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NO APPEAL LIES FROM AN ORDER ISSUED ON DEFAULT, A MOTION TO VACATE IS THE ONLY REMEDY; NO APPEAL LIES FROM AN ORDER ISSUED ON CONSENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, dismissing the appeal in this custody case, determined (1) no appeal lies from an order issued on mother’s default, and (2) no  appeal lies from an order entered with mother’s consent:

Because the fact-finding order was issued on the mother’s default, it is not appealable as of right and her remedy was to move to vacate (CPLR 5511 …). Although the mother appeared on the final date of the inquest after petitioner’s witnesses had testified, she was not present during the majority of the fact-finding hearing, and her counsel was not authorized to proceed in her absence … . The mother also did not offer any evidence or seek to testify.

Furthermore, no appeal lies from the dispositional order, as it was entered on the mother’s consent and she is therefore not an aggrieved party under CPLR 5511 … .  Matter of P. A. (Joseph M.), 2023 NY Slip Op 03432, First Dept 6-27-23

Practice Point: No appeal lies from an order issued on default. The only available remedy is a motion to vacate the default.

Practice Point: No appeal lies from an order issued on consent because the consenting party is not “aggrieved.”

 

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IN THIS DIVORCE PROCEEDING (1) THE HUSBAND’S REQUEST FOR CLOSURE OF THE COURTROOM SHOULD HAVE BEEN PUBLIC, NOT CONCEALED FROM THE PUBLIC IN EMAILS, AND (2), THE COURTROOM CLOSURE WAS IMPROPERLY BASED ON AN EXCEPTION TO THE PUBLIC-TRIAL REQUIREMENT WHICH IS NOT INCLUDED IN JUDICIARY LAW SECTION 4 (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have ordered closure of the courtroom pursuant to Judiciary Law section 4 in this divorce proceeding. The criteria for closure of a courtroom are discussed in some detail. Here the judge ordered some documents to be submitted under seal and then based the closure on the existence of sealed documents as evidence. That justification for closure is not one of the exceptions in Judiciary Law section 4:

The motion court did not provide the public and the press adequate notice of the husband’s courtroom closure request. Because it directed the parties to file their submissions on the application for courtroom closure by email, the submissions were not reflected on “the publicly maintained docket entries,” as required … .

We also reverse on substantive grounds. “Public access to court proceedings is strongly favored, both as a matter of constitutional law . . . and as statutory imperative …” … . In the order appealed here, the motion court improperly read an exception into the “statutory imperative” of NY Judiciary Law §4 that does not exist. The first part of that statute, entitled “Sittings of courts to be public,” states: “The sittings of every court within this state shall be public, and every citizen may freely attend the same . . .” The only exceptions to this rule are set forth in the statute’s next sentence: “except that in all proceedings and trials in cases for divorce, seduction, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, criminal sexual act, bastardy or filiation, the court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not directly interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of the court” … .

Here, the motion court used its discretion to insert another, unwritten category of cases into the statutory exception: proceedings that could entail arguments that implicate documents filed under seal. We find its decision to do so to have been improper … . Paulson v Paulson, 2023 NY Slip Op 03310, First Dept 6-20-23

Practice Point: A request for courtroom closure must be accessible by the public, not concealed in email exchanges.

Practice Point: Courtroom closure based on a reason not included in the public-trial exceptions in Judiciary Law section 4 is an abuse of discretion.

 

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THE LETTER OF INTENT WAS AN AGREEMENT TO AGREE WHICH CONTEMPLATED ONLY OUT-OF-POCKET DAMAGES FOR A BREACH; THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIED ON CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS TO, SUA SPONTE, AWARD SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFFS (FIRST DEPT).

​The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the letter of intent (LOI) was an agreement to agree which, if breached, supported only out-of-pocket damages, not cover damages. The judge improperly relied on credibility determinations to, sua sponte, award summary judgment to plaintiffs:

… [R]ecovery for breach of a preliminary agreement’s confidentiality provision could not be based on “the theory that it would have acquired” the company at issue, as the “defendant[] w[as] not bound to go forward with the transaction” … . * * *

… [T]he text of the LOI and the surrounding circumstances support a finding that the parties did not contemplate cover damages at the time of contracting. That the parties entered only a preliminary agreement with no obligation to close a transaction and no specific damage provision for breach conclusively shows that defendant did not wish to assume the risk of covering whatever replacement transaction plaintiffs might pursue … .

… [T]he court improperly relied on credibility determinations to resolve material issues that should have been resolved by the jury. It is “not the function of a court deciding a summary judgment motion to make credibility determinations” … . Cresco Labs N.Y., LLC v Fiorello Pharms., Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 03305, First Dept 6-20-23

Practice Point: Here the letter of intent was an agreement to agree which contemplated only out-of-pocket damages for a breach.

Practice Point: The judge should not have relied on credibility determinations to, sua sponte, award summary judgment to plaintiffs.

