The First Department, over a dissent, determined a stipulation of forfeiture of a sum of money entered by the defendant was part of the judgment of conviction, and was therefore reviewable on appeal. The dissent argued that appeal should have been dismissed because the forfeiture was not part of the judgment of conviction and was therefore not reviewable.  The forfeiture was ultimately affirmed on the merits:

At the outset, we reject the People’s contention, adopted by the dissent, that this appeal is not properly before us because the forfeiture was not part of the judgment of conviction. Pursuant to Penal Law § 60.30, a court has the authority to order a forfeiture of property, and any order exercising that authority “may be included as part of the judgment of conviction.” In People v Detres-Perez (127 AD3d 535 [1st Dept 2015]), relying on Penal Law § 60.30, this Court recently found that a forfeiture agreement was part of the judgment of conviction and thus reviewable on the appeal from the judgment. Likewise here, the court’s so-ordering of the stipulation at the time of sentencing rendered it part of the judgment of conviction and reviewable on this appeal as of right (see CPL 450.10). Contrary to the dissent’s position, we do not conclude that Penal Law § 60.30 authorizes the inclusion of forfeiture as part of a defendant’s sentence. Rather, that provision allows a court to order forfeiture as a separate component of the judgment of conviction… . … Finally, the omission of the forfeiture order from the sentence and commitment sheet does not render the order unreviewable since a forfeiture, although not a component of a criminal sentence, can nevertheless be part of the judgment of conviction … . People v Burgos, 2015 NY Slip Op 05600, 1st Dept 6-30-15