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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined plaintiff raised a question of fact whether the 2 1/2 year statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous treatment doctrine, despite gaps in treatment exceeding the statute of limitations:

The determination whether continuous treatment exists “must focus on the patient” … and, “[i]n determining whether plaintiff[] raised an issue of fact concerning the applicability of the continuous treatment doctrine, [her] version of the facts must be accepted as true” … . Based on plaintiff’s version of the facts, there is support in the record for a finding that plaintiff “intended uninterrupted reliance” upon defendant’s observation, directions, concern, and responsibility for overseeing her progress. Notably, during approximately 7 years of treatment with defendant, plaintiff underwent two surgeries, saw no other physician regarding her shoulder, and returned to him for further treatment, i.e., a potential third surgery, but was told that he did not treat or operate on shoulders anymore. Defendant referred plaintiff to another physician in his practice, and plaintiff went to that appointment, but was told that the second physician would not treat her. Furthermore, the fact that plaintiff left the September 5, 2003 appointment with a direction to see defendant “as needed” is not dispositive inasmuch as defendant conceded that “[o]bviously [plaintiff’s] problem is long standing and chronic. She most likely will need further surgery in the future due to her young age and need for revision shoulder replacement vs fusions.” Lohnas v Luzi, 2016 NY Slip Op 04819, 4th Dept 6-17-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINED TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINED TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINED TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINED TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)

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GUNPOINT DETENTION NOT JUSTIFIED, SEIZED EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.

The Fourth Department determined the gunpoint detention of defendant was not justified by what the officer knew or observed. The motion to suppress the seized marijuana and handgun should have been granted:

The People concede that the sergeant’s encounter with defendant constituted a level three forcible detention under People v De Bour …, and thus required “a reasonable suspicion that [defendant] was involved in a felony or misdemeanor” … . “[A]ctions that are at all times innocuous and readily susceptible of an innocent interpretation . . . may not generate a founded suspicion of criminality” … .

We agree with defendant that the arresting sergeant lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion. There is no evidence in the record that the sergeant was informed of the recovery of marihuana in the area the day before defendant’s arrest, and defendant’s actions in merely “grabbing” at his waistline and bending down to the floor of the vehicle, without more, were insufficient to provide the sergeant with the requisite suspicion that defendant committed a crime, and to justify defendant’s gunpoint detention … . People v Elliott, 2016 NY Slip Op 04838, 4th Dept 6-17-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (GUNPOINT DETENTION NOT JUSTIFIED, SEIZED EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, GUNPOINT DETENTION NOT JUSTIFIED, SEIZED EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/SUPPRESSION (CRIMINAL LAW, GUNPOINT DETENTION NOT JUSTIFIED, SEIZED EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)

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NO JUSTIFICATION FOR A STRIP SEARCH, EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.

The Fourth Department determined there were insufficient grounds for a strip search and defendant’s motion to suppress the drugs seized from his person should have been granted:

… [T]he search performed by the officer constituted a strip search … , which must be justified by “a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing evidence underneath clothing” … . We conclude that the officer did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion. Defendant was fully cooperative with the officer, admitting his possession of marihuana and denying possession of any other contraband. There was no indication that defendant might be concealing any contraband under his clothing, and the mere fact that he possessed marihuana does not justify a strip search. Although the People assert that the search was justified because defendant appeared to be nervous about being searched, the record reflects that defendant became nervous only after the officer began to perform the strip search … . People v Tisdale, 2016 NY Slip Op 04842, 4th Dept 6-17-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (NO JUSTIFICATION FOR A STRIP SEARCH, EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, NO JUSTIFICATION FOR A STRIP SEARCH, EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/STRIP SEARCH (NO JUSTIFICATION FOR A STRIP SEARCH, EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/SUPPRESSION (CRIMINAL LAW, NO JUSTIFICATION FOR A STRIP SEARCH, EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)

TOWN DID NOT TAKE THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WALMART STORE, NEGATIVE DECLARATION ANNULLED.

The Fourth Department determined the town failed to take the requisite hard look at the environmental impact of the construction of a Walmart store and annulled the town’s negative (impact) declaration. The court held that the effects of the construction upon wildlife, community character and surface water were not adequately investigated:

We agree with petitioner … that the Town Board failed to take the requisite hard look at the impact of the project on wildlife, the community character of the Village, and surface water, and that the resolution adopting the negative declaration must therefore be annulled. … Given the information received from the public that state-listed threatened species might be present on the project site and the failure of the Town Board to investigate the veracity of that information, we conclude that the Town Board failed to take a hard look at the impact of the project on wildlife, and the negative declaration with respect thereto was therefore arbitrary and capricious … .

[A] “… town . . . board reviewing a big box development should consider the impact of the development on the community character of a neighboring village that might suffer business displacement as a result of the approval of the big box development”… .