 

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THE FRAUDULENT-CONVEYANCE CAUSES OF ACTION INVOLVED CONNECTICUT PROPERTIES AND WERE TIME-BARRED IN CONNECTICUT; NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE RENDERED THE ACTIONS TIME-BARRED IN NEW YORK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the fraudulent-conveyances causes of action should have been dismissed as time-barred under New York’s borrowing statute. The properties which were conveyed are in Connecticut and the action is time-barred under Connecticut law:

Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred pursuant to CPLR 202, New York’s borrowing statute. Under CPLR 202, where a nonresident plaintiff asserts causes of action in a New York court, “the claim must be timely under both New York and the jurisdiction where the action accrued” … . “Consequently, . . . it is the shorter of the two states’ statutes of limitations that controls the timeliness of the action” … . For purposes of CPLR 202, “a cause of action accrues at the time and in the place of the injury” and “[w]hen an alleged injury is purely economic, the place of injury is usually where the plaintiff resides and sustains the economic impact of the loss” … .

Here, plaintiff is a resident of Connecticut and alleges only economic injury. Moreover, it does not dispute that, under Connecticut law, where the claims accrued for purposes of the borrowing statute, the statute of limitations for the asserted causes of action has expired (see Conn Gen Stat § 52-552j …). National Auditing Servs. & Consulting, LLC v Assa, 2023 NY Slip Op 03198, First Dept 6-13-23

Practice Point: Causes of action which accrued in another state must be timely under both that state’s and New York’s statutes of limitations.

 

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THE PROOF THAT THE SUBWAY TRACKS WERE USED AS A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT; DEFENDANT’S ASSAULT SECOND CONVICTION VACATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating the assault second as a hate crime conviction, determined the proof did not support the theory that the subway tracks were used as a dangerous instrument:

The theory supporting this count was not that defendant intended to use the electrified third rail or a moving train as a dangerous instrument, or acted recklessly, but instead that defendant intended that the victim be injured by striking the tracks, alleged to be a “hard object.” The evidence failed to establish defendant’s intent to use the tracks in that manner. The People’s evidence, including the victim’s testimony and a blurry video, was consistent with the victim merely tripping and falling onto the tracks during an altercation with defendant … . Moreover, even if defendant merely caused the victim to fall on the tracks, that would not establish the specific intent required for this conviction. For similar reasons, we find that the verdict on this count was against the weight of the evidence. People v Ames, 2023 NY Slip Op 03205, First Dept 6-13-23

Practice Point: The proof that the victim tripped and fell onto subway tracks during an altercation did not demonstrate defendant’s intent to use the subway tracks as a dangerous instrument. The assault second conviction was vacated.

 

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THE LOCAL LAW WHICH DISQUALIFIES CANDIDATES WHO HAVE CERTAIN FELONY CONVICTIONS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED TO APPLY ONLY TO CONVICTIONS AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE LOCAL LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Local Law which disqualified candidates who have certain felony convictions from running for city council and other officers should not have been interpreted to apply only to convictions after the enactment of the Local Law. Given the importance of the law, the proceeding should not have been converted to a summary judgment motion and decided on an expedited schedule because of the impending primary election:

Under the circumstances presented, where plaintiffs, without good reason, waited until shortly before the upcoming June 27, 2023 Democratic primary election to bring this action seeking a determination as to the constitutional and procedural validity of Local Law 15, enacted in February 2021, and to bring this motion seeking injunctive relief barring its enforcement, on an expedited basis that would not permit meaningful review of the important issues and that necessarily would result in electoral disruption, the court should not have converted, with limited notice to the City, the motion to one for summary judgment and resolved the merits of plaintiffs’ claims on an expedited schedule. * * *

We also find that the court, in prematurely resolving the merits of plaintiffs’ challenges, erred to the extent it construed, against the statutory reading proffered by both parties in the motion court, Local Law 15 as not disqualifying candidates based on the specified felony convictions where the convictions predated the law’s enactment in February 2021. A reading of the statutory language that the law applies to any person who “has been convicted” makes clear, on its face, that the law applies to both pre- and post-enactment convictions and, as the City shows, the legislative comments entirely support that reading, as do the subsequent practices of the Board of Elections. Martinez v City of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 03073, First Dept 6-8-23

Practice Point: The matter should not have been converted to a summary judgment motion and determined on an expedited schedule because of the impending election. The Local Law which disqualifies candidates with certain felony convictions from running for local offices should not have been interpreted to apply only to convictions after the enactment of the local law.

