the motion. It is axiomatic that ” [l]eave to amend a pleading should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party where the amendment is not patently lacking in merit' ” … . * * *

… “[I]n the absence of prejudice . . . , a motion to amend the ad damnum clause, whether made before or after the trial, should generally be granted” … . Putrelo Constr. Co. v Town of Marcy, 2016 NY Slip Op 01949, 4th Dept 3-18-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (AMENDMENT OF AD DAMNUM CLAUSE OF THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED)/AD DAMNUM CLAUSE (AMENDMENT OF AD DAMNUM CLAUSE OF THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED)

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SKIER ASSUMED THE RISK OF STRIKING A SNOWMAKING MACHINE.

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff had raised a question of fact whether he assumed the risk of a skiing injury. Plaintiff fell and slid headfirst into an unpadded portion of a pole on a snowmaking machine. The court rejected defendant’ argument that the General Obligations Law, not the common law controlled:

 

Although there was padding on the upper portion of the pole, plaintiff collided with the lower, unpadded portion of the pole. Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff assumed the risks associated with the sport of skiing. We agree with plaintiff that Supreme Court properly denied the motion. We note at the outset that General Obligations Law § 18-107 provides that, “[u]nless otherwise specifically provided in this article, the duties of skiers, passengers, and ski operators shall be governed by common law” and, contrary to defendant’s contention, the precise circumstances of plaintiff’s accident are not covered by article 18 of the General Obligations Law. Thus, the common law applies where, as here, plaintiff is alleging the negligent placement and inadequate padding of defendant’s snowmaking machines, a condition not “specifically addressed by the statute” … .

It is well settled under the common law that “[v]oluntary participants in the sport of downhill skiing assume the inherent risks of personal injury caused by, among other things, terrain, weather conditions, ice, trees and man-made objects that are incidental to the provision or maintenance of a ski facility” … . Here, although defendant met its initial burden by establishing that the accident was caused by the inherent risks in the sport of downhill skiing, plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact by submitting the affidavit of his expert … . Plaintiff’s expert asserted therein that the snowmaking machine was on the ski trail and was insufficiently padded, thus raising an issue of fact whether defendant “failed to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition” … . Dailey v Labrador Dev. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 01072, 4th Dept 2-11-16

 

INSURANCE LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP SUPPORTED AN INSURANCE MALPRACTICE ACTION)/MALPRACTICE, INSURANCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP SUPPORTING AN INSURANCE MALPRACTICE ACTION EXISTED)

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TRUST WHICH ALLOWED PETITIONER’S CHILDREN TO DISTRIBUTE PRINCIPAL TO PETITIONER RENDERED PETITIONER INELIGIBLE FOR MEDICAID, DESPITE CHILDREN’S REFUSAL TO MAKE A DISTRIBUTION.

The Fourth Department confirmed the Department of Health’s finding that a trust which allowed petitioner’s children to distribute the principal to her rendered petitioner ineligible for Medicaid benefits, despite the children’s refusal to make a distribution:

 

… [W]e conclude that the agency’s determination, which is based on its conclusion that the principal of a trust of which petitioner is a beneficiary is an “available resource,” is supported by substantial evidence and is not affected by an error of law. The trust at issue grants petitioner’s children, as cotrustees, “the authority to distribute so much of the principal to [petitioner that they,] in their sole discretion, deem advisable to provide for [petitioner’s] health, maintenance and welfare.” Because the principal of the trust may, in the discretion of petitioner’s children, be paid for petitioner’s benefit, the agency did not err in concluding that the principal of the trust is an available resource for purposes of petitioner’s Medicaid eligibility determination (see 18 NYCRR 360-4.5 [b] [1] [ii]…), despite the fact that her children refuse to exercise their discretion to make such payments of principal. Matter of Flannery v Zucker, 2016 NY Slip Op 01075, 4th Dept 2-11-16

 

MEDICAID (TRUST WHICH ALLOWED CHILDREN TO MAKE DISTRIBUTIONS TO PETITIONER RENDERED HER INELIGIBLE FOR MEDICAID, DESPITE CHILDREN’S REFUSAL TO MAKE SUCH A DISTRIBUTION)/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (MEDICAID, TRUST WHICH ALLOWED CHILDREN TO MAKE DISTRIBUTIONS TO PETITIONER RENDERED HER INELIGIBLE FOR MEDICAID, DESPITE CHILDREN’S REFUSAL TO MAKE SUCH A DISTRIBUTION)

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FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO REVOKE FIREARMS PERMIT AS PART OF AN ORDER OF PROTECTION.