… [T]he Town Board erred in failing to consider the surface water impact of the entire project. While the Town Board considered surface water impacts relating to the footprint of the Supercenter and related areas, the project documents submitted to the Town Board make clear that the reconstruction of four golf course holes on a golf course adjacent to the project is a central part of the project, and the DEC specifically directed that the environmental assessment of the project include consideration of that reconstruction. Matter of Wellsville Citizens for Responsible Dev., Inc. v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 04847, 4th Dept 6-17-16

 

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (TOWN DID NOT TAKE THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WALMART STORE, NEGATIVE DECLARATION ANNULLED)/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (TOWN DID NOT TAKE THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WALMART STORE, NEGATIVE DECLARATION ANNULLED)/SEQRA (TOWN DID NOT TAKE THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WALMART STORE, NEGATIVE DECLARATION ANNULLED)/BIG BOX STORE (ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, TOWN DID NOT TAKE THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WALMART STORE, NEGATIVE DECLARATION ANNULLED)/WALMART (ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, TOWN DID NOT TAKE THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WALMART STORE, NEGATIVE DECLARATION ANNULLED)

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STRIKING ANSWER TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR FAILING TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE TAPES IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE.

The Fourth Department, over an extensive dissent, determined striking defendant's answer in this slip and fall case was too severe a sanction for failing to preserve evidence, i.e., surveillance tapes:

… [W]e agree with plaintiff that a sanction was warranted inasmuch as defendant “wilfully fail[ed] to disclose information” that the court had ordered to be preserved (CPLR 3126). Nevertheless, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in striking defendant's answer and affirmative defenses. It is well established that “a less drastic sanction than dismissal of the responsible party's pleading may be imposed where[, as here,] the loss does not deprive the nonresponsible party of the means of establishing his or her claim or defense” … . Indeed, we note that the record does not demonstrate that the plaintiff has been ” prejudicially bereft' ” of the means of prosecuting his action … . Thus, we conclude that an appropriate sanction is that an adverse inference charge be given at trial with respect to the unavailable surveillance footage … . Sarach v M&T Bank Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 04820, 4th Dept 6-17-16

NEGLIGENCE (STRIKING ANSWER TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR FAILING TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE TAPES IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (STRIKING ANSWER TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR FAILING TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE TAPES IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)/EVIDENCE (STRIKING ANSWER TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR FAILING TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE TAPES IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)/SLIP AND FALL  (STRIKING ANSWER TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR FAILING TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE TAPES IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)/SURVEILLANCE TAPES (SLIP AND FALL, STRIKING ANSWER TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR FAILING TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE TAPES)

ONLY ONE FINE SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSED WHERE TWO CONVICTIONS AROSE FROM THE SAME ACT.

The Fourth Department determined one fine, not two, should have been imposed on two convictions arising from the same act:

We agree with defendant, however, that the fines are illegal to the extent the court imposed a fine on both a conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree that arose from a single act … . People v Regatuso, 2016 NY Slip Op 04836, 4th Dept 6-17-16

CRIMINAL LAW (ONLY ONE FINE SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSED WHERE TWO CONVICTIONS AROSE FROM THE SAME ACT)/SENTENCING (ONLY ONE FINE SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSED WHERE TWO CONVICTIONS AROSE FROM THE SAME ACT)/FINES (CRIMINAL LAW, (ONLY ONE FINE SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSED WHERE TWO CONVICTIONS AROSE FROM THE SAME ACT)

INVESTIGATING A MALFUNCTION CONSTITUTES COVERED REPAIR UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff was covered by Labor Law 240(1) when he was diagnosing a problem on a cell tower, which constituted “repair” under the statute. The Fourth Department further concluded the defendants raised a question of fact about whether plaintiff had been provided with sufficient safety equipment (the dissent argued defendants had not raised a question of fact on that issue):

Here, plaintiff testified that he never performed preventive maintenance on the towers, and that he and his coworkers were dispatched to a tower only when something was in need of repair … . Indeed, plaintiff's submissions establish that an item on the tower was malfunctioning prior to commencement of the work, and that plaintiff was injured after climbing approximately 180 feet to conduct an investigation into the cause of the alarm and to remedy the malfunction … . Where, as here, ” a person is investigating a malfunction, . . . efforts in furtherance of that investigation are protected activities under Labor Law § 240 (1)' ” … . Cullen v AT&T, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 04503, 4th Dept 6-10-16

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (INVESTIGATING A MALFUNCTION CONSTITUTES COVERED REPAIR UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1))/REPAIR (LABOR LAW, INVESTIGATING A MALFUNCTION CONSTITUTES COVERED REPAIR UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1))

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FAILURE TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS TRIGGERED NEED FOR ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION.

The Fourth Department, reversing the conviction, over a concurrence, determined defendant was entitled to an adverser inference jury instruction based upon the failure to preserve surveillance videos:

We agree with defendant that the court erred in refusing to give an adverse inference charge based on the People's failure to preserve surveillance tapes … . Defendant used reasonable diligence in requesting those tapes, which captured “evidence that [was] reasonably likely to be of material importance” …, i.e., a video in the area where the crime occurred, from cameras operated by the City of Rochester Police Department.