 

​DEFENDANT DAWSON FELL ON PLAINTIFF DURING A DANCE HOSTED BY DEFENDANT NON-PROFIT, LENOX HILL; PLAINTIFF SUED LENOX HILL ALLEGING NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF THE DANCE; LENOX HILL DID NOT OWE A DUTY OF CARE TO PLAINTIFF AND DID NOT PROXIMATELY CAUSE PLAINTIFF’S INJURY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was unable to show defendant non-profit (Lenox Hill), which hosted a dance for its members, owed her a duty of care to her or proximately caused her injury. Both plaintiff and defendant, Dawson, were members of defendant Lenox Hill. Lenox Hill hosted a dance. During the dance Dawson fell on plaintiff, breaking her ankle. Plaintiff sued Lenox Hill alleging negligent supervision:

In general, a party does not have “a duty to control the conduct of third persons to prevent them from causing injury to others … . A duty can only be found where there exists a special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff requiring the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the third party, or a special relationship “between defendant and [the] third [party] person whose actions expose[d] plaintiff to harm,” which “would require the defendant to attempt to control the third person’s conduct” … .

… [P]laintiff failed to plead that she had a special relationship to defendant requiring it to protect her … . * * *

Plaintiff also failed to establish proximate cause. To establish proximate cause, “a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury” … . In the context of the intervention of a third-party between defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s injury, “liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant’s negligence” … .

Here, Lenox Hill established that Dawson’s fall was not foreseeable. The record supports that Lenox Hill was not on notice of any similar incidents. Bindler v Lenox Hill Neighborhood House, Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 02966, First Dept 6-6-23

Practice Point: Generally a party does not have a duty to control the conduct of third persons. Therefore the defendant nonprofit which hosted the dance where plaintiff was injured when another dancer fell on her did not owe plaintiff a duty of care and did not proximately cause her injury.

 

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PLAINTIFF LANDLORD WAS NOT ABLE TO SHOW THE FULLY EXECUTED LEASE WAS EVER DELIVERED TO DEFENDANT TENANT; THEREFORE THE LANDLORD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE TERMS OF THE LEASE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff-landlord was not entitled to summary judgment based on the terms of the second amended lease because the landlord could not show that the defendant-tenant was ever provided with a fully executed lease:

… [A] leasehold estate cannot be conveyed without a legal delivery of the fully executed lease to the lessee … , and plaintiff did not offer sufficient proof to rebut [defendant’s] showing that he never received delivery of the executed second amendment during the lease period. Evidence of defendant’s continued occupancy and payment of rent after expiration of the first amendment to the lease in 2016 is equally consistent with a month-to-month tenancy giving rise to an obligation to pay use and occupancy, and therefore does not, without more, prove delivery of the second amendment. Walber 82 St. Assoc., LP v Fisher, 2023 NY Slip Op 02993, First Dept 6-6-23

Practice Point: A leasehold estate cannot be conveyed without legal delivery of the fully executed lease to the lessee.

 

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THE PEOPLE DID NOT DISPROVE THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE; THE FACT THAT THE VICTIM WAS SHOT IN THE BACK DURING A SHOOTOUT WAS NOT ENOUGH (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, exercising its interest of justice jurisdiction, reversing defendant’s manslaughter conviction, determined the People did not disprove defendant’s justification defense. The fact that, during a shoot-out, the victim was shot in the back was not enough:

“When a defense of justification is raised, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] defendant’s conduct was not justified. In other words, the People must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not believe deadly force was necessary or that a reasonable person in the same situation would not have perceived that deadly force was necessary” … . In this case, the evidence regarding which man initiated the gunfire was equivocal at best. Valentin, the lone eyewitness, testified that she did not know who fired first. Footage from numerous surveillance cameras, each of which captured only part of the scene, did not answer that question, nor did the ballistic evidence. There was no evidence that defendant approached displaying a firearm. Rather, the evidence strongly suggests that [the victim]  was the first person to do so.

In this case, we do not believe that the mere fact that the victim was shot in the back establishes that defendant was the initial aggressor, or that he did not reasonably believe that deadly physical force was still being used against him at the time he fired the fatal shot. Under the totality of the evidence, the fact that [the victim]  had his back turned to defendant at the moment when he was shot does not establish that he was withdrawing from the gunfight or running away. People v Skeeter, 2023 NY Slip Op 02946, First Dept 6-1-23

Practice Point: When the justification defense is raised, the People must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Here the fact that the victim was shot in the back during a shoot-out was not enough to disprove the defense.

 

THE MOTION TO INTERVENE DID NOT HAVE THE PROPOSED PLEADING ATTACHED; THE MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to intervene should have been denied because the proposed pleading was not attached to the motion:

A motion seeking leave to intervene, whether made pursuant to CPLR 1012 or 1013, must include the proposed intervenor’s proposed pleading (see CPLR 1014 …). Here, Plotch did not submit a proposed pleading with her motion for leave to intervene, nor did she submit an affidavit which in some cases may excuse the failure to attach a proposed pleading … . Plotch’s reliance on Oversea Chinese Mission v Well-Come Holdings, Inc. (145 AD3d 634 [1st Dept 2016]) for the proposition that no proposed pleading is required is misplaced. That case made no reference to CPLR 1014, which specifically provides that “[a] motion to intervene shall be accompanied by a proposed pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought” … . U.S. Bank Trust N.A. v 21647 LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 02955, First Dept 6-1-23

Practice Point: Here the motion to intervene should have been denied because the proposed pleading was not attached.

 

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