The Fourth Department determined Family Court did not have the authority to revoke respondent’s firearm permit as part of an order of protection:

Under Family Court Act § 846-a, the court may revoke a license to carry and possess a firearm “[i]f the court determines that the willful failure to obey [a protective] order involves violent behavior constituting the crimes of menacing, reckless endangerment, assault or attempted assault.” Where, as here, no such determination is made, the court is not authorized to revoke a respondent’s firearms permit … . Moreover, restriction of respondent’s right to use or possess firearms was not warranted under Family Court Act § 842-a, inasmuch as the court did not find, and could not find based on the evidence at the hearing, “that the conduct which resulted in the issuance of the order of protection involved (i) the infliction of physical injury . . . , (ii) the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument . . . , or (iii) behavior constituting any violent felony offense” (§ 842-a [2] [a]), or that there is a “substantial risk that the respondent may use or threaten to use a firearm unlawfully against the person or persons for whose protection the order of protection is issued” (§ 842-a [2] [b]). We thus modify the order by vacating the provision directing that respondent is not to use or possess firearms nor hold or apply for a pistol permit during the pendency of the order. Matter of Schoenl v Schoenl, 2016 NY Slip Op 01060, 4th Dept 2-11-16

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO REVOKE FIREARMS PERMIT AS PART OF ORDER OF PROTECTION)/ORDER OF PROTECTION (FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO REVOKE FIREARMS PERMIT AS PART OF ORDER OF PROTECTION)/FIREARMS PERMIT (FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO REVOKE FIREARMS PERMIT AS PART OF ORDER OF PROTECTION)

MOTHER DEMONSTRATED CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES RELATED TO EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT BY HUSBAND; FAMILY COURT REVERSED, CUSTODY AWARDED TO MOTHER.

The Fourth Department reversed Family Court finding changes in circumstances sufficient to modify the custody arrangement and award sole physical custody to mother. The evidence demonstrated father imposed excessive corporal punishment. The Fourth Department noted the Family Court judge placed too much emphasis on mother’s sexual conduct:

 

Although the father testified that each of [the] types of physical discipline was a one-time occurrence, the records of the daughter’s medical examination documenting that the daughter had “multiple bruises all over her body in different stages of healing,” as well as the son’s statements with respect to the frequency of the father’s physical discipline, support the finding that the father repeatedly inflicted excessive corporal punishment on the daughter. We thus conclude that there was a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant an inquiry into the best interests of the children … . Furthermore, even crediting the father’s assertion that the daughter’s injuries resulted from tantrums, we conclude that there was a sufficient change in circumstances inasmuch as the father was admittedly unable to handle the daughter’s behavioral issues, resorted to inappropriate physical discipline to punish the daughter for her alleged misbehavior, and requested that the mother remove the daughter from his care … .

We further agree with the mother and the AFC that the court’s custody determination lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record … . Upon our review of the relevant factors … , “including an evaluation of the character and relative parental fitness of the parties” … , we conclude that it is in the best interests of the children to award the mother sole legal and primary physical custody. Matter of DeJesus v Gonzalez, 2016 NY Slip Op 01059, 4th Dept 2-11-16

 

FAMILY LAW (EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT BY FATHER CONSTITUTED SUFFICIENT CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES, CUSTODY AWARDED TO MOTHER)/CUSTODY (EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT BY FATHER CONSTITUTED SUFFICIENT CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES, CUSTODY AWARDED TO MOTHER)

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