We respectfully disagree with our concurring colleague that the State's duty to preserve surveillance videos is not triggered until a request has been made by the defendant. People v Butler, 2016 NY Slip Op 04512, 4th Dept 6-10-16

CRIMINAL LAW (FAILURE TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS TRIGGERED NEED FOR ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION)/EVIDENCE (FAILURE TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS TRIGGERED NEED FOR ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION)/ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS TRIGGERED NEED FOR ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION)/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS TRIGGERED NEED FOR ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION)

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RODRIGUEZ HEARING NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER SINGLE PHOTO IDENTIFICATION WAS CONFIRMATORY.

The Fourth Department, remitting the case, determined a Rodriguez hearing was necessary to determine whether a witness’s single photo identification of the defendant was confirmatory:

We agree with defendant that, during the suppression hearing, the court erred in precluding defendant from cross-examining the police investigator on the issue whether “Witness #1” was sufficiently familiar with defendant in order to render the single photo identification of defendant by that witness “merely confirmatory” … . Although the court conducted a Wade hearing, which ordinarily eliminates the need for a Rodriguez hearing … , we conclude that the court’s error during the suppression hearing renders a Rodriguez hearing necessary in this case … . We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to Supreme Court for a hearing to determine whether the identification by the subject witness was truly confirmatory in nature … and, if the court determines that the identification was not confirmatory, it must further determine whether the single photo identification procedure employed with the subject witness was unduly suggestive … . People v Hoffman, 2016 NY Slip Op 04508, 4th Dept 6-10-16

CRIMINAL LAW (RODRIGUEZ HEARING NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER SINGLE PHOTO IDENTIFICATION WAS CONFIRMATORY)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, RODRIGUEZ HEARING NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER SINGLE PHOTO IDENTIFICATION WAS CONFIRMATORY)/IDENTIFICATION (CRIMINAL LAW, RODRIGUEZ HEARING NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER SINGLE PHOTO IDENTIFICATION WAS CONFIRMATORY)

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ALTHOUGH EVIDENCE OF PRIOR THREATS AGAINST THE VICTIM MAY BE ADMISSIBLE UNDER MOLINEUX, SUCH EVIDENCE MUST BE IN ADMISSIBLE FORM, HERE THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF PRIOR THREATS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTERS ASSERTED.

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant's conviction in this 30-year-old domestic murder case, determined hearsay evidence of threats allegedly made by the defendant against the victim were improperly admitted for the truth of the matters asserted. While evidence of threats made to the victim may be admissible under Molineux, such evidence must be in admissible form:

Citing Molineux and other like cases, including People v Alvino (71 NY2d 233), the People argue that evidence of defendant's prior threats and physical abuse of the victim were highly relevant for various nonhearsay purposes, such as establishing background information, revealing the state of mind of the victim and defendant, and demonstrating his motive and intent to kill the victim. As defendant correctly points out, however, there is no Molineux exception to the rule against hearsay. It may be true that evidence that defendant beat and threatened to kill the victim is admissible under a Molineux theory, but such evidence must still be in admissible form. For instance, a witness could testify that he or she witnessed defendant assault the victim, or heard defendant threaten the victim. That is not hearsay. It is hearsay, however, for a witness to testify that someone else told him or her that defendant beat or threatened the victim. People v Meadow, 2016 NY Slip Op 04505, 4th Dept 6-10-16

CRIMINAL LAW (ALTHOUGH EVIDENCE OF PRIOR THREATS AGAINST THE VICTIM MAY BE ADMISSIBLE UNDER MOLINEUX, SUCH EVIDENCE MUST BE IN ADMISSIBLE FORM, HERE THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF PRIOR THREATS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTERS ASSERTED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, ALTHOUGH EVIDENCE OF PRIOR THREATS AGAINST THE VICTIM MAY BE ADMISSIBLE UNDER MOLINEUX, SUCH EVIDENCE MUST BE IN ADMISSIBLE FORM, HERE THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF PRIOR THREATS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTERS ASSERTED)/PRIOR CRIMES AND BAD ACTS (ALTHOUGH EVIDENCE OF PRIOR THREATS AGAINST THE VICTIM MAY BE ADMISSIBLE UNDER MOLINEUX, SUCH EVIDENCE MUST BE IN ADMISSIBLE FORM, HERE THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF PRIOR THREATS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTERS ASSERTED)/MOLINEUX EVIDENCE (ALTHOUGH EVIDENCE OF PRIOR THREATS AGAINST THE VICTIM MAY BE ADMISSIBLE UNDER MOLINEUX, SUCH EVIDENCE MUST BE IN ADMISSIBLE FORM, HERE THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF PRIOR THREATS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTERS ASSERTED)